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ABSTRACT  
The central argument of this thesis is that the 
contradictions between modernisation and restoring a national 
identity, drawn from the Arab-Islamic culture, have generated 
tensions in the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia). The 
thesis concentrates on the particular problems posed 4y language 
and language policies in these contemporary circumstances. 
Chapter One provides an overview of the major 
concerns of the thesis, with a special stress on cultural 
and language questions. 
The main argument of Chapter Two is that Western 
theories of development are based on the assumption of the 
universality of the Western model, and undervalue the social 
and cultural elements of developing nations, including the 
Maghreb. 
Chapter Three extends the analysis to the role of 
language and nationalism in the process of nation building 
and analyses, with special reference to Algeria, the 
contradictions between development policies drawn from the 
West, and language policies stressing an Arab-Islamic 
identity. This chapter deals particularly with the problems 
of having Arabic as the national language and French as the 
operational language. 
- i - 
Chapter Four examines comparatively the 
interrelationship between language policies and the social 
and educational contexts of the Maghreb. The arguments of 
the chapter are: that language policies have been influenced 
more by ideological than practical considerations; that 
contradictions at the political level are reflected in the 
social and educational contexts; that these contradictions 
are affecting the educational system adversely. 
Chapter Five draws the themes of the thesis 
together, and reassesses contemporary difficulties over 
language policies in the context of modernisation problems. 
The chapter makes proposals for new language policies in a 
complex linguistic, cultural and economic, situation, with 
some concluding comments on the specific case of Algeria. 
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Chapter I 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 
This general introduction sets out the main 
purpose and argument of the thesis. It sketches some 
relevant features of the Maghrebian socio-cultural and 
economic context in terms of language policies. The 
introduction also outlines the overall organisation of the 
thesis. 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse 
comparatively language policies in Morocco, Tunisia and 
Algeria; and to underline the contradictions generated by 
these policies in a process of nation building which has 
emphasized economic modernisation. These contradictions are 
located against the existing social, educational and 
economic background of the Maghreb(1). In the light of this 
analysis, alternative approches to language policies in the 
Maghreb, with special reference to Algeria, will be 
proposed. 
The general argument of this thesis is pursued 
through the testing of two propositions. 
The first proposition is that most theoretical 
work - and many policy makers in the developing world - have 
understood modernisation within a model which stresses 
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industrialisation and economic growth. This emphasis on 
economic development has undervalued the socio-cultural 
context and the specific problems of developing nations. 
The second proposition is that the adoption of a 
Western model of development(2) has had disruptive effects 
on the societies of the emerging nations, affecting their 
cultural identity and reinforcing their dependence on the 
West. The dilemma faced by these countries is exemplified in 
the three countries of the Maghreb, where a more delicate 
balance between their search for national identies and 
economic modernisation is still sought. 
Specifically, in the case of the countries of the 
Maghreb, it is argued that there is a strong contradiction 
in practice between the emphasis on national identity drawn 
from Arab-Islamic culture and the process of modernisation 
which has been based on the experiences of the West. It is 
argued that the Western model of development, in its 
conception and practice, ought to be applied with care in 
countries such as those of the Maghreb with their specific 
political, social, economic, and educational contexts. It is 
argued that the problems and constraints generated by the 
adoption of the policies of development in the Maghreb 
indicate the inadequacy of prevailing theories of 
development. It is suggested that this inadequacy is mainly 
due to the lack of altertness in such theories to the 
specific contexts and needs of these countries. 
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However, the argument put forward in this thesis 
does not imply that the Western model of development should 
be rejected. The Western model remains at the present time a 
major source for reference in terms of modernisation. 
Western literature and experiences, knowledge and 
achievements, are of some relevance to developing nations 
such as those of the Maghreb, in their current stage of 
development. 
However, the assumptions in the Western literature 
need careful examination in the light of contemporary 
problems of development. Secondly, the unsophisticated 
application of Western theories to problems of development 
(especially in the Maghreb) needs very careful review and 
critique. This thesis examines the first proposition in 
Chapter Two. The remainder of the thesis concentrates on 
the second proposition by a review of development in the 
Maghreb, with a special emphasis on the cultural dimension 
of Maghrebian development and the particular problem of 
language policy. 
The language policy in the three countries is 
centered on the concept of "Arabisation". The term 
Arabisation means, linguistically, the adoption, 
translation, and/or conversion of foreign words into the 
Arabic language. This is part of the process of development 
and modernisation of the language(3). However in the 
Maghrebian context, Arabisation refers basically to the 
reestablishment of the national culture through the Arabic 
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language. That is, the replacement of the French language, 
especially in education, by the national language: 
Classical Arabic. In this context, the language policies are 
determined essentially by political considerations rather 
than a desire to modernise the Arabic language and adapt it 
to the requirements of modernisation. The political position 
(and the nature and characteristics) of the Arabic language 
on the one hand, and the economic policies, based on the 
Western model on the other hand, have led to the failure of 
the Arabisation issue in the Maghreb, especially in Algeria. 
In this sense cultural identity, in the three countries, and 
especially in Algeria, is primarily a political national 
identity which is emphasised by the government(4). In this 
case Arabo-Islamic culture in general and the Arabic 
language in particular are used to ensure domestic and 
international political legitimacy. In this process language 
holds a salient position because of its importance in 
national cultural identification: 
Language which reflects cultural and 
ethnic affiliation and includes values 
and modes of perception which are 
encapsulated within it, is the most 
frequently found part of cultural 
identity and its maintenance is a 
political act of supreme importance. 
(5) 
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Behind this issue of language, which is at the 
core of the thesis, is a subordinate question about the 
nature of the necessary adaptations and transformations of 
the Western model before its adoption, according to the 
contexts, potentialities and aspiration of each country. 
To approach this question the particular 
experiences of China and Japan are reviewed before attention 
turns to to the Maghreb. China and Japan, in their different 
practices, suggest insights into the applicability of 
Western theories in contexts of development. China's stress 
on "delinking"(6) from the capitalist world economy may be 
contrasted with Japan's apparently proven ability to succeed 
in economic terms while retaining a strong socio-cultural 
identity. 
It is this latter achievement which defines much 
of the immediate problem facing the nations of the Maghreb. 
How may they combine economic development with the 
development and reassertion of clear cultural identity? 
However this question glosses over an important theme 
which needs clarification to determine the parameters of the 
comparative work: is there a Maghrebian problem - or are 
there sharp differences between the three nations? 
The contemporary socio-cultural and economic contexts 
of the three selected countries of the Maghreb share some 
similarities in the midst of differences. They share common 
socio-cultural assumptions, social structures and historical 
experiences. The nations of the Maghreb were subjected to 
almost the same waves of colonisation and foreign domination 
of which French colonisation and its strong impact has been 
their latest common experience. They also share the 
commitment to establish an Arab-Islamic identity as well as 
undertaking modernisation inspired by Western thought and 
practice. At the present time, they face many of the same 
problems and constraints of nation-building, as well as 
similar contradictions and hesitations between their past 
and their future. The Arabic language is considered, in the 
three nation-states, as a central feature in the creation of 
national identity. But the French language, for historical 
as well as practical reasons, holds a salient place and 
plays an important role in these societies. 
However, each of these emerging Maghrebian nations 
also has its specific socio-historical and economic context, 
and aims. The political system, the economic potentialities, 
and the educational policies vary from one country to the 
other. As a consequence, the language policies vary from a 
radical option for a rapid and complete Arabisation (as is 
the case in Algeria), to a moderate bilingualism (as is the 
case in the two other countries, especially Tunisia). These 
different approaches vary also according to the role of 
language in the areas of cultural ire-)creation and 
modernisation, and the primacy of each. 
There are differences in the social-cultural 
context of the three countries, as well as similarities. In 
Morocco and Algeria an important proportion of the poulation 
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has preserved the use of the original vernacular - 
Berber(7). Identification with the Berber language varies 
from one country to the other and from one group to the 
other. In Tunisia the proportion of the Berber population is 
almost non-existent(8), which diminishes the complexity of 
the linguistic problem in this country. In Morocco and 
Algeria identification with the Berber language (though in 
different spoken varieties) differs from one group to the 
other and from one country to the other. The major argument 
of these different groups in the two countries is that the 
Berber language constitutes an integral part of the 
authentic national cultural identity, and that Berber should 
be accounted for in language policies. 
In addition to the complex linguistic situation in 
the Maghreb, generated by the coexistence of the Arabic 
language (with its diaglossic problem)(9) and the Berber 
language (with its varieties), there is the problem of the 
French language which is deeply rooted in these societies as 
a result of French colonisation. 
The type and length of French colonisation and its 
impact differs from one country to the other. In Morocco, it 
was shorter (less than half a century) than in the others. 
Morocco, a protectorate like Tunisia, was not subjected to 
the same French cultural and especially linguistic influence 
as Algeria. Rather it is the case that French influence, 
because of the adopted policies of development, has been 
increasing since independence in both Morocco and Tunisia. 
-7- 
However in these two countries there emerges, as in 
Algeria, contradictions between the stated emphasis on the 
Arabic language as the symbol and means of national identity 
and unity, and the frequent predominence in daily national 
activities of the French language. 
In Algeria there is no official policy in favour of 
bilingualism. The Arabic language, as the national official 
language, is more strongly stressed. Hence the Algerian 
approach could be considered as more radical than that of 
the two other countries. Nevertheless, French is more deeply 
rooted. The economic and social structures inherited from 
the long colonial period, as well as the adopted policies of 
development, have maintained the use of French, if not 
increased it. In other words, there is a problem. 
In Tunisia there is a relatively overt adoption of 
bilingualism as a language policy. This is partly due to the 
shorter length of colonisation (seventy five years) as 
compared with Algeria. Tunisia, like Morocco, was a 
protectorate. Because of this indirect French colonisation, 
the impact of French culture and language was less important 
than in Algeria. In fact, in Tunisia, as well as in Morocco, 
the link with the Arabo-Islamic culture has never been 
interrupted: the use of Arabic was relatively well 
maintained in Tunisian society and in education. However the 
increasing use of French after independence has led to a de 
facto situation of bilingualism which coexists with the 
official position claiming Arabic as the national language. 
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Algeria, however, was integrated as a French 
national territory for over a century and thus was subjected 
to a strong assimilationist policy, and its social and 
cultural structures have thereby been deeply affected. In 
this context, Morocco and Tunisia underwent a process of 
"acculturation". In Algeria it was a process of 
"deculturation"(10) which took place. Hence the more radical 
approach to language policy in the Algerian context is a 
reaction to a stronger colonial policy. The heavy emphasis 
on the Arabic language as the national language is used as a 
major means to assert its cultural identity. At the same 
time, it is hoped that the national language will constitute 
a cultural barrier against further foreign penetration. 
Thus, the Algerian case suggests the idea that 
the stronger the Western impact, the more powerful is the 
need to strengthen socio-cultural charecteristics. 
The different language policies in the three 
countries reflect their political systems and orientations. 
In Morocco, the Monarchy emerged at Independence as the most 
powerful political institution. Its legitimacy is drawn 
essentially from its identification with the Islamic 
religion(11). However its continuity is justified through 
its commitment to modernisation. In this country, a liberal 
form of political organisation has been adopted with a 
multi-party system and a constitutional assembly. However, 
decision making and authority are highly centralised. In 
Tunisia, the political leadership draws its legitimacy from 
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its role in the nationalist movement and its commitment to 
modernisation. Tunisia claims a left-wing oriented policy 
with a single party system. However, there is a trend, in 
this country, towards a capitalist type of economic system. 
In Algeria, as in Tunisia, the political leadership draws 
its legitimacy from the role it played in the nationalist 
movement, and the commitment to modernisation. Culture and 
language are used, because of the particular colonial 
experience, in the Algerian context, as a strong means for 
power and legitimacy. In this country a relatively clear 
left-wing oriented policy is adopted with a single party 
structure. 
Modernisation is emphasized in all three countries 
as a major objective in nation-building and is therefore 
constantly used as a means of legitimacy for the political 
leadership in the three countries. In the same way the 
reestablishment and reinforcement of national culture and 
language is stressed in these countries, though with greater 
assertion in Algeria. 
In the search for political power, ideological 
positions are important. Thus many issues of social and 
educational policies are treated as significant symbols: 
policies are ideologised. In this context, language is 
treated, in very similar ways in the three countries, as a 
primarily political issue, and as with so many political 
issues, a gap emerges between rhetoric and practice. 
The perspective of this thesis is that a more 
careful assessment of language policies would now be useful; 
and will become the more useful as ideologically informed 
decision-making diminishes. At the moment the contradictions 
and gaps between stated aims in terms of language policies 
and practice strongly reflect the political and economic 
situation in the three nation-states. 
In economic terms, the three countries of the 
Maghreb possess different potentialities, especially in 
natural resources. This affects their language and 
educational policies. For example, Morocco and Tunisia, with 
relatively more limited resources than Algeria, need to rely 
more on external aid for their development. Algeria, 
relatively richer in terms of human and natural resources 
than the two other countries, appears to be more 
self-reliant and relatively less dependent. Hence the claim 
for a "delinking" policy with the West in general and France 
in particular. However, the strong emphasis on economic 
development and modernisation, through industrialisation as 
a major national aim, has required, in Algeria, relations 
and dependence on Western thought and practice. This 
situation, in the light of the present economic recession 
and especially with the drop in oil prices and limited oil 
reserves, is likely to continue. Consequently, the 
international framing and process of modernisation in the 
three countries of the Maghreb is likely to continue to 
structure their language policies. 
This theme of language-related problems of the 
three countries of the Maghreb in the process of 
nation-building is analysed in this thesis around the 
following themes: 
(a) a critical review of some of the theories of 
modernisation and an examination of the experiences of China 
and Japan in relation to these theories, which is the work 
of Chapter Two; 
(b) an assessement of the tensions in the social 
and economic contexts of the Maghreb, which is the central 
concern of Chapter three; 
(c) an assessment of the tensions in the linguistic 
and educational contexts of these three selected countries 
is the topic of Chapter Four; and 
(d) an investigation of alternative approaches to 
the language problem in the Maghreb is the work of Chapter 
Five. 
Chapter I 
Notes and References. 
1. The "Maghreb" is an Arabic name for the three countries 
of Northern Africa. Literally meaning "setting sun", 
this term was maintained by the French to designate 
Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. These countries formed 
historically one geographic, political, ethnic, and 
cultural entity called "Berberia". In contemporary 
history, Libya and Mauritania are included in "Le grand 
Maghreb". This thesis is concerned with the three 
countries of the Maghreb: Morocco, Tunisia, and 
Algeria. 
2. The term "Western model of development", as used in 
this thesis, refers to: the example of "successful" 
industrialization and modernisation achieved by 
countries such as Britain, Germany, the USA, and 
France in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
The term "Western theories of development" has a 
general reference to the long line of theorising which 
streches back into the nineteenth century (eq. in the 
works of Marx) about development; but it has a 
particular reference to the theorising of Western 
thinkers about development in the period 1960 to 1980. 
For analytic purposes, it may be sometimes useful, in 
the thesis, to make a distinction between nineteenth 
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century and twentieth century theories: but it also 
should be noted - and this is one of the points made 
later in the thesis - that there are some similarities 
of assumption in both nineteenth and mid-twentieth 
century theorising. 
3. See Grandguillaume, G. 	 Arabisation et Politique  
Linquistique au Maghreb. Maisonneuve et Larose, 
Paris 1983, p. 37., see also Souriau, C. 
" l'Arabisation en Algerie.", in l'Afrique du Nord  
Contemporaine, C.N.R.S, Paris, 1975, pp.375-397. 
4. cf. Brock, C., & Tulasiewicz,4pultural Identity and  
Educational Policy., Croom Helm Ltd, London, Sydney, 
1985, p.3. 
5. Ibid., p.8. 
6. For the concept of "delinking" see: Amin, A. 
reel inking: towards a Polvcentric World., Zed Books Ltd. 
1385, pp.51-52. 
7. "Berber" is a name given to the inhabitants of 
the Maghreb by the Romans when they occupied the 
area. It is also the name of the vernacular spoken 
by the population before the Islamisation and 
Arabisation of the Maghreb. Today this language is 
still preserved by important proportions cf the 
population, especially in Morocco and Algeria. 
8. The proportion of Berber speaking population is 
estimated at over 40% in Morocco, over 80% in Algeria, 
and about 1% or less in Tunisia. Estimates quoted by 
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Grandguillaume, G., in Arabisation et..., op.cit. p.14. 
However in the absence of official and reliable census 
returns in the three countries, about the 
Berber-speaking population, any figures can only be 
approximate. 
9. "Diaglossia" is a socio-linguistic term proposed first 
by C.A. Ferguson, to refer to languages, such as the 
Arabic language, where two varieties of the same 
language coexist: one classical and one colloquial. 
There is thus a situation of diaglossia when there is 
a sharp cleavage, in syntax and vocabulary, between 
the written and spoken forms of a language. 
See: Ferguson, C.A. "Diaglossia" In Word, Vol. 15, 
1959, pp. 325- 340. 
10. Because of the nature of colonisation in Morocco and 
Tunisia, French cultural influence was as a relatively 
'normal process' resulting from a contact with a 
different culture which led to the incorporation of 
some of its elements. It was therefore a process of 
"acculturation". Algeria it was a case of "cultural 
imperialism" in so far as the French culture and 
language were systematically imposed on Algerian 
society as an integral part of colonial policy. 
The existing national culture was repressed and the 
social structures shattered, and an attempt was made 
to replace them by French culture through an 
assimilationist policy. In this sense a process of 
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"deculturation" took place in Algeria. 
See: Haouam, S: Education and Cultural Imperialism:  
the Case of Algeria. M.A. thesis in Education, 
Institute of Education University of London. 
1979. 
11. The Moroccan Monarchy claims its descent from the 
Prophet's genealogical tree, hence, as a theocratic 
monarchy it draws its legitimacy principally from 
Islam. 
See R. Leveau: "Islam et controle politigue au Maroc" 
in the Maghreb Review, January-April 1981, Vol.6, 
No 1 and 2, pp. 10-18. 
CHAPTER II 
Development and Modernisation. 
This Chapter has two purposes. 
The first purpose is to analyse selected major 
theoretical approaches to development and modernisation(1). 
This task is not carried out extensively, as the literature 
is now extremely large. The attempt here is to look at the 
similarities and differences among the theories of 
modernisation and their implications in terms of choice of 
development strategies. The second purpose is to investigate 
the processes of development of China and Japan. These two 
particular experiences of development, through their 
different approaches and emphases, give a clearer insight 
into the interrelations between the development problem and 
cultural specifcities. 
Thus Chapter Two is divided into two parts: 
firstly it assesses the assumptions of Western theorising 
about development, and secondly it examines the experiences 
of China and Japan. 
The main argument in the first section is a double 
one: (a) that most Western theories of development and 
modernisation are based on the assumption of the 
universality of the Western model; (b) that these theories 
emphasized industrialisation and economic growth and have 
overlooked, or undevalued, the specific socio-cultural, 
-17- 
political and economic contexts of the developing nations. 
Thus the adoption of the Western model of development in 
these nations has generated obstacles rather than led to 
modernisation. The implementation of the Western model of 
developemnt, in its thought and practice, has in fact only 
reinforcd the socio-economic and even political dependence 
of these developing countries on the Western world and has 
contributed to local socio-political contradictions and 
problems. 
As indicated, section two of this Chapter is 
devoted to two illustrative cases: China and Japan. The 
experience of development in China is used in this thesis to 
illustrate the 'delinking' approach suggested by the 
Marxist, neo-marxist and Dependency theories based on the 
notion of self-reliance. The problems and constraints 
generated by such an approach are assessed. The Japanese 
experience is used to illustrate the 'convergence' approach 
suggested by most Western social scientists in this context. 
The argument in this section is that China managed 
to achieve a certain degree of development, relying mostly 
on its own potentialities, and has therefore constituted a 
challenge to the Western based and Western dependent model. 
However, the apparent viability of the Western model of 
development is reflected in the experience of Japan. Drawing 
from Western thought and practice, Japan has achieved a high 
level of development in a short span of time. Japan's 
experience, with its ability to adapt elements of the 
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Western approach and practice to its own needs and 
circumstances, may constitute a model for developing 
nations, such as those of the Maghreb, in terms of national 
and international integration. Lessons might be learnt from 
the policy adopted by Japan to develop its human resource 
and its use of its social and cultural features to reinforce 
its development. 
The two examples stress the overall argument that 
while the Western model cannot be completely adopted in 
other contexts, neither is it useful to reject it 
completely. Internal and external adaptations are necessary 
in any process of development and modernisation. The Chinese 
experience suggests that a complete delinking with the West 
(as the principal source and prototype of today's 
development) was not only unwise but perhaps impossible. To 
catch up with the swiftly moving process of development, it 
is necessary to refer to, and rely on, Western thought and 
practice. 
However, it is the general argument of the thesis 
that the local socio-cultural characteristics in any society 
must be considered in development strategies. Thus, the 
value of the Western model resides in the efficiency with 
which it can be adapted to local characteristics and needs. 
This "internalisation" of the Western model can only be 
achieved if adaptations and adjustments are undertaken at 
local 1.e national level kpoliticaliy, economically, and 
socially/ to avoid, or at least minimise, the disruptive 
erfects of an imported model. 
these adaptations are reflected in the Japanese 
experience of development. In that country, the will to 
adapt Western thought and practice to its own context, 
coupled with an effort to bring about internal 
transformations, has led to its present success in achieving 
a striking level of modernisation. 
Section i: The Assessment of Western  
theories of development. 
it is suggested, in this chapter, that classical 
and contemporary theories of development have been based on 
the general assumption at the universal validity of the 
Western model. This emerges from the continuous emphasis on 
industrialisation and economic growth as the main means, and 
indicators, of development and modernisation. This view had 
led to a dichotomous categorization or the world's nations. 
This dichotomy, shared by most Western theorists of 
development, is based on the assumption that Western 
industrialized nations represent the prototype of "modern" 
societies; and that other nations generally represent the 
"traditional" societies. Therefore, in order to modernise, 
the so-called traditional societies have to follow the same 
path undertaken earlier by Western societies in their 
process of modernisation. Furthermore, the developing 
societies need to adopt western social, cultural, and 
political structures as pre-requisites for their 
development. 
Therefore these theories, with their different 
approaches, were concerned with questioning the socio-
cultural fabric of traditional societies(2), claiming that 
such social fabrics were major obstacles to their 
development and modernization. In so doing, such theories 
reject the possibility that there could be positive, and 
adaptable elements in each nation's socio-cultural setting, 
which would promote development rather than hinder its 
progress(3). 
Western industrialised nations have undoubtedly 
achieved a remarkable level of development. The theories of 
development and modernization stemming from these nations' 
experiences can contribute to the development of emerging 
nations such as those of the Maghreb. However, it is 
suggested in this thesis, that this would be better achieved 
if such theorising were adapted to the specific 
socio-cultural and political contexts of each society. The 
developing nations, in their desire to catch up as quickly 
as possible with the industrialized nations, perhaps cannot 
go through the same linear process and stages of development 
as the industrialized nations. Hence, development theories 
ought to make provision for the time factor, as the present 
circumstances and potentialities of the developing nations 
are different from those of the industrialized nations. 
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It is suggested that this criticism - of the lack 
of attention to local contexts - applies even to those 
theories of development which are themselves critical of 
other approaches to development. That is to say, it is 
suggested that even Marxist views of development, although a 
critique of the prevailing world order of capitalist 
nations, have not acknowledged local socio-cultural 
circumstances. 
However, what the Marxist, and especially later on 
the Neo-Marxist approaches have acknowledged, and attempted 
to explain, is that underdevelopment is a consequence of the 
earlier development of the industrialized nations. 
"Underdevelopment" is seen as the consequence of the 
international order that the capitalist nations have 
established. Marxists do not see underdevelopment as the 
result of the 'inherent' characteristics of under-developed 
societies, but as the result of prevailing international 
relationships characterized by neo-colonialism and 
imperialism(4). In this limited sense it may be argued that 
Marxist theories break with one version of linearity, i.e 
they suggest that the arena in which development is now 
taking place has altered from the relative 'tabula rasa' of 
the nineteenth century. 
The important contemporary version of neo-Marxist 
theory is dependency theory which emerged during the 1960s, 
principally in Latin America as an alternative approach to 
the existing Western theories of development(5). Dependency 
-22- 
theories underline the increasing dependence of emerging 
nations, and their subordination to Western-dominated 
nations' international relations. This dependence has 
resulted in widening the dap between the developed and the 
underdeveloped nations. 
Nevertheless, it is also suggested here that 
dependency theories, although concerned with industrializing 
rather than industrialized nations, propose a universal 
approach to development for the different developing 
nations. 
Both the Marxist approach(6) and Rostow's stages 
of development(7), although different, share an 'historical' 
view of development, based on an evolutionary, linear 
perspective of the patterns of change. Both emphasize the 
economic basis of the process of modernisation. That is, 
they view development as a linear process dependent 
principally on economic growth. Newer evolutionary approach 
emerged in the post war period, mainly between the 1960s and 
the 1970s, and principally in the United States. American 
sociology, in fact became the model in terms of social 
theorising about societies and their development(S). Thus 
most theories about development and modernisation , 
throughout the Western world, were therefore highly 
influenced by American theoretical assumptions at one pole 
and at the other pole by Marxism. 
The theoretical assumption made by 
American-influenced Western social scientists were exported 
to developing nations. Thus,in the Maghreb, for instance, 
the influence of the French model of development, the 
influence of the French model, has affected policy choice 
along with American theories of development(9). 
These neo-evolutionary theories - with such works 
as those of T. Parsons(10), F. Hoestelitz(11), E. Hagen(12), 
and S.N Eisenstadt(13) - classify societies into traditional 
and modern. Newer Marxist approaches present an alternative 
view of development and modernisation(14). However, even the 
neo-Marxist approaches, though created from a third world 
perspective, do not bring obvious practical solutions to the 
problems faced by countries such as those of the Maghreb. 
A large amount of literature has been devoted, in 
the West, to explaining and analysing the processes of 
development and modernisation. During the particular period 
of the 1960s and early 1970s, Western social scientists, in 
their analysis of the development and modernisation 
processes, have formulated theories based on two major 
assumptions: 
- Western countries present the prototype of 
modernisation. 
- Industrialization and economic growth are the key 
factors to modernisation. 
It is suggested here that these assumptions about 
the process of development stem from a long-established 
Western intellectual tradition concerned with the notion of 
progress. This notion was stimulated by the important 
development of science and technology in Western Europe from 
the late eighteenth century, and which nurtured a belief in 
the 'historical' superiority of Western societies, the 
validity of its model and its historical development. Hence, 
the theories of development which emerged during the 
nineteenth century and after, explained the process of 
development in terms of evolution from one pole to another, 
a historical process based on general laws and causal 
effects(15). 
To trace this 'continuum' through which societies 
pass, from tradition (backwardness) to development 
(progress), theorists of development established categories 
of societies and their characteristics. Two categories were, 
in fact, established: at one end there are the simple 
(primitive) and at the other the developed (complex). Most 
of these theories concentrated on the 'differences' between 
'simple' and 'complex' societies(16). 
It is suggested that in spite of a notable 
improvement in terms of analytical detail, these theories 
have remained faithful to the evolutionist tradition. The 
theories continued to maintain the assumption of the 
universal value of the Western model to achieve 
modernisation. This 'evolutionary' conception of develc'pent 
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based on 'linear' unidirectional pattern was, for example, 
also expressed in Marx's approach to development(17) as well 
as Rostow's stages of economic growth(18). 
A. The Evolutionary approaches 
The evolutionary perspectives of development are based 
on the notion that history presents certain regularities and 
a specific succession of features and events. The evolution 
of society is therefore perceived according to specific 
processes and patterns of economic and social changes. The 
evolutionary interpretations of Marx and Rostow have in 
common the notion of the process of development as a 
succession of stages with specific characteristics(19). 
(a) The Marxist approach 
Marx and Engels in extending Hegel's dialectical 
materialism to the study of society and its history, 
attempted to propose a 'scientific' theory of the general 
laws of social development(20). Marx's conception of social 
change and development was centred on the 'evolving' 
material relationships, (relations of production)(21), i.e. 
ownership of the means of production and the social 
relationship they entail. Hence, class and class conflicts 
are related to the modes of production and ownership(22). 
This constitutes the basis of Marxist analysis of society. 
In 1848, Marx stated that : 
The history of all societies has been, 
until today, only the history of 
struggle... The modern bourgeois society 
has not abolished class conflicts, it has 
only substituted new classes, new 
conditions of oppression, new forms 
of struggle to that of the past. 
(23) 
Marx's fundamental assertion is that social classes are 
determined by their economic roles, more precisely by their 
position in the modes of production(24). This relationship 
can be seen in a capitalist system where a "bourgeois" class 
(the owners of the means of production) is exploiting a 
class of proletariat (the working class)(25). This process 
of exploitation will eventually generate reaction from the 
working class, through a "class consciousness" within the 
proletariat, leading to a situation of class conflict. This 
class conflict is related to the economic struggle of 
classes in a capitalist system, the processes of production 
are based essentially on profit maximisation. This profit is 
mainly in the interest of the economically dominant group 
and consequently conflicts with the interests of the working 
class. This situation of conflict will necessarily lead to 
an organised struggle by this group (a revolution). This 
'revolution' will continue until the dominent relationship 
between capital ownners and salaried workers is abolished. 
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This will result in the collapse of the capitalist system, 
and the establishment of a new social order(26). A new order 
will emerge from the new social relations based on economic 
and social equality in an egalitarian state(27). In relation 
to Hegel's thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, Marx's defined 
development as a dialectical process based on "capital 
accumulation" leading to the wealth of one class and the 
poverty of the other(28). He therfore believed that the 
characterisitics of a social structure could be explained in 
terms of the society's economic system, and the class 
conflict thereby generated. The economic structure 
constitutes the basis of different social relations, ideas 
and institutions. The ideas, the institutions and the 
different organizations are considered as the superstructure 
of the society. This approach of 'structure and 
superstructure' underlines the way in which the mode of 
production determines all aspects of social life. Change of 
the structure entails change in the superstructure, which in 
turn influences the change of the structure, that is, it can 
either delay or accelerate this change. 
Change (or development) is therefore linear, and it 
repeats itself(29). The relationship between the structure 
(economic relations) and the superstructure (socio-political 
values) is summarized by Marx as follows: 
...The economic structure of society-
the real foundation - on which rises the 
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legal and political superstructutre and to 
which correspond definite forms of social 
consciousness,..determines the social, 
political and intellectual processes in 
general. It is not the consciousness of men 
that determines their being, but on 
the contrary, it is their social being 
that determines their consciousness. 
(30) 
Economic determinism is thus the major feature of 
the Marxist approach to development and it therefore limits 
the role of socio-cultural characteristics in changing 
societies. Marxism also conceives change and development as 
linear processes; which implies that all societies are 
firstly similar and that secondly, in the process of their 
development, they necessarily go through the same 
experiences, and eventually achieve the same results. 
However, as much as it exerted influence, Marxism 
has had many opponents and critics(31). Rostow's 'stages of 
economic growth', for instance, were presented as an 
alternative to Marx's stages of feudalism, 
bourgeois-capitalism, and socialism-communism(32). Marx and 
Rgstow show some of similarities in their interpretations of 
development. They both conceive the evolution of societies 
from primarily an economic perspective. That is, economic 
cnancle conditions social, political and cultural changes. 
However Rostow rejects the view that class conflict and 
exploitation are inherent to the capitalist system. 
(b)Rostow's stages of development 
Rostow's approach to development was as an 
attempt to formulate a general theory of modernisation with 
a classification of all nations or societies along linear 
stages on a single path of "self-sustaining growth"(33). The 
stage-approach to development elaborated by Rostow is based 
on a "dynamic theory of production"(34) where he identifies 
the leading sector, the growth of which is thought to be 
instrumental in 'propelling the economy forward'. He 
proposes five stages of development through which any 
society has to pass to achieve modernisation(35). 
Modernisation and development are considered as a 
process of going from a stage one (traditional society) to a 
stage five, when the society reaches the level of intensive 
consumption. In terms of historical sequence, in Rostow's 
analysis, the sequence is tradition,transition, take-off, 
and then the society, becoming auto-dynamic, evolves towards 
maturity and then high consumption. According to Rostow, 
most Western industrial nations are now in stage five(36). 
This analysis has generated interest and arguments 
among social scientists(37). Moreover, it seems to have had 
a lot of influence and appeal among policy-makers, 
especially in the period extending from the 1960s to the 
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1970s(38). However, Rostow's approach, as well as exerting 
influence on development theory and practice, has been 
subject to strong criticism, directed mainly to his 
'universalist' view of development and his 'linear' 
conception of history: he assumed that all economies tend to 
pass, regularly, through the same stages, starting with the 
same potentialities(39). He also assumed that the 
availability of resources, and the choices presently 
confronting the developing nations, would in the stages two 
and three be the same as those experienced formerly by the 
modern nations(4O) . 
Thus, although Rostow's theory places less 
emphasis on pure economic determinism than Classical 
Marxism, Rostow's approach to development and modernisation 
is based primarily on economic growth and therefore comes 
under the same criticism of development theories which 
neglected or undervalued the importance of the 
socio-cultural aspects in the process of development. 
B. The Neo-Evolutionist Approaches 
The neo-evolutionist approaches of development 
are relatively contemporary as they emerged in and after the 
1960s. However, these theories remained faithful to the 
evolutionary perspectives of development and hence have 
analysed development and modernisation on similar 
assumptions. Their work was also based on an evolutionary 
conception of development and a classification of the 
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world's nations into two categories (eg the modern and the 
traditional. This implies that unless the same path of 
Western nations is followed by the developing nations, 
modernisation cannot be achieved. 
Among these theorists, Talcott Parsons is 
considered as the leading figure in the 'neo-evolutionary' 
theory of development which appeared during the 1960s and 
1970s. Parsons explains the process of change (development) 
as a result of industrialisation, thus following the same 
line of thought as the evolutionary theories. For him the 
movement, (called a stage of change), from one type of 
society (seen as simple, traditional, usually non--Western), 
to the other (seen as complex, modern, Western) is the 
process of modernisation and development(41). Therefore, the 
so-called 'traditional' societies, possessing distinctive 
characteristics ('dichotomously' opposed to modern ones) 
need to acquire the opposite distinctive traits of the 
modern societies(42). This movement is made through stages 
of social differentiation and integrative patterns (the 
evolutionary universals)(43). Parsons therefore implies that 
the acquisition of what he calls 'new normative complexes' 
and new values are necessary to regulate the new 
relationships imposed by differentiation, a feature of 
modern societies(44). For instance, in modern societies, 
kinship is replaced by 'citizenship' within "democratic 
institutions and new forms of social organisation"(45). 
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The process of development and modernisation is 
conceived in terms of 'shifts' from a simple, 
particularistic, ascriptive, and diffuse type of society 
(the traditional) to a complex, universalistic society (the 
modern), where roles are assigned in terms of abilities, 
achievements, and talents, thus increasing efficiency and 
rational division of labour(46). 
Folilowing the same line of analysis 
B.F.Hoeselitz(47) also uses a similar type of 
categorisation of modern and non-modern societies. For him 
three major criteria distinguish the traditional society 
from the modern. 
The first is cultural, whereby the traditional 
society is characterized by 'conservatism and 
particularism'(48); whereas the modern society is 
characterized by 'universalism and differentiation'. The 
traditional society is described as specific and therefore 
presents a certain 'static' quality; modern society is 
dynamic allowing for expansion, change and improvement(49). 
The second criterion is psycho-social: the individual 
in the traditional society is subjected to tradition and 
conformism, and therefore cannot manifest 
entrepreneurship(50). He is often unable to innovate, since 
his possibilities are confined with established limits. In 
modern society, the individual enjoys more freedom, 
non-conformism, and therefore shows more initiative and 
creativity(51). 
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The third criterion is socio-economic: the 
traditional society's economy is underdeveloped with a 
defined distribution of roles(52). Individuals are not 
equipped to function effectively as the conditions are 
'undifferentiated' and 'ascriptive 1 (53). The modern society 
has a developed economy where individuals enjoy a great deal 
of 'differentiation', 'separation and specialisation' of 
roles(54). This yields functional specialization and 
increases the capacity to create and adopt effective 
institutions generating economic growth(55). 
It is suggested here that Hoesetelitz's approach 
fits into the general framework of the classical theories of 
development underlying the universal validity of the Western 
model. Furthermore, this categorisation with descriptive 
trait lists, implies a 'schematic' (ideal type) of modern 
society as a polar opposite of traditional society. This 
approach, it is suggested, unifies, under each of the 
proposed categories, societies which are actually 
heterogeneous and diverse. 
It is also suggested that Hoeteliz' theory gives a 
'static' representation of the modern and the traditional 
societies, and does not provide an analysis for the pi7ocss.  
of transition from one type to the other. Thus, Hc'eselitz 
sees the characteristics of the Western societies are 
'inherently' modern and that the traditional societies, are 
therefore required to adopt the same characteristics of the 
Western industrialized nations. However, Hoesteliz does not 
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explain how this would come about, neither does he account 
for the specific characteristics of these so-called 
traditional societies; or whether some of them might possess 
positive elements which would contribute to the process of 
their modernisation. 
Another example of the Western analysis of the 
processes of development is that proposed by E.Hagen (56) in 
his theory of social change. Although he admits that 
societies identified as 'traditional' are diverse and that 
traditionalism characterises certain aspects of all 
societies, nevertheless his approach is also based on the 
'criteria' method(57). 
In his approach, Hagen emphasises that the 
traditional society shows a notable resistance to change 
mainly due to a certain mystical vision of the world and to 
an "authoritarian" type of social structure(58). For Hagen, 
in this type of societies, change can only occur as a result 
of important pressures such as social or political 
upheavals(59). 
It is suggested that this approach, again, 
appears essentially Western-oriented, as it stresses the 
value of the Western model of development; and undervalues 
any capacity of the traditional societies to initiate and 
sustain a process of development. Hagen even emphasizes that 
the characteristics of the so-called traditional societies 
are obstacles to development(60). Nor does Hagen explain, 
for the countries in search of appropriate models of 
development, how the process of development occurs. 
However, the analysis of modernisation as a 
process, a movement from one type of society (the 
traditional) to another type of society (the modern), has 
been made by other authors such as S.N.Eisenstadt(61). 
Although identifying modernisation according to a set of 
criteria(62), and hence applying the method of 
categorization adopted by the previously mentioned authors, 
Eisenstadt does identify the conditions and mechanisms of 
the process of modernisation(63). 
He stresses that a modern society is 
characterized by a flexibility of social, political, and 
economic structures, and the capacity to adapt quickly to 
changing situations(64). Continuous change is in the nature 
of modernisation. Hence flexibility of a society's 
sub-systems is a necessary condition of access to 
modernisation. He also believes that modernisation is not 
unilinear or irreversible. The process of modernisation can, 
for different reasons and in different contexts, suffer 
interruptions, which he calls "breakdowns of 
modernisation"(65). In this process, diversified structures 
can be produced and would operate with different approaches 
depending on the time when they occur(66). 
For Eisenstadt, the process of change in the 
developed nations, was initiated by economic as well as 
cultural changes in the society(67). Therefore such features 
as urbanism, political organisation, social mobility are a 
consequence of those changes. In the developing nations it 
is the consequences of these changes, such as rapid 
urbanisation, political organisation, and a rise in people's 
needs and aspirations, which appear first and often before 
adequate economic and cultural changes are achieved(66). 
When these changes occur before the societies' 
'superstructure is consolidated', and before its 'proper 
dynamism' becomes operational and autonomous, the process of 
modernisation would then be 'partial' and cannot be 
sufficiently 'diffuse'(69). It therefore remains fragmented 
and leads to "breakdowns of modernisation"(7q). 
The argument of the thesis, in this context is 
that the neo-evolutionist approach, in the different 
theories, is based on a general paradigm of societies which 
assumes 'identifiable' qualities and characterisitics which 
differentiate traditional from modern societies. The shared 
assumption among the different theorists is that, in order 
to become modern, the traditional societies need to acquire 
the qualities and traits of modern societies, that is 
Western societies. Hence any nation aspiring to 
modernisation needs to acquire the same traits as the 
Western nations: Westernisation in those approaches is a 
'sine-qua-non' condition for modernisation. 
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Thus, there are 'evolutionary universals'(71), or 
'the Western ethics'(72) which are necessary conditions for 
modernisation, This implies not only the adoption of the 
economic structure and organisation of the West but also its 
socio-cultural values. Even when provision is made for the 
socio-cultural variables in development, the subordination 
to the industrialized Western World is maintained. 
Western theories of development and modernisation, 
have, directly or indirectly, influenced many development 
programmes and policies of Third World countries, especially 
during the 1960s and 1970s(73). It is the argument of the 
thesis here that most of these 'new' nations which embarked 
on intensive programmes for industrialization and economic 
development, have had to import technologies and to rely on 
Western knowledge and expertise. This not only reinforced 
their dependence on the Western nations but has generated 
important internal socio-cultural, political and economic 
problems. 
Among the problems have been desillusionment with 
and criticism of the Western model and its theorizing about 
development(74). These theories were seen, especially by 
Third World intellectuals', as serving the interests of 
developed nations, with the major aim of maintaining 
them(75). 
The strongest attack against neo-evolutionst 
modernisation theories has come from Marxist-oriented 
theories offering a different view and explanation of 
development from the perspective of underdevelopment and 
"dependency". 
D.The Neo-Marxist approach: 
The neo-marxist perspective of development 
analyses the 'under-development' of Third World nations(76). 
Nec'- colonialism in the neo-Marxist analyses is seen as the 
new means by which the international capitalist order 
exploits and maintains the newly independent nations in a 
subordinate position: the centre (advanced capitalist 
nations) maintains the under-developed nations in their 
'periphery'. The structures serve the interest of capitalist 
nations through this continuous situation of dependency(77). 
The dependency 'theories' emerging from Latin 
America express this view of 'centre' and 'periphery' (or 
Metropole and Satellite) relations(78). Most neo-Marxists 
now consider neo-colonialism as the new means of 
exploitation used by the industrialised nations over 
developing and undeveloped ones(79). Hence, the structures 
of the economy, established during the colonial period, are 
perpetuated and even strengthened. The process of political 
decolonisation itself, expressed with an emphasis on 
industrialization and economic growth, provides a framework 
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of neo-colonialism for the great majority of developing 
nations. The less-developed nations are therefore maintained 
in a peripherical position, in relation to developed nation 
(in the centre). 
Hence the less-developed nations become an 
extension of the centre (the developed nations). According 
to Johan Galtung(BO), there is a disharmony of interest 
between 'centre' and 'periphery' nations leading to an 
increasing inequality expressed in the dominance exercised 
by the centre nation over the centre of the periphery; which 
in turn exercises its dominance over its own periphery. This 
produces conflicts of interests within the periphery, and 
contributes to maintaining the dominant position of the 
centre over the periphery(G1). 
Although Galtung's analysis deals principally 
with the overall theme of imperialism, in its different 
forms it covers in particular the themes of development and 
underdevelopment and their interactions. Borrowing largely 
from the Marxist approach, Galtung defined imperialism 
through the interaction, and the relationship which exists, 
between the centre and periphery nation so that : 
(i) there is a harmony of interest between the centre 
in the centre nation and in the centre of the 
periphery nations. 
(ii) there is more disharmony of interest within the 
periphery nation than within the centre nation. 
(iii) there is a disharmony of interest between the 
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periphery in the centre nation and the periphery 
nation(82). 
Thus, according to Galtung, imperialism is not merely an 
international relationship: it is a combination of internal 
and international relations. Galtung asserted that 
development is linked with, and depends on, the interaction 
between internal and external structures of the centre and 
the periphery(83). 
Dependency theories emerged mainly as a critique 
of theories of modernisation and development, where the 
previous views of "non-development" as a consequence of 
different stages of the evolution of societies, are 
rejected(84). "Under-development" is seen as a feature of 
the same historical process, related to the existence of 
capitalist system of development and its expansion founded 
on international relations of dominance and subjugation. 
The Dependency approach stemmed from the work 
undertaken by the Economic Commission of Latin America 
(E.L.C.A) led by Raohl Prebisch during the 1950s. The ELCA 
is considered as the major source which gave impetus to 
dependency theories(85). This commission attributed 
underdevelopment to the international structural 
relationships based on unequal trade with the industrialised 
nations. These relations and exchanges - based on the 
importation of capital, equipment, and technology against 
raw materials and fuel exports - meant increasing reliance 
on international firms and corporations. This dependence was 
stimulated by a strong emphasis on industrialization and 
consumer goods imports. Thus unequal exchange is founded on 
a market situation favourable to the industrialised nations, 
and whereby the development of non-industrialised nations is 
limited and even hampered(86). 
This idea was further developed by Paul.Baron in 
the early 1960s(87). He pointed out in 1957, that 
development and underdevelopment are integral parts of the 
unbalanced and unequal character of the relationship 
existing between rich and poor nations(88). This 
relationship was achieved with the complicity of the elite 
of the poor nations and it has both facilitated access to 
their resources and has maintained the traditional 
domination of the Western capitalist powers. Under these 
conditions, economic growth and development of these nations 
will remain limited and will, even, with time, reach a stage 
of stagnation. The only solution would have to be political, 
i.e. through a revolution. 
A.G. Frank developed this view further in 
describing capitalist nations as imetropoles' and the poor 
nations as 'satellites'(89). He also stressed the relation 
between the metropole and the satellite nations as a 
dominant dependent relationship: the stronger the ties 
between metropoles and satellites, the higher is the 
underdevelopment of the satellites. The economy of the 
satellite countries is incorporated in the economy of the 
metropole and its structure is adapted to the needs of the 
metropole in order to maintain the dependency(90). 
According to Frank, the only alternative to this 
pressure exercised by the metropole over the satellite, 
would be a complete decoupling or delinking between the two 
poles; this can only be achieved through an immediate 
socialist revolution(91). 
Dependency theory, as an alternative approach to 
development, has, from the late sixties and early seventies, 
initiated a great deal of research in the sociology of 
development of the emerging nations(92). In particular the 
dependency approach, within the neo-Marxist approach, has 
attempted to explain the mechanisms underlying development 
and underdevelopment, from the developing nations' 
perspective. Although deriving from Marxism, dependency 
theory is not concerned with the effects of imperialism on 
the metropole, but with its effects on the peripheral 
countries. In this theory, the dependent-dominant 
relationship of interaction constitutes the major obstacle 
to a proper development of the third world countries. 
Breaking the existing pattern of development - delinking - 
is therefore a necessary condition to ensure the development 
and modernisation of the peripheral nations. 
However, it is the argument of this thesis that 
dependency theories' analysis of underdevelopment have, in 
crucial aspects, remained within the Western determined 
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theoretical framework. including an implied acceptance of 
Western socio-economic superiority and the viability of its 
model of development. What is questioned by Dependency 
analyses is the unequal and dependent economic relations and 
exchanges with capitalist-industrialised nations. 
What these theories failed to emphasize is the 
diffrential effects of the applicability of the Western 
model, in contexts with different socio-cultural 
characteristics, such as the case of the Maghrebian nations. 
Apart from prescribing 'a socialist revolution', or a 
'delinking' with the Western type of political and economic 
system for developing nations, dependency theories fail to 
specify how an integrated development , based on the 
rationale of local socio-cultural, political, and economic 
circumstances is to be achieved. 
Thus, dependency theories have maintained the 
pattern of categorization of the nations of the world into 
two categories: in this case the capitalist-Western and the 
developing-dependent nations. Implied in these theories, 
therefore, is the assumption of universal characteristics of 
the developing nations. Hence, a universal solution to the 
problems of development, a socialist revolution and 
delinking, is proposed. 
The cases of China and Japan are used in this chapter 
to underline, through their specific experiences of 
development, the inadequacy of the previously analysed 
theories about development in non Western contexts. China's 
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policy of delinking from the capitalist Western economy is 
contrasted with Japan's ability to develop, economically, on 
Western lines, while retaining its socio-cultural identity. 
Section II: illustrating Cases: The Chinese and 
Japanese experiences of modernisation. 
The purpose of this section is to investigate, in 
the light of the critical analysis of the different theories 
of development and the two major approaches drawn from them 
(capitalist and socialist oriented), two specific 
experiences: China and Japan. 
The major argument is that these two experiences 
of development practically assess the validity and 
usefulness of delinking with the Western approach to 
development (as the case of China suggests), and convergence 
with the Western approach (as the case of Japan apparently 
suggests). The overall argument pursued in these two 
illustrative cases is that neither a complete delinking nor 
a complete convergence with the West are adequate approaches 
to development and modernisation. Both approaches 
underestimate the difficulties posed by historical 
traditional and cultural specificities - and the complex 
effects of development with and on, culture. 
A. China: a Case for Delinking 
The purpose of this case study is to analyse a 
specific strategy and experience of development which was 
based on the notion that a delinking with the Western world, 
with the influence and international relations it entails, 
was a better approach to development and modernisation. 
The argument in this particular case is that the 
Chinese experience of development has suggested that a 
delinking with the West was not an ideal solution and can be 
problem-generating. The Western model of development has had 
disruptive effects on the nation's socio-cultural values and 
structures. This eventually led to radical oscillations in 
development policies. 
a) The historical Setting. 
The specific historical development of China, as 
is the case of each nation, has shaped the present course of 
its development. Therefore it is the purpose of the analysis 
of the Chinese historical setting to underline relevant 
aspects of its socio-cultural, political, and economic bases 
which affected its development. 
It is the argument in this case that Western 
influence, coming through power and unequal exchanges, and 
hence without adaptation to the Chinese context, has 
disrupted rather than promoted the processes of development 
and modernisation in this nation. It has distabilized the 
social structures. 
In the specific case of China, one can even 
argue, considering the present socio- cultural and economic 
situation, that contacts with the West have caused a 
movement backwards rather than forwards. This country's old 
civilization, which was the cradle for Asian culture, has 
disintegrated as a result of Western intrusion(93). 
Chinese civilization, until it was affected by 
Western disruptive influence, was characterised principally 
by the Confucian tradition, a specific system of ethics 
where the society's structure was highly hierarchial. 
Relationships were properly ordered within the society, and 
behaviour and attitudes were regulated by social position or 
status. It was believed that prosperity of the society was 
based on appropriate hierarchical relationships, according 
to specific and clearly defined positions and roles. 
Great men have their proper business 
and little men have their proper 
business... Some labour with their 
minds, and some labour with their 
strength. Those who labour with their 
minds govern others; those who labour 




In terms of development, China until the 
eighteenth century, had enjoyed a great deal of prosperity 
and economic and political expansion with the annexation of 
more than half of the Asian continent including Nepal, 
Burma, Siam, Vietnam and Korea. The exports of agricultural 
goods such as tea, silk, cotton, towards South-Asia and 
Europe, were increasing. This economic growth was also due 
to a rapid increase of the population. The important 
economic, commercial and demographic evolution which occured 
during the eighteenth century continued until the 
mid-nineteenth century(95). 
From the last quarter of the nineteenth century, 
China became a major arena for capitalist and imperialist 
rivalries in terms of economic and political 
intervention(960. The Northern and South-Eastern coasts, 
where commerce was floursihing and most transport networks 
were established, became the centres of Western influence. 
Treaties and conventions were signed with Western partners, 
increasing their attempts to enforce their position in the 
country(97). The 'most favoured nation clause', enforced 
after 1642 in Chinese treaties signed with the West, 
encouraged the industrial powers to strengthen their 
position and each one of them attempted to obtain new 
economic advantages. 
It is the argument at this point that this 
process of development in its form and practice was alien to 
the Chinese context and did not serve their needs. The 
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initiated industrialisation was geared to the development of 
the difterent powers attracted to the area and created an 
increasing dependence of China on the Western powers. 
In fact each capitalist power had its own 'zone 
at influence'. Hence Russia strengthened its position in the 
North-East (Manchouria), where she was to be supplanted 
later by Japan in 1905; Germany was established in the 
Shandong peninsula; Great Britain occupied the middle-basin 
of Yangzi; and France's stronghold was in the three 
provinces of China's South-West. Permanent military bases 
were established to protect and maintain the different 
powers' investments and authority in their sphere of 
influence(98). 
On the eve of the First World War, the political, 
economic and even cultural influences of the West were at 
their highest in China. Their control was so powerful that 
it took the form of a 'financial protectorate'. Foreign 
investments were considerable, especially in the sectors of 
light industries, mines and railways. Foreign firms 
dominated and controlled most financial institutions. The 
economy was oriented towards the interest of the foreign 
firms and most of the consumer goods were imported(99). 
It is suggested, here, that this foreign 
intervention if it promoted industrialisation in China, also 
aggravated the gap between the modern industrial sector 
(unequally spread), and the agricultural sector (which 
remained traditional). The existing urban and rural 
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differences and inequalities were reinforced. It is 
therefore suggested that the economic developments 
introduced by the West have had disruptive effects on 
Chinese political and social structures. 
The new capitalist 'bourgeoisie', of merchants 
and tradesmen started to exercise pressure for a share in 
economic and political responsibilities. On the other hand, 
in the cities a class of proletariat was emerging while the 
economic conditions of the population in the rural areas 
were not improved(100). This situation led to internal 
discontent and eventually rebellion which created a 
political fragility within the Chinese context, especially 
with the influence of the Western political system. October 
1911 witnessed the fall of the Mandchouri empire and the 
establishment of the first Chinese republic with the 
adoption of an 'American' inspired constitution and the 
organisation of general elections in 1913(101). 
The victory of the Japanese army in parts of China 
in 1935 reinforced the rising popular discontent and 
accelerated the emergence of the Chinese communist 
party(102). Low wages, hard and dangerous working 
conditions, unfair work contracts, the foreign export geared 
economy, led in the urban centres to the organisation of 
trade unions with a strong communist ideology, culminating 
to the Chinese revolution and the birth of the People's 
Republic of China(103). 
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it is suggested here that the international 
political context, especially the Russian revolution, 
influenced the Chinese revolution. The new approach to 
development adopted by the Soviet revolution in 1917 was a 
challenge to some Western value and all Western economic 
systems. Communism and socialism emerged as possible 
alternatives to existing Western political and economic 
systems(104). The wars, conflicts and turmoils in Western 
societies, helped to weaken the image of Western culture 
and strengthened the belief that modernisation could be 
achieved without it. A non-capitalist alternative was sought 
by the new leaders of the Chinese revolution. 
The argument put forward at this point is therefore 
that the Western model and its impact on China has had 
disruptive effects and eventually led to a radical 
transformation of the Chinese society: from a feudal, highly 
capitalist society to a socialist one. 
(b) The Industrial Revolution and the Birth of a 
popular Republic. 
The birth of the Chinese Republic was therefore 
the beginning of a new era, a revolution against a long 
established order and mainly against an existing pattern of 
international relations. The major aim of the new leaders it 
is suggested was to build a national economy, self-reliant 
and hence indpendent from the West and its influence. A 
policy of delinking was adopted in order to put an end to 
what the dependent and 'exploitative' relationship with the 
West. 
The experience of the Soviet Union, and its 
success in becoming a superpower, presented an attractive 
alternative model of development. Moreover the Soviet Union 
proved to be a valuable ally of China in the first years of 
the revolution. However, it is an argument that, later on, 
Chinese approach to communism was to become different from 
that of the Russian, the Chinese were more concerned with 
the need to create barriers against external interventions 
and by national reconstruction than by class conflicts. In 
this sense, Marxism was adapted to their specific problems 
and needs. 
In China the Socialist Revolution was undertaken 
by a 'popular consensus', a 'new form of democracy' which 
included groups from the different strata of the 
society(105). In fact the four social groups defined by Mao 
as the "four revolutionary classes": the proletariat, 
peasantry, middle-class and national capitalists, were 
involved in the new republic politics. However, this 
"heterogenous homogeneity" inevitably led to important 
conflicts and contradictions within the new polity and were 
to continue. These conflicts were reflected, as will be 
related subsequently, in the development and modernisation 
policies adopted. 
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However, it is the argument here that the 
alternative approach to development, Marxism-based, was 
still in the early period of the Revolution heavily relying 
on industrialisation and economic growth and on an imported 
model of development, that is of the Soviet Union. This has 
also created problems and contradictions. 
Industrialisation was seen by the Chinese 
leadership as the key factor in the process of modernisation 
and economic development. The period, from 1949 to 1952, was 
devoted to 'reconstruction' that is the use of the existing 
economic institutions, while transforming the social and 
political structures in accordance with the socialist 
thought and practice(106). Industrialisation became a 
central theme in the Chinese development programmes, 
especially from the period 1952-1957 with the first five 
yearplan. From the first years of the revolution, agrarian 
reform was undertaken, but this sector remained in a 
secondary position as compared with the industrial sector, 
and consequently suffered from lower rates of 
investment(107). 
It is suggested here that this emphasis on 
industrialisation and economic growth led to a need for 
external assistance, namely from the Soviet union. This was 
a major contradiction with the set objective of 
self-reliance sought by the Revolution. In fact Soviet aid 
was very important in the early years of the Chinese 
revolution(108). This aid included the adoption of Soviet 
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management approach (the one-man management system), and the 
high number of Chinese students as well as advanced research 
personnel sent to be trained in the USSR(109). During this 
phase of Chinese economic and industrial planning impressive 
achievements were obtained in the industrial sector and 
important changes were undertaken in the agricultural 
sector(110). 
However, it is argued here that the highly 
centralized political and economic system, the emphasis on 
the development of heavy industries, the conflicts at the 
political level and the contradictions generated by the 
collective leadership and the adoption of the Soviet 
'one-man system'(111) produced important constraints on 
Chinese development. The famous "Great Leap Forward", 
launched by the end of 1957 and early 195B, was the strategy 
marking a new period in the Chinese political and economic 
policies(112) 
The Great Leap Forward was aimed, principally, at 
mobilizing human resources and energies to accelerate 
development. It was also an attempt to reduce the imbalance 
between the agricultural and industrial sectors. The slogan 
was to "walk on two legs"(113), that is to increase 
production in both sectors. In this context, radical 
transformations were undertaken at the managerial level to 
fight the highly centralised urban-based bureaucracy. This 
was reflected in the decision of the Central Committee, in 
1957, which stipulated that all managers and specialised 
staff must participate in manual tasks and that the workers 
were expected to participate in managerial functions(114). 
By the 1960s, the negative effects of the Great 
Leap Forward began to emerge: the Chinese economy was facing 
a crisis(115). This situation coincided with unfavourable 
climatic conditions leading to serious agricultural 
problems, which indirectly affected industry. Thus the 
economic imbalance between industry and agriculture was 
aggravated(116). 
The Chinese experience, in its attempt to import 
and implement the Soviet model of development, proved 
unsuccessful. This underlines the argument about the 
inadequacy and inefficiency of importing a foreign model of 
development without adapting it to local context and needs. 
The failure of the Soviet model of development in China led 
to the interruption of important industrial projects and the 
deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations. Their conceptions 
of socialism and communism as well as major political issues 
appeared to diverge increasingly(117). 
It is suggested that the apparent inadequacy of 
these foreign models, first the Western then the Soviet,in 
the Chinese context led to a radical reaction against these 
models expressed in the delinking policy adopted by China 
from the early sixties. It also led to the search for an 
alternative approach to development, emanating from within, 
hence the appearance of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. 
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cl The Cultural Revolution: 
The Cultural Revolution in China, it is the 
interpretation in this thesis, was a new alternative to the 
Soviet model of development and modernisation. It was also a 
means of overcoming the obstacles encountered by the Chinese 
socialist revolution in its process of national construction 
and development. Although an innovation, the Cultural 
Revolution was presented by the Chinese political elites as 
a 'natural' process of an 'uninterrupted' revolution where 
"throughout the stages of socialism, the class struggle 
between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie" could not be 
stopped(116). 
It is suggested here that modernisation in China's 
Cultural Revolution was consequently equated with the notion 
of a 'continuing revolution' which would lead to new norms, 
behaviours and structures in the Chinese society; a society 
which would develop by relying on its own forces. Hence the 
claimed aim of the Cultural Revolution was basically 
self-reliance. This could only be achieved by the 'political 
dynamism of the masses', and through an extensive and 
continuous socialist education in urban as well as rural 
areas(119). 
The Chinese Cultural Revolution was socio-cultural 
based rather than economic. In this sense, it can be 
suggested, that it constituted an alternative to development 
rejecting the long established tradition of Western 
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theorising about the primacy of economic growth and 
industrialisation over the social and the cultural. In this 
limited sense, the Chinese Cultural revolution fits with the 
general argument of the thesis: the importance of 
socio-cultural aspects in fostering and sustaining 
development. 
However, it is also suggested that, unlike Japan, 
China's Cultural Revolution was not based on, and did not 
aim at, using the positive elements in the Chinese culture 
to promote the nation's development. On the contrary, it was 
aimed at radically transforming traditional socio-cultural 
assumptions and replacing them then with new values and a 
new ideology. 
The start of the Cultural Revolution was the 
'Sixteen Point Declaration' of August 8, 1966. This was a 
call for a 'struggle' against 'revisionism' and 'economism', 
promoted by the adoption of the Soviet model(120). This 
declaration stressed the need for a renewed sense of 
revolutionary impetus and the creation of economic and 
social structures in line with Mao's thought. The 'triple 
combination' of the Red Guards, the army and the 'faithful' 
members of the communist party constituted the active forces 
of the Cultural Revolution. They formed the central core, 
organising mass-mobilisation and mass-participation(121) 
To shake old values and develop new ones was the 
assertive slogan of the Cultural Revolution: to 'touch the 
people in their souls' was seen as the basic means of 
success for the Chinese leaders(122). The development of a 
socialist cultural revolution was not the prerogative of the 
elite only but the responsibility of the broad popular 
masses. Workers, peasants, soldiers, revolutionary 
intellectuals, cadres, and leaders were to participate in 
the new bases of national construction(123). 
The formation of a 'New Socialist Man' was,in 
fact, seen as the most important objective of the Chinese 
Cultural Revolution. Mao believed that "men are more 
important than weapons", and that the success of the 
Cultural Revolution depended largely on the "revolution in 
men's minds"(1E4). Hence the necessity to re-educate all 
members of the society in order to enable them to combine 
professional competence with political consciousness. 
Criticism and self-criticism were prescribed by Mao as the 
best methods to elucidate past errors and clarify the path 
for the future. He insisted that the education of the 
Chinese New Man should be based on the close relationship 
between socialist political education and productive labour. 
Practice was to be therefore both the source and the test of 
knowledge in general and the national ideology in 
particular(lE5). 
It is suggested therefore that the Cultural 
Revolution was to stimulate the process of development by 
firstly a 'revolution of the minds'. This was a necessary 
condition to break up with traditionalism, capitalism, and 
the Western impact as a whole. The revolution of the minds 
was to be achieved with the education of the masses. 
Education in its widest sense was central to 
the aims of the Cultural Revolution. It was seen as the 
major means to communicate to the masses the principles and 
objectives of this revolution.The formal educational system 
therefore needed to be changed and adapted to the new 
national realities and aims.It had to embody the general 
principle of the Cultural Revolution that : "all knowledge 
should arise from practice"(126). 
The major modification introduced in the Chinese 
educational system was the emphasis on political and 
ideological instruction, and linking theoretical learning 
with practical learning (emanating from the workers and 
peasants)(127). The curricula was divided into part-time 
work and part-time education; the slogan was 'red and 
expert'(128). To organise practical training in the 
countryside, for the different cycles of the educational 
system, to stress political education and abolish forms of 
selection (such as marks and examinations), were the 
measures taken in order to make the educational system a 
potent means in transforming ideas and behaviour(129). In 
other words the educational system was to be one of the 
major agents of change and a source of self-strengthening, 
an instrument to achieve modernisation. 
It is the argument at this point that education 
was both a means and an aim in the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution: it constituted a central theme of this new 
approach to development.The important changes in educational 
form and content were undertaken in order to adapt national 
education to the new national aims and objectives. Hence, 
education was perceived as the driving force, and the 
principal agent of social change(130). National goals were 
to be achieved through educational goals. 
The radical policies on educational thought and 
practice adopted and implemented during the Cultural 
Revolution, are increasingly criticised today(131). This 
revolution in education is held responsible for a fall in 
educational quality and the high rate of illiteracy. It is 
principally criticized for its inability to produce the 
efficient and expertly qualified manpower needed for 
economic, industrial and technological development and 
national modernisation, according to international 
standards(132). 
However, the most striking aspect of 
educational reform in China during this period, which may be 
relevant to developing nations such as those of the Maghreb, 
is the equal weight given to theory and practice, the close 
relationship between knowledge and its practical use for 
national development. In the Chinese experience, education 
was no longer confined to specific institutions, nor to a 
limited length of time or specific groups. Problem-solving 
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and practice were the methods and aims. Mao stated: "Reading 
is learning, but applying is also learning and the more 
important kind of learning at that"(133). 
Mao insisted that any type of knowledge, whether 
national or foreign, old or new, should be used to solve 
Chinese problems(134). Hence, appraoches to learning should 
be selective and aimed at assimilating only what is useful 
to the development of the society. 
However, it should also be noted that in the 
Chinese context, as is also often the case in developing 
nations, ideology and political considerations, overrode 
practical realities; education came to reflect more the 
abstract ideas, the ideology of those in power, rather than 
to solve problems faced in the process of development. 
As Communist China enters a new phase of its 
history, beginning from the 1970s, a shift in educational 
emphasis is visible, especially in the nourishing of talent 
and efficiency, to hasten the process of modernisation in 
China. Important steps were taken by the post-Mao leadership 
to open up again to the outside world. The aims and 
principles were accordingly reconsidered: "education should 
be oriented towards the future", was the official 
statement(135). 
It is suggested here that the new reforms of 
education will undoubtedly aim at relating education to 
national development rather than merely to ideology. This 
can currently be seen for example in the Central Committee's 
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proposals for the reform of the secondary education 
structure and especially with the expansion of vocational 
education(136). 
China is undergoing a major transformation 
of its educational system, with the aim of 
better orienting education toward modernisation, 
toward the outside world, toward the future, 
and better integrating the results of the social 
and scientific revolution in educational 
practice. We are much interested in the 
educational reforms going on in many other 
countries, for we fully realize that education 
has become a major global issue, that it will 
be quite impossible to completely solve 
education problems if a country tries to rely on 
its own material and intellectual resources in 
internationalizing age of increasing 
interdependence, in which the development of 
human resources to a large degree means the 
improvement of education, information and 
knowledge. 
(137) 
This summarizes the new orientation of Chinese 
educational policies as well as its new approach to 
development and modernisation. Implicit is a rejection of 
Mao's policies and prescriptions for a self-contained and 
self-reliant society, within his version of a socialist 
society. 
Thus in the Chinese context, the search for 
socio-cultural identity and unity were not so much based on 
linguistic, religious or other common characteristics of 
national identification as on a specific view of communist 
ideology. 
Within this framework - in terms of language policy 
- no specific or radical changes occured during the Cultural 
Revolution. The need for a unifying language, especially in 
education was felt long before the advent of this 
revolution. As early as the fifteenth century officials in 
China used 'Mandarin', an educated variant of the Peking 
dialect, as an official language(138). But it was only after 
1911 that the option for a unifying national language became 
a clear policy. 
In 1916 a committee was set up, the National 
Language Reasearch Committee,with the aim of developing a 
standard national language. Between 1892 and 1920 efforts 
were made to develop and modernise the Chinese language, to 
make it more accessible to the vast majority of the 
population(139). In 1952 another research committee was set 
up with the aim of reforming the Chinese written language. 
This resulted in the simplification of the more complex 
characters (about 2300 were changed); at the same time 
another alphabet was published and was immediately 
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introduced into schools, newspapers, and books. The new 
alphabet was a teaching aid as well as a basis for the 
development of alphabets of the other dialects, and 
consequently would contribute the diffusion of the national 
language(140). Another important change in language policy 
was the arrangement of the chararcters from vertical to the 
horizontal rows, read from left to right, like European 
writings (141), which is quite a revolution. This language 
policy, in spite of some limitations is considered as 
successful(142). 
The argument of the thesis, therefore is that in 
China, as in many other nations, language is perceived as a 
powerful instrument in national unity, and the development 
of a national education. However, the Chinese approach to 
language is not, as is the case in the Maghreb, ideological, 
but rather practical. Efforts were made to develop, 
modernise, and adapt language to national circumstances and 
needs, to make it simpler and more accessible as a tool of 
communication and learning. The useful aspect of the Chinese 
approach to language for the Maghreb is that although 
ideology and political considerations were paramount in the 
Chinese society, language policies were not determined by, 
nor based on, ideology but on a systematic and pragmatic 
development and modernisation of the language to make of it 
a viable and useful medium. Moreover, in spite of a strong 
and general reaction against foreign influence and 
penetration, there was no radical rejection of foreign 
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Western languages. These were maintained, their acquisition 
was encouraged, but with the stress, from the political 
leadership, on adapting and using them to the Chinese needs 
and way of thinking. 
To summarise the general arguments related to the 
Chines experience of development, it is suggested that, 
during the Cultural revolution, it was the overall national 
development, the process of nation-building which was the 
major concern of the Chinese leadership from the onset of 
the Revolution in 1949. The Chinese experience was 
principally a reaction against the Western model of 
development and later on the Soviet model and the dependence 
they entailed. 
The pre-1940 failure of the Western model in the 
Chinese context created important socio-cultural, economic, 
and political problems. This generated the need to break 
radically with this model and turn to the alternative model 
of the Soviet Union, that of a Communist Revolution.The 
attempt was then to adopt a specific approach to 
development, an alternative, based essentially on 
self-reliance and the full use of the existing human and 
material potentialities. 
However, the Chinese Cultural Revolution 
suggests that the delinking approach, claimed by the 
Neo-Marxists as a viable policy for development, appears 
irrelevant to the problem it attempts to solve. 
Modernisation in China is still in the process The Cultural 
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Revolution has suggested that if the complete adoption of 
the Western model is problem-generating, a complete 
delinking with the West is also problem-generating. This is 
firstly because the Western world is today the leading 
example of development and modernisation, and secondly, 
because the requirements of modernisation necessitate 
exchanges and interdependence. 
The Chinese experience has asserted that the process of 
development could (and should) start from "within". However 
this does not mean isolation and seclusion as this 
particular experience has shown. Rather, it means that 
socio-cultural characteristics, ought to be flexibly 
reinforced in the process of development so that adaptation 
to the requirements of modernisation are possible. The path 
to modernisation does not reside in a complete adoption or 
rejection of the Western mode of thought and practice - as 
suggested by the two major theoretical approaches. It 
resides in the ability to adapt the Western model of 
development to the specific context of the society 
concerned. In this sense, development means, as it should, 
transformation of the society more than transfer of external 
thought and practice. In this respect, the experience of 
Japan offers a useful example of a policy of development 
based on both internal social transformation and the 
acquisition, through adaptation, of foreign techniques and 
know-how. 
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B. Japan : a case of 'convergence' 
The purpose of this section is firstly to analyse 
an experience of development largely based on Western 
thought and practice and to emphasize the argument of the 
thesis that to achieve development it is important to adapt 
the Western model to local needs, circumstances and 
characteristics 
The general argument here is that the Japanese 
experience suggests a successful formula for a modernisation 
inspired by the Western model of development whithin a frame 
of the retention of social and cultural identity. The 
remarkable achievements of japan, in terms of development 
are not so much a result of its own economic potentialities, 
or the adoption of Western thought and practice, as a result 
of an ability to adapt, and adjust, to the Western model. 
It is also the argument that the Western model of 
development, in its thought and practice, when selectively 
adapted to the nation's specificities by internal 
adjustments offers a viable means for achieving 
modernisation. The combination of what the West has to 
offer, in terms of scientific and technological knowledge, 
of strategies and means for development, with selected and 
adapted national socio-cultural elements, constitutes a 
positive strategy of development as Japan illustrates. 
a) The historical setting: 
The characteristics of Japanese society, its 
structure and organisation, were to be gradually altered 
through contacts with the outside world in general and the 
West in particular. 
The argument is that Japan has shown, throughout 
its history, an inclination (rather than resistance) to 
absorb foreign cultures and know-how in its social 
framework. First the Chinese influence and then the Western 
influence played the role of catalysts in the Japanese 
process of development and modernisation. However it must be 
emphasised that these foreign influences and effects were 
accepted and incorporated into the existing socio-cultural 
setting; they were not imposed. They were adopted, and 
mainly adapted, to the needs of a desired change. Hence, 
these influences brought about changes; they were not the 
change. 
China had for centuries been a privileged 
commercial partner and an attractive political and cultural 
model for Japan. Japanese absorbtion of Chinese culture 
reached its peak between the seventh and nineth century AD. 
In fact the introduction of Buddhism, the influence of the 
Confucian tradition and other socio-economic and political 
elements imported from China largely accounted for the 
shaping of the Japanese culture(143). Hence the Japanese 
social structure was, as in China, highly hierarchial: 
status, roles, behaviour, and attitudes were strictly 
regulated. The Imperial institution, one of the longest 
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surviving monarchial dynasties, was the supreme institution. 
The Monarch 'Tenno' was considered as the father of all 
Japanese people. He was like the Chinese Monarch, seen as 
the intermediary between the two worlds, that of heaven and 
that of mortals. But in Japan the role of the 'Tenno' was 
more 'holy' than administrative, from the twelfth century to 
the early nineteenth century. Actual power, legislative as 
well as executive, moved into the hands of the military 
chiefs the 'shoguns' who held the reigns of government and 
gradually managed to establish a rigorous 'feudal' 
administration and exercise tight control over the 
population(144). 
The Japanese social culture during the Edo Era 
(around 1615 to 1568) was organized on a rigidly structured 
system. Its members were divided into basically four social 
groups: the Samurai, the Peasants, the Artisans, and the 
Merchants. Inter-relationships among these different social 
groups were organised according to strict rules and social 
barriers isolated these groups leading to the development of 
specific characteristics, behaviour in each one of these 
groups. The Samurai, at the top of the social hierarchy, 
represented a distinct group, socially, functionally, and to 
a certain degree geographically(145). 
The peasants, second in the social hieararchy, 
constituted the vast majority of the population. However, 
they were often higly exploited and suffered hardships and 
injustice. There was also an important regional disparity 
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between a rich South-West and a poor North-East. The 
Artisans were mostly located in rural areas and were 
classified among the peasants (later they were incorporated 
into the Merchant group)(146). The Merchants, the last in 
the Japanese social order, were often despised. The Japanese 
slogan " "revere the grain - despise money"(147) expresses 
Japanese disdain for the merchants, the money-makers, and 
their subordination even to the peasants. Nevertheless, the 
merchants, principally city merchants, played a key role in 
the development of the modern economy during the seventeenth 
century(148). 
The Edo Era in general and the seventeenth 
century in particular witnessed important changes in 
economic, social, and political terms(149). It was a period 
of initiative, innovation, and entreprise. Internal peace, 
commercial and financial activities expanded, leading to the 
growth of urban centres like Osaka. This, in turn, along 
with important demographic growth, contributed to the 
development of agriculture(150). From a subsistence economy, 
agriculture developed into a cash crops economy. The 
development of consumer goods generated the development of 
manufacturing which in turn generated inter-regional trade 
and further expansion of small-scale manufacture(151). The 
growth of urban centres, the improvement of communication 
networks, entrepreneurship, and the increasing demand for 
consumer goods, resulted in a rapidly expanding market 
economy and created an economic vitality which gave a new 
shape to Japan's process of development(152). 
The argument in the thesis here is that the 
important socio-cultural changes, during this period and 
after, underline Japanese skill and readiness to change a 
rigidly organised social structure and adapt to the changing 
circumstances of the country and the requirements of 
development. This economic effervescence, which 
characterized seventeenth century Japan, brought about 
changes in the social structure and affected political 
organisation. The strict social differences and distinct 
roles began to fade as people from the different groups 
started to engage in various kinds of entrepreneurship and 
profit-making. Many Samurai, for instance, had to take up 
administrative positions toward the end of the seventeenth 
century and some of them were forced by the financial 
pressures of the end of the Edo Era to undertake commercial 
activities(153). The Merchants began to control the 
country's finances. With the consolidation of their economic 
position, many of them managed, in spite of persistent 
hostitlity, to climb the social ladder, and a few of them 
even reached Samurai rank. Their situation was strenghened 
with the establishment of the guild system which regulated 
commercial organisation and protected merchants' 
interests(154). 
The Edo Era, it is suggested, marked the 
beginning of the process of the modernisation of Japan. The 
important evolution achieved during this period, in economic 
and social terms, constituted the basis on which subsequent 
developments, in the nineteenth century, were built. 
However, it is also suggested that if important social and 
economic transformations took place in Japan during this 
period and after, aspects of the Japanese social 
organisation and values, such as respect for hierarchy, were 
retained. In spite of new conditions in social mobility, the 
blurring of the traditional social divisions, the 
Confucian-based organisation of systematized relationships 
and organisations has survived to the present day. This 
respect for hierarchy, in professional as well as in private 
life, has regulated the process of Japanese development and 
could be even considered as the genesis of its access to 
modernisation(155). 
Overall, it is suggested that Japanese access to 
modernity has been a result of a successful combination of 
traditional and modern elements, a fusion of external 
influences with internal adjustments. It was a process of 
adaptation to the outside world which is the theme of the 
next sub-section. 
(b) Japan and the outside world 
Japan's transformation to modernity occurred in 
the second half of the nineteenth century with its direct 
contact with Western powers, but its roots go far back in 
history. The Chinese political system and ideology based on 
secular authority served as a model in the establishment of 
imperial institutions in Japan. Buddhism and Confucianism 
constituted the most powerful moral, philosophical, and 
religious doctrines which determined Japan's social 
life(156). Even the Japanese language, one of the strongest 
features of the country's identity and unity, borrowed from 
the Chinese language the bases of its characters(157). The 
Chinese influence on Japan was powerful: China has been for 
centuries the "centre of the World" for the Japanese(158). 
And in spite of important controversies and consequent 
suspension of their relations, which characterized 
Chinese-Japanese history, trade between the two countries 
continued to flourish. 
The Japanese distinctive ability to borrow and 
adapt foreign techniques and know-how was not limited to 
China and to a lesser extent Korea, but it also has profited 
from Western knowledge and konw-how and adapted them to 
their particular context. Western thought and practice has 
particularly influenced the development of modern Japan 
because of this readiness and ability to internalise foreign 
elements to a local setting(159). 
However, the argument here is that foreign 
influence is accepted, even strongly desired, in Japan as 
long as it is not imposed and does not constitute a threat 
to the Japnese socio-cultural identity. When the Japanese 
felt that contacts with the West, at a certain period of 
their history, was detrimental to their interests, radical 
reactions followed: for example, the complete insulation 
that happened during the sixteenth-seventeenth century. 
c) Japan's contact with the West 
Japan's earliest contact with the West goes back 
to the sixteenth century with the arrival of the Portuguese 
in this area in 1542-43, during the European expansion in 
the East and the Far-East with the propagation of 
Christianity(160). The Jesuit Order (Society of Jesus) began 
by the late sixteenth century to exercise a monopoly over 
Nagasaki's raw silk and foreign trade. The missionaries led 
the way for merchants and traders. These were Portuguese 
initially but later an important number of Spanish, Dutch, 
and British businessmen came to concentrate their trade and 
commercial activities in Japanese ports(161). 
Western influence on Japanese development started 
in fact from this period. The Portuguese brought to Japan, 
along with the Christian faith, goods and techniques. Their 
influence was substantial in the development of scientific 
knowledge, trade and politics. They introduced the printing 
press and naval construction. They contributed to the 
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development of cartography, warfare techniques and fire 
arms(162). The Japanese were willing to absorb and use this 
knowledge and techniques until the expansion of Christianity 
and the foreign monopoly on trade and important commercial 
centres became to be resented by the Japanese. This led to 
the radical policy of "Sokoku", that is isolation and 
insularity against foreign penetration and influence. 
The policy of insularity was enforced by an 
Imperial Edict, to ban Christianity from Japan and to expel 
the Jesuit missionaries. This policy, primarily directed 
against Christians, was also used to protect Japan from the 
destabilising effects of the West. It lasted for more than 
two centuries from 1639 to 1854(163). During this long 
period of isolation the Japanese leaders managed to ensure 
internal pacification and unification(164). As indicated it 
was this period which was instrumental in consolidating the 
economic foundations of the country, during the seventeenth 
century(165). 
It is suggested that this long period of Japanese 
'gestation' reinforced its socio-cultural, political, and 
economic characteristics. it was also a period of 
internalising and testing the efficiency of foreign 
techniques. Japan's period of isolationism could be 
considered as a period of relative dynamism. The different 
governments in the course of the seventeenth century 
concentrated on consolidating the nation's economic basis by 
establishing a monopoly on foreign trade and encouraging 
domestic production which, as indicated, led to the 
expansion of the national market(166). 
However, in spite of the notable development 
achieved by the mid-eighteenth centuty, the policy of 
isolation was leading to a gradual stagnation in terms of 
economic development. It was in fact the beginning of 
economic recession which affected the social and political 
contexts of Japan. The central authority began to weaken and 
this prompted a need for a change. It was also realised that 
to bridge the gap in terms of economic and technological 
developments, it was necessary to reopen the country to the 
West. Modernisation, therefore, was seen as the best 
defensive policy(167). 
From the second half of the eighteenth century, 
Europe and America emerged as increasingly powerful 
nations, and hence began their expansionist policies in the 
East. These policies were principally directed to China, 
American interest in Japan was intially related to the use 
of Japanese ports for refuelling and supplies. However 
commercial treaties were signed between 1853 and 1854(168). 
The Americans were followed by Western powers, mainly the 
French and British, who managed to obtain similar treaties 
for free trade. Japanese ports were then opened to Western 
commercial activities with the signing of the 'Ports 
Treaties' in 1859(169). These commercial relations paved the 
way to diplomatic relations and the Western system of 
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international political and economic relations was gradually 
imposed. This was reflected in the imposition of Western 
jurisprudence in parts of Japan to protect Western 
interests. 
The increasing economic and social influence of 
the Western powers produced revolts against the government. 
This led to the policy of "Joi" (expel the barbarians) 
culminating in an attack on American, French, and British 
ships, who retaliated by bombarding Kagoshima and 
strengthened their fleet to protect their positions(170). 
Western technological superiority was confirmed, 
principally by the deployment of their war force. 
The Japanese discovery of this striking 
technological, especially military, superiority spurred the 
Japanese to master this technology and the knowledge 
underlying it. It was the beginning of the emergence of 
modern Japanese nationalism, with the emergence of a new 
elite concerned with the modernisation of Japan in the light 
of international developments(171). 
The "Shogun" government was forced to resign in 
1867, and with the death of the Emperor Komei in the same 
year, his son Mutsuhito was restored as the legitimate 
monarch of the country. The new government moved to Edo, 
renamed Tokyo(172). 
This was the beginning of a new era in the 
Japanese history and its entry into the international 
capitalist system. It was the period of the restoration of 
the young 'Tenno' (emperor) and the decisive movement for 
modernisation. 
d) The Process of modernisation 
The most crucial phase in fostering Japan's 
modernisation was the Meiji period (1868-1912). The most 
important aspects of this period were the building of a 
modern state and economic development, which generated rapid 
and profound changes politically, socially, and 
economically. These changes, it is suggested, were drawn 
from the Western model while retaining the country's 
socio-cultural specificity. The ideal sought by the Japanese 
political elite was to absorb Western knowledge and 
techniques with a Japanese spirit. 
A major characteristic of the policy of 
modernisation undertaken during the Meiji period was speed. 
From their access to power, the new Japanese political 
leadership undertook to establish, on Western lines, their 
political authority with the creation of a central 
government, the promulgation of a constitution in 1889 
(based on the Prussian model), a parliament, and different 
parties(173). 
It is the argument here that the important 
political and economic policies, during the early nineteenth 
century, were coupled with social policies. The aim was to 
bring about important social changes for a more adequate 
adaptation to the new requirements of development and 
modernisation. It was in this context that the abolition of 
the rigid feudal social structure was undertaken, as argued 
earlier, as a necessary step in the process of 
modernisation. Social relations and social mobility in 
modernising Japan would not be regulated by birth-rights 
and social status but essentially through efficiency and 
meritocracy. This has led to important transformations in 
the Japanese traditional social stratification with the 
gradual disappearance of class division which had 
characterized Japan. These profound changes, in turn, 
largely contributed in speeding up the process of 
modernisation. 
However, it should also be noted that the 
Japanese approach to modernisation during the Meiji period, 
was not free from problems and contradictions. As was 
underlined in the general argument of the theseis, the 
adoption of the Western model of development creates 
disruptive effects in other contexts. 
One of the strongest effects of the West in Japan 
was the development of militarism. This was initially aimed 
at protecting the country against foreign penetration, but 
rapidly it became, as in the Western tradition, a major 
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means for imperialist expansionism. The militarisation of 
Japan conditioned the process of its development which 
bacame more strongly geared towards warfare than towards 
socio-economic development(174). 
However, during the period between 1878 and 1900, 
important economic developments occured. The opening of the 
ports for foreign trade had stimulated further developments. 
Imports and exports increased quickly along with industrial 
and technical development leading to the expansion of 
communication networks(175). The involvement of the 
government in laying the industrial infrastructure and 
foundations had decisive effects on speeding Japanese 
development. In its early stage of leadership the Meiji 
state had a complete control over the economy, but gradually 
the private sector emerged with the expansion of firms and 
enterprises. It was in fact the strong relationship and 
co-operation between the state and the private 
enterprises(176), both drawing from, and relying on some of 
the socio-cultural values of the Japanese society that 
account for the country's remarkable development(177). 
An important aspect of the Japanese experience of 
development and modernisation, which is relevant to 
developing nations such as those of the Maghreb, is that 
Japan was essentially an agrarian society. Modernisation and 
economic development were initiated in a predominently rural 
poulation with limited industrial activities(178). During 
Japan's development the role of agriculture was dominant 
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employing the largest proportion of its labour force and 
constituting its main source of revenue. It is also 
suggested that industrialization was not undertaken at the 
expense of agriculture as is often the case in 
industrializing countries. In Japan agriculture was used to 
subsidise industry, to contribute to industrial development, 
especially after the Land Reform Act of 1873 when land 
distribution and taxation were rationalized and new 
techniques, such as fertilizers and courses in agriculture 
and farming, were introduced(179). 
An important development in agriculture and its 
link with industrial development was the diversification of 
agricultural products (such as new rice varieties); the 
development of sericulture wihch led to development of a 
silk fabrics industry. This was followed by growth in 
textile and cotton spinning industries. These products 
constituted, with tea, the major exports. In fact by 1918 
Japan became a major competitor in the silk fabrics trade. 
Silk, tea, and textile revenues were reinvested in capital 
goods imports, such as machinery(18O). Hence, gradually, the 
Japanese economy was moving from agriculture, to light 
industry, to heavy industry, especially armaments, ship 
building, iron and steel. Gradually the nature of imports 
and exports was changing, from exporting raw materials and 
importing finished goods. By the end of the Meiji period, 
Japan was able to reduce its imports of manufactured goods 
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to a minimum and Japan was able by 1870 to export finished 
goods(181). Rapidly, Japan was becoming a major partner 
with, and a competitor of the world powers. 
It is the argument here that it is 
'internalisation' and adaptation of the Western model to the 
Japanese context, rather than transplanting it as a whole, 
which distinguishes the Japanese experience. At the same 
time a process of internal adaptations to the requirements 
of modernisation and development were undertaken, as for 
example in the modernisation and diversification of 
agriculture. These internal and external adaptations have 
reduced Japanese dependence on the West, and lessened the 
disruptive effects of Western thought and practice in 
Japan's socio-cultural context. 
Consequently, in a short span of time (mainly 
from the Meiji Restoration to the First World War), the 
Japanese leadership succeeded in setting up a consolidated 
and largely unified political system, was able to achieve 
important institutional reforms and social changes, and 
established strong industrial base. 
The Japanese experience raises questions about 
the validity of the linear-evolutionary Western theorising: 
the speed of the Japanese changes makes it difficult to 
locate the transitions between stages, or even the stages 
themselves. However it is also important to note that the 
importation of the Western model, with its technology and 
know-how, were crucial in Japan's transformation to 
modernity. 
But the successes were not without a price. As 
stated earlier Japanese militarism and imperialism, its 
conflicts with Western powers in general and the United 
States in particular, was a result of the Western impact in 
this area and mainly of the Japanese attempt to achieve the 
Western level of power and military strength. The 
transplantation of this foreign model, and the international 
relations it entails have adversly affected the Japanese 
process of development and modernisation. The Japanese did 
not succeed in their attempt to be accepted among the world 
powers, but were rather driven into wars and destruction and 
subordination to the West, namely America. 
After that experience and its consequences, a 
more systematic process of adaptation of the Western model 
(in its thought and practice) was undertaken. 
This approach was reflected in Japanese post-war 
political and economic policies and international relations. 
Efforts were geared towards consolidating national political 
and institutional structures, reinforcing the existing 
economic bases, and expanding and diversifying international 
relations(182). Self-reliance became a major objective in 
Japanese developmental policy. 
Overall, it is suggested that the acquisition of 
knowledge and modern technology have been the moving forces 
in the Japanese development: hence the emphasis on education 
in the process of nation-buiding. This stress on education 
reflects an awarness of the socio-cultural dimension in the 
Japanese approach to development. However it must be noted 
that the importance given to education is not new in the 
Japanese context. Emphasis on the accumulation of knowledge 
and the absorption of foreign know-how has been a 
characteristic of the Japanese, from their emulation of 
China to the present day. This thirst for knowledge, 
accumulation, and receptivity to foreign ideas, underlines 
the strong emphasis put on education in the Japanese 
context. 
It is the argument here that the major aim of 
Japanese education was, and still is, to provide and secure 
an efficiently trained manpower, within national cultural 
characteristics (eg.loyalty) as the principal frame in 
national development. It is also the argument that with its 
very limited natural resources, its need to rely almost 
exclusively on external capital and knowledge, education in 
Japan has constituted the major source for its access to 
modernity. Hence the strikingly strong emphasis on 
educational achievement in the Japanese society. 
Today education provision in Japan has achieved 
high levels: 100 per cent of the age cohort arein the 
primary cycle (6 to 12); 94 per cent in intermediary 
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education, and 88.6 per cent finish secondary education. 
There are in Japan 981 universities and institutions of 
higher education (Colleges) of which 216 are state 
controlled(183). Access to higher education is highly 
selective. There are two qualifying examinations for entry: 
the first is organised by the National Centre of 
Universities, the second examination set by individual 
universities is dependent on success in the first. It allows 
access to the different universities depending on the 
results achieved. 
Fierce competition and severe selection are the 
preeminent features of the Japanese educational system. This 
is due to the tight relationship between educational 
institutions and the job market. This underlines the social 
transformations in Japan and the process of internal 
adaptations to the requirements of development and 
modernisation. Meritocracy rather than aristocracy, 
efficiency rather than ideology, are stressed through 
education(184). 
Education in Japan is therefore basically geared 
to producing the human capital necessary for national 
development. The general aim is to train competent and 
skilled manpower, possessing a flexible mind and the ability 
to adapt to new situations, to be able to innovate and 
rapidly grasp the process and strategy of the enterprise 
within national economic and socio-cultural structures(185). 
It is the argument here that the close relationship 
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between the state and industrial enterprises, and the 
attention given by both to national socio-cultural values 
are reflected in the Japanese educational system. The close 
relationship between formal education institutions and the 
enterprises, between educational achievement and 
professional life, creates intensive competition. Education 
is used purposefully to serve practical ends in the process 
of nation-building. Hence, education in Japan is an 
important economic resource, as the provider of qualified 
manpower. Also is the major means used to reinforce and 
perpetuate national cultural values (traditional and modern) 
which form the bases of the Japanese national cohesion. This 
has been strengthened by a single and developed unifying 
language, the Japanese national language. In Japan, although 
there are regional dialects, the national language is 
accessible to the majority, if not the totality of the 
population(186). 
Today Japan is in the vanguard of the third 
revolution of industrial technology. Japanese large-scale, 
urban centered, industrialisation and level of modernisation 
is sustained by a modern political structure, with a strong 
central government which has provided an adequate political 
leadership and economic and social structures and 
institutions which constituted strong support and incentive 
to development and modernisation(187). 
In the process of its modernisation, Japan has 
had to undergo fundamental changes politically (with the 
establishment of a strong central authority and the 
achievement of unity), socially (with the preponderence of 
efficiency over rank or social origin), and economically 
(with a rational organisation and use of the available 
resources). These structural, institutional, and social 
transformations were, in general terms, conceived and 
adopted along Western lines. 
The Japanese experience thus presents at one 
level a case of convergence and immersion with the West, 
since it changed from a backward, agrarian and feudal 
society, to an industrially developed, urban, more or less 
liberal, and secular society. The process of its 
modernisation was based on a conscious imitation of the 
Western model. Its present achievements bear striking 
similarities with those of Western modernised societies: a 
high rate of industrialization, with an important degree of 
self-sustaining growth; a modern political structure with 
means for democratic representation; a system of universal 
education; and a social mobility determined by efficiency 
and merit. These phenomena fit the indicators proposed by 
most Western theorists of development and modernisation. 
However, the major argument put forward in the 
case of Japan is that, in spite of similarities with the 
Western model of development, and in spite of the degree of 
impact of this model, Japanese modernisation presents a 
specific and distinctive case. It is suggested that the 
Japanese experience, refutes the universal validity of the 
Western model as emphasized by Western theories of 
development. The Japanese case underlines the importance of 
the local context: the socio-cultural characteristics which 
affect the process of modernisation. 
The political, social, cultural and even economic 
transformations of Japan are rooted in its historical 
process of development, going back to to its earliest 
contacts with China and its culture. Development began prior 
to its contact with the West(188). Even during the period of 
isolation which lasted for over two centuries, there was 
important dynamism and preludes to change, mainly during the 
seventeenth century(189). Therefore, Western influence 
constituted an extra stimulus to internal potent forces. 
Japanese emulation of the Western model was in fact based on 
careful selection and adaptation of foreign elements 
considered as useful to its modernisation, but at the same 
time compatible with its social and cultural setting. The 
Japanese legal system , for instance, was established with a 
structure inspired by French, British, and German models. 
But it drew also from its social tradition and customs, 
specific assumptions and values concerning family relations, 
the reciprocal obligations of individuals, and the moral 
codes governing the while social fabric. These elements were 
incorporated, though often in a subtle way, in the 
system(190). 
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The Japanese experience of development is 
presented in this thesis as an example of a successful 
adaptation of the Western model of development rather than 
its 'blind' adoption. Its modernisation has been influenced 
by Western thought and practice. However these were 
incorporated, and improved upon, thanks to its own cultural 
traits, its people's sense of duty, entrepreneurship, thirst 
for knowlege, and creativity. 
In this context nationalism has been important. 
However, Japanese nationalism is particular in its strong 
emphasis on efficiency. It is this pragmatic approach to 
national issues that propelled its modernisation and which 
is relevant to countries as those of the Maghreb where 
nationalism as an ideology is strongly emphasized. 
It is thus the theme of nationalism as an 
ideology which is underlined in the following chapter. But 
befrore attention turns to the Maghreb, it is useful to pull 
together the themes of this chapter, against the general 
argument of the thesis. 
Conclusion 
The period following World War Two witnessed 
the scramble of colonialism and imperialism which led to the 
emergence of an important number of new political entities: 
the newly independent states, as was the case of the three 
Maghrebian states (Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria). Once 
political independence achieved, these states were to 
undertake the process of nation-building in order to 
establish and reinforce their sovreignty and achieve 
national development and modernisation. A need was then 
felt, in these emerging states to find means and ways to 
initiate and sustain a process of development to achieve a 
level of modernisation similar to that of the Western 
industrialized countries. Therefore, the Western World 
offered a viable source of reference in terms of development 
and modernisation. 
This viability of the Western model was 
emphasised by Western theories of development, especially 
those formulated during the late fifties and early sixties. 
These theories, and in fact subsequent ones, were based on 
two major assumptions which proved inadequate and even 
misleading for the emerging nations: 
- The universal validity, and necessary use, of the 
Western model of development for modernisation, 
- the preponderence of industrialisation and economic 
growth in this process. 
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The adoption of the Western model of development, 
with the political, economic, social, and cultural 
influences it entails, has, instead of propelling 
development and modernisation in the emerging nations, 
created problems and obstacles to the process of 
nation-building. The gap between industrialized and 
industrializing nations has been widening. This led to the 
emergence of alternative theoretical approaches to 
development such as neo-Marxists, and mainly dependency 
theorising. 
These theories have emphasized the unequal 
international relations between developed and developing 
nations, and stressed that underdevelopment in the emerging 
nations is but a consequence of the development of 
capitalist Western nations. Therefore, to break: this 
dominant-dominated relationship a 'delinking' with the 
Western capitalist system approach to development was 
proposed as the way toward the development of the new 
nations. 
However, these alternative theories to 
development, although voicing the intellectual perspective 
of the developing nations, were also based on the general 
assumptions proposed by the theories they criticise. The 
approach - of the alternative theories - is also based on a 
universal perception of the different developing nations and 
consequently proposes a universal solution: breaking with 
the Western system and repalcing it by a radical socialist 
-92- 
system. In so doing, the neo-Marxists have ignored, as did 
other theorists, the importance of socio-cultural 
specificities in any process of development. Furtheremore, 
their solution of a radical break with the West, in this 
increasingly internationally-based world order, is probably 
impossible. 
The experiences of China and Japan have emphasized 
the argument that neither the 'convergence with the West' 
approach proposed by the 'evolutionary' (capitalist 
oriented) theories, nor the 'delinking' approach proposed by 
the radical (Marxist-inspired) theories are adequate 
formulas for development in emerging nations such as those 
of the Maghreb. The Western model and its influence, when 
not adapted, had disruptive effects in the societies it was 
introduced in. The Chinese as well as parts of the Japanese 
experience have attested to the problems arising from 
imposed rather than selected Western forms of influence. The 
delinking approach adopted by China has led to a set of 
economic, social, and political problems. In turn, this has 
led especially in the after-Mao period, to a reconsideration 
by the Chinese themselves, of such a radical approach to 
national policies for development. There seems to be a 
readiness in China, though hesitant, to turn back towards 
the West and the international world, for a model of 
modernisation which can only be possible through an 
interdependence. 
It is suggested here that the Western world 
remains the major source of modern knowledge, science, and 
technology. As a model, it has much to offer to those 
nations still in the initial phases of their process of 
development and moderniosation. However, the point is that, 
because it constitutes a model, it cannot be applied without 
adaptation to other contexts with their specific aims, 
characteristics, and possibilities. 
The example of Japan, in its relation to this 
point is that this 'convergence', has been based on Japanese 
terms: that is, the ability, not to adopt, but to select and 
adapt Western modes of thought and practice to its own 
context, needs, and aspirations. This strategy of combining 
Eastern values with Western techniques could be a useful 
model for the Maghreb which is still in search for a 
balance, between a strong desire for national cultural 
preservation and an equally strong desire to achieve a 
Western-based modernisation. 
However, the Japanese experience and its 
achievements are the result of its own particular conditions 
and circumstances. Therefore, it too remains a model, and 
like any other model of development cannot be transplanted 
into another context without having the same disruptive 
effects the Western model has had. 
Thus, one can note that, Japanese pragmatism has 
been apparant in Japan's realisation, and acceptance, of 
Western economic, social and technological superiority. One 
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can note its success in incorporating, through rigorous 
selection, useful elements of Western theories and 
technologies. One can note efficiency and meritocracy have 
become the major conditions for social mobility. One can 
note its investment in education. One can note that, through 
internal and external adaptations, Japan has been able to 
ensure national as well as international integration and 
achieve a high degree of modernisation. And one can even 
note that it is this national as well as international 
integration which constitute the major concern for the three 
countries of the Maghreb: Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. In 
the process of their nation-building they are faced with the 
dilemma of achieving modernisation while preserving their 
specific cultural identity. Modernisation is partly 
dependent on the West while national cultural identity is 
based on the Arabo-Islamic culture. 
But in so noting, there is no suggestion that the 
Japanese or Chinese experiences are transferable or should 
be, to the Maghreb. 
The Chinese and Japanese cases establish some 
caveats or limits on accepting the usefulness of Western 
theorising or rpcipies. for development in the third world. 
The Chinese and Japanese cases provide illustrations of the 
difficulties of combining nation-building with economic 
development - especially the dangers of domestic or 
international political instability. But they are mainly 
useful as warnings both about the over-simplicities of some 
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of the major theories of development which have influenced 
men's behaviour and about the importance of local 
socio-cultural specificities in influencing development. 
It is now time to address the question of the 
local socio-cultural specificities of the Maghreb directly, 
with special reference to the role of language policies in 
those contexts. This is the whork of chapters three and 
four. 
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CHAPTER III. 
Modernisation and National Identity. 
Language Policies and Modernisation in the Maghreb. 
The purpose of this chapter is firstly to locate 
the role of nationalism and language in the process of 
nation-building, and to look more specifically at the 
importance given to language in the Maghrebian states within 
the process of their particular process of development. The 
second purpose is to investigate comparatively the 
contradictions(1) and the fluctuations(2) in terms of 
language policies in the three selected countries of the 
Maghreb. These policies will be examined in relation to the 
political and economic contexts which have influenced these 
policies. 
The arguments of the chapter are: 
- that both social actors and social theorists have 
identified the central importance of language in the 
creation of national identity; and that political actors in 
the three countries of the Maghreb have used the language 
issue to promote nationalism and national identification as 
important bases for nation-building, 
- that the present language situation and the related 
problems are the result of the specific historical processes 
of each of these countries, namely the impact of 
colonisation and especially French colonisation, 
-112- 
- that politics, focused through the power of the state, 
have framed language policies as a contentious and 
ideological issue, 
- thus, as the politics of language are determined by 
ideological rather than practical considerations there are 
frequently contradictions between official stated aims and 
actual practices, 
- that the economic policies adopted in each country, 
largely inspired by the Western model and dependent on. 
Western thought and practice, have reinforced these 
contradictions. The strong commitment to both national 
identity and modernisation underlines these contradictions 
and has led to fluctuations in language policies, between 
these two aims, and has made problematic the role and status 
of the French language, 
- that the experiences of development of these countries 
emphasize the general argument of the previous chapter: the 
disruptive effects of the adoption - without adaptation - of-
the Western model of development in a different 
socio-political context, especially when national cultural 
identity is strongly stressed. 
While there are important similarities between the 
three countries(3), their political systems and structures 
and their political emphases differ. Hence, their policies 
in terms of national identity and national modernisation 
differ accordingly. The type of colonisation experienced by 
each of them, its length and strength, has shaped the 
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process of their decolonisation, especially their approach 
to national cultural identity symbolized in the Arabic 
language. 
Morocco as a constitutional Monarchy claims a 
democratic system allowing the existence of different 
political parties. Its economy is capitalist-oriented and 
its relations with the West are based on a liberal 
approach(4). The type of colonisation, as a French 
protectorate with less direct control, and its time period 
resulted in a lesser colonial impact. Its transition to 
independence was smoother(5) than in Algeria, which led to 
the maintenance of closer relations with France. There has 
also been, since Independence, continuous emphasis on 
decolonisation while there has been incresing relations and 
reliance on the West in general and on France in particular, 
The Arabic language has been used as the symbol of national 
identity and as the means of cultural decolonisation, 
whereas French is seen, and used, as the means to 
modernisation and international relations. 
Tunisia is a republic claiming a liberal 
political system, though with only one official party. Its 
economy oscillates between capitalism and socialism(6). 
However, like Morocco, Tunisia has maintained open relations 
with the West. Tunisia was also a French Protectorate and 
experienced a shorter period of colonisation than Algeria, 
with less colonial impact. The transition to independence 
was even smoother than in Morocco and thus French-Tunisian 
relations were characterized by 
continuity(7), The contradictions and fluctuations in 
language policies in the Tunisian case emerge from the 
official emphasis on the Arabo-Islamic identity, symbolized 
and expressed in the Arabic language, and the desire to 
modernise on the Western model, through the use of the 
French language. The strong commitment of the Tunisian 
leaders to both has led to the maintenance of the two 
languages. Each fulfils specific roles and aspirations. The 
Arabic language is used to achieve national integration 
while the French is used for international integration 
(especially with the West). In spite of their different 
political systems, Tunisia and Morocco share a relatively 
similar approach to language policy. This can be described 
as a more moderate approach to language policy than in 
Algeria, which because of its specific historical and 
political contexts, has adopted a radical approach to 
language. 
Algeria is a republic based on a claimed socialist 
system with one official party. Its economy is socialist, in 
the sense that it is state-controlled, and its relations 
with the West are selective. Foreign participation in the 
national economy is rather limited and is made through the 
appropriate official agencies. Among the three contries 
Algeria experienced the longest and strongest type of 
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colonisation. It was under the direct control of France for 
over a century. The colonial imprint was therefore much 
stronger than in the other two countries. Algeria's 
transition to independence was achieved after a long-lasting 
war and important political conflicts with France. Hence, 
the process of decolonisation was more radical. 
The contradictions regarding language policies are 
reflected, as in the two other cases, in the strong emphasis 
on a national identity based on the Arabo-Islamic culture 
and the adoption of the Western model of development. 
However, the process of development has yielded increasing 
relations with the West and the need to maintain the French 
language as an important medium for modernisation. Here 
again there is a strong and continuous claim for economic 
and cultural decolonisation whereas modernisation, based on 
heavy industrialisation, has led to greater reliance on 
Western technology, thought and practice. 
The three countries of the Maghreb are therefore 
engaged in the achievement of two major objectives in their 
nation-building: the establishment of a national cultural 
identity and modernisation. The former is derived from the 
Arabo-Islamic culture where language holds a central role; 
the latter is largely dependent on the Western model and 
what it entails, such as the need to maintain the 
ex-colonial language. 
However, the issue of language is perceived and 
tackled differently in each of the three countries. This is 
related to their relatively different colonial experiences, 
and their political and economic structures. 
To pursue the general arguments outlined above, 
this chapter will be organised as follows: 
Section I is a general introduction to the 
chapter. It will deal with nationalism and language and 
their role in nation-building. Emphasis in this section will 
be on the importance of language in nation-forming in 
general and in the Maghreb in particular. 
Section II, as the core part of the chapter, deals 
with the processes of nation-building of the three 
countries. The following sub-sections are analysed for each 
country: 
a) the historical context, 
b) the political context, 
c) language policies, 
d) the economic context. 
In this chapter, the process of nation-building 
with its historical setting, political context, language 
policies, and economic context of each country will be 
treated separately. This is to underline the general theme 
of the thesis stressing the importance of local 
specificities in the process of development. The order in 
which the three countries are treated in this and the 
following chapters is based on the sequence, in time, of 
their access to independence: Morocco in March 1950, Tunisia 
in June 1956, and Algeria in July 1962. 
Section I: Nationalism and Language. 
The purpose of this section is to analyse briefly 
the importance of language and nationalism in the creation 
of nations in general and in the Maghreb in particular. The 
argument is that language, as a central ingredient in 
nationalism can be a unifying force in claims for national 
identity. However, language can also be a major source of 
disunity after the initial excitment of the creation of a 
nation-state. 
Nationalism has been a major force which has 
contributed to the shaping of the world today with its 
division into nation-states. The three countries of the 
Maghreb, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria gained access to 
independence, during the late 1950s and early 1960s, after a 
long chain of colonisation and foreign interventions(8). The 
latest foreign penetration was French colonisation which 
started in Algeria during the mid-eighteenth century, in 
Tunisia in the last part of the same century, and in Morocco 
in the early nineteenth century. 
Thus, in the Maghreb, as in other parts of the 
world, nationalism which had characterized late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century Europe spread to the colonies, 
especially after the second world war, and was the genesis 
of the emergence and construction of "new" nation-states 
(commonly called the emerging nations). But what is 
nationalism, and what is the role of language in 
nationalism, especially in the case of the Maghreb?. 
Nationalism as a modern phenomenon(9) is 
commonly recognized as a potent and powerful force for 
promoting a sense of groupness and solidarity. As such 
nationalism has contributed to the emergence and 
consolidation of nations. Hence the close relationship which 
exists between the idea of a nation and nationalism(10). 
The concept of nation(11) refers, generally, to a 
notion of droupness, a manifestation of a "national 
conscience" based on a sense of solidarity and 
affiliation(12). This is often perceived within a political 
and geographic unit with a number of ingredients such as a 
common history of race, traditions, culture and language, 
which constitute the bases of a 'national identity' and a 
'national unity'. National cultural identity as an 
'affective' conception of beloning to a specific nation has 
constituted the core of nationalism. It is this form of 
nationalism, seeking nation formation and development, which 
has influenced the widespread movement of 'national 
consciousness' which characterized the twentieth century, 
particularly following World War I and World War II, in 
different parts of the world(13). 
Hence, because of its power to generate support 
and cohesion, nationalism has been used by political leaders 
in the Maghreb, as elsewhere, to promote a national 
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awarness, to create a sense of solidarity and community and 
to establish, (or re-establish) an independent state or 
nation(14). 
Cultural identity has been central in stimulating 
and fostering nationalist sentiments. Ethnic and cultural 
identification has been used by most, if not all, 
nationalists as the catalyst of group solidarity. Cultural 
identity creates a sense of common bonds, of 'sharing', of 
common traits, affiliations, and aims(15). 
Ethnocultural identification has helped create 
nations and liberate populations from dependance and 
subjugation, as was the case with the Maghrebian states. 
Thus, in this context aspects of cultural identity, 
such as language, are used, as in the Maghreb, as important 
symbols in nationalism, and sustain national sentiment and 
national mobilization. Nationalism was not only used against 
the colonial power but it continued to be used after 
independence to achieve political legitimacy. Consequently 
the language question has become central to the politics and 
policies of the Maghreb. 
Language as an important element in national 
cultural identity has been a powerful element in nationalism 
and its maintenance(16). But why is language in particular 
of such significance in national identification? 
Language is seen as the means by which a nation 
asserts its existence, ensures its continuity and protects 
itself from outsider influence. For Fichte, for instance, 
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language was the national soul, and its defence was 
simultaneously, a defence of the nation(17). Hence the need 
for a nation to have and assert its own language as the main 
expression of its identity. 
A people without a language of its own 
is only half a nation. A nation should 
guard its language more than its 
territories - 'tis a surer barrier, a 
more important frontier than fortress 
or river. 
(18) 
The importance given to language, the strong 
attachement to it as one of the most significant indicators 
and tools of national identity, is due to the 'intrinsic' 
value of language and its qualities as a communicative as 
well as symbolic device for the individual and the 
society(19). It is because of both its 'instrumental' 
function (as a tool of expression and communication) and its 
'symbolic' function( as an element of national 
identification and assertion) that language often played a 
central role in nationalism. As a powerful tool of 
communication and interaction, it has been the medium of the 
'message of nationalism': the means of spreading it and of 
transmitting national ideology. Because of its identitive 
connotations, its integrative power and its historical and 
cultural associations, language in fact surpasses its 
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instrumental role to become a symbol, if not the symbol, of 
national identity. Hence from a mere tool of communication, 
language, as an important element in nationalism becomes a 
conduit carrying the ancestral cultural heritage and 
'historic greatness'(20). 
Hence in Maghrebian nationalism it is asserted 
by the political elite, especially in Algeria, that 
preserving the national language is the major means of 
safeguarding national cultural values and national 
identity. Consequently language has become a political 
issue, and considered as basic to sociocultural and 
political integration. 
It is mainly because of its symbolic values that 
language has been so significant in the nationalism of the 
three countries of the Maghreb(21). This is because of the 
'sacred' and 'holy' attributions given to the Arabic 
language as the expression and the major defining 
characteristic of Islam. Arabo-Islamic tradition, symbolized 
by the Arabic language, was an efficient instrument of unity 
and mobilization against colonialism.The Arabo-Islamic 
identity which was among the principal justifications for 
independence, continues to be used as a mobilizing force in 
the process of nation building, as a means to guarantee 
mass-participation and adhesion to the leadership of these 
states. 
The official adoption of a common unifying Arabic 
language, submerging regional differences, was therefore 
seen by the political elite of the three countries as an 
important means for fostering national cohesion, and 
participation in the process of national development and 
modernisation. Hence language in these 'new polities' 
became, for political leaders, an issue to be settled 
urgently, if national consensus and national adhesion were 
to be realized. 
However, the three emerging nations of the Maghreb 
were faced at Independence with other pressing problems and 
priorities. In the process of nation building, they had on 
the one hand to ensure their political stability, dependent 
on accommodating their population into a unified political 
and socio-cultural framework, and on the other hand to 
ensure the development of their political, social and 
economic structures, in accordance with the model of 
development of the advanced (mainly Europeans) nations. 
In these processes, the role given to language was important 
- and a review of decisions and difficulties connected with 
language policies is one work of the next sub-section. 
Section II: The process of nation building. 
The purpose of this section is to analyse 
comparatively, language policies in the three countries of 
the Maghreb within historical, political, and economic 
contexts. 
The major arguments pursued in this section are: 
- that the Arabic language became, with the advent of Islam, 
a central feature of the Maghrebian societies. This language 
was absorbed and integrated into the local contexts, 
subsequently giving birth however to local dialects. In 
addition the Berber language has been preserved by important 
proportions of the population in Morocco and Algeria. 
- that the Western impact, mainly through French 
colonisation, and later on through the importation of its 
model of development, has generated problems and 
contradictions especially in linguistic terms. 
- that economic policies, with their emphasis on 
industrialisation (of agrarian societies), have led to 
increasing dependence on the West and have increased 
tensions over language policies. 
- that these language policies are politically sensitive and 
inefficient in practical terms both in terms of the 
socio-linguistic context and in the effects of the adopted 
policies. 




a) The historical context: 
The particular historical development of Morocco 
has shaped its present socio-economic and political 
structure and orientations. The two major historical events 
which have had far reaching effects in the Moroccan context 
(politically, economically, and culturally) were its contact 
with firstly the Arabs and secondly with the French. These 
contacts have left their imprints in the socio-cultural 
framework of this country. The Arabo-Islamic culture is 
accepted while the French, linked with colonisation, is 
questioned (principally by the political leadership). 
The Arabo-Islamic culture implanted in this area 
especially between the tenth and fifteenth centuries was 
paralleled by economic prosperity, internal organisation 
(political, social, military) and a notable commercial 
expansion with the Islamic empire controlling a large net of 
commercial routes(22). However, internal divisions and wars 
and the Turkish threat contributed to the weakening of the 
reigning Dynasty and led to serious financial difficulties. 
It was during this period, from the fifteenth century, that 
the Islamic empire began to decline. At the same time. 
Europe was undergoing an unprecedented development. Its 
industrialisation, and socio-economic progress led to the 
need for its expansion outside its borders in a search for 
markets, raw materials, and larger spheres of control and 
influence. 
Morocco, because of its strategic position, and 
precarious political and economic situation, presented an 
attractive place for the increasing European imperialist and 
colonialist ambitions. So, Morocco, from the mid-fifteenth 
century, was increasingly attracting European interest as an 
important route for commercial and political penetration. 
This led to the signature of treaties in 1856, opening the 
gates for European products and influence. A Moroccan-French 
convention was signed in 1863 granting commercial 
privileges to French products and another treaty with Spain 
was made with an important indemnity for previous wars 
between the two countries. 
Hence, Morocco, in a short span of time, became a 
centre for the rivalries of European powers, mainly France, 
Spain, Germany, and Britain. For Great Britain, concerned 
with the security of Gibraltar, it represented a strategic 
political spot. For Spain, in addition to its strategic 
position, it represented the recovery and acquisition of 
expanded borders. However, it was for France that the 
Maghreb was most important in terms of economic and 
political ambitions(23). 
With its control of Algeria, the control of 
Morocco became necessary for France. This led, in spite of 
resistance from inside Morocco, and opposition from the 
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other Europen powers, to French success in annexing Morocco 
to its empire. France gradually managed to reach agreements 
first with Britain then with the other rivals allowing its 
supremacy in the control of Morocco. 
Morocco came under French control from 1912. 
However it remained a zone of international interests, 
especially in terms of commercial exchanges, with Spain 
controlling the Northern part of the country. But French 
domination was reinforced, and for fourteen years Morocco 
was a French protectorate. Although its colonisation was 
'indirect', French penetration, politically, economically 
and culturally was important in affecting Moroccan society 
as a whole. A process of modernisation, that is 
industrialisation and a new socio-political organisation, 
was undertaken. Capital investment, the creation of an 
economic and industrial infrastructure, the development of a 
modern agriculture, were among the most important changes 
brought about by French colonisation in Morocco(24). 
However, it is suggested here that these economic 
and industrial transformations were aimed at fostering the 
interests of the colonial powers and at consolidating the 
development and modernisation of the metropole. 
Consequently, they strongly disrupted the existing 
socio-cultural and economic patterns of the Moroccan 
society. This affected mainly the rural areas where the most 
fertile land, was colonized and its owners uprooted(25). 
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These disruptive effects of French colonisation in Morocco 
eventually led to the emergence of nationalist liberation 
movements. 
The Moroccan nationalist movement against French 
domination started with rural revolts during the twenties as 
a reaction to increasing rural colonisation. These revolts 
gradually developed by 1930 into an organized general 
movement for national independence, involving the rural as 
well as the urban population. The Second World War and its 
effects on the expansion of nationalism, the tightening and 
hardening of French occupation, its recourse to direct 
control through military intervention and the extension of 
land colonisation, and finally the deposition of Sultan 
Mohammed V in 1953 contributed to the strengthening of 
nationalism in Morocco and led to the weakening of French 
colonialism(26). Hence negotiations for the independence of 
Morocco were undertaken between France and national 
representatives and culminated in Independence in March 
1956. 
It is suggested that ideas about a national 
identity, drawn from the Arabo-Islamic tradition, played a 
key-role in stimulating and sustaining nationalism in this 
area, and because of its power in sustaining people's unity 
and adhesion, it has continued to be a central theme in the 
processs of nation building. 
The Arabic language as the 'sacred' language of 
the Koran, has been a salient feature in Arabo-Islamic 
identification. In Morocco, as in the other countries, 
Arabic was therfore used as a means of reaction to, and 
protection against French cultural, and especially 
linguistic influence. From the onset of Moroccan 
nationalism, the reestablishment and reinforcement of Arabic 
as the official national language, and the principal 
feacture of national identity, was emphasised(27). 
Morocco's position between the Western and Eastern 
Worlds has made of it a centre for different cultural 
contacts throughout history(28). The adoption of Islam, and 
The Arabic language became the overriding distinctive 
features of the emerging Moroccan cultural identity. However 
the French influence also left deeply rooted cultural and 
linguistic marks. This was reinforced by the policies 
adopted for national construction and modernisation after 
independance. Furthermore, the Moroccan socio-cultural 
setting contains another important feature: the Berber 
language and culture, preserved by an important proportion 
of the society and having an impact Moroccan culture in 
general(29). 
Therefore, it is suggested here that the adoption 
of the classical form of Arabic, which is different from the 
spoken variety, as the official national language in 
Morocco, without an analysis of the existing socio-cultural 
and linguistic situation, has led to problems in the 
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society. These have resulted principally from the extreme 
centrality of politics and power of the state in the 
Moroccan process of nation-building. The race for power and 
political legitimacy has characterized the Moroccan 
political elite since Independence. In this context 
nationalism and the emphasis on the Araboo-Islamic cultural 
identity in general and the Arabic language in particular 
were used as symbols and means for political exercise and 
influence. Consequently ideology, though useful in framing 
language policies, has reduced efficiency in implementing 
them. 
b) The Political Context 
The political situation of Morocco which emerged 
at Independence, after a long period of foreign 
intervention, had two major characteristics: the powerful 
position of the Monarchy and the intense battle for power 
among the different political parties. The Monarchy emerged 
at Independence as a legitimate and powerful political 
institution with the Sultan (who became officially the King 
in 1957) as the living symbol of nationalism, victory, and 
unity. Mohammed V restabilished his throne as the principal 
locus of power, legitimacy, and unity(30). He represented 
political as well as religious institutions in accordance 
with the Arabo-Islamic tradition, holding the title of 
'Amir-El-Moumininin' (The Commander of the Faithful)(31). 
The Moroccan Monarch was however in favour of a modern form 
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of polity, a constitutional monarchy with a democratic type 
of government, that is with an assembly, a constitution, and 
multi-party system(32). 
Shortly after Independence a Consultative 
Assembly (parliament) was created in August 1956 as an 
initial step towards the democratic institutionalisation of 
the monarchy, but the Assembly members were nominated by the 
king and not elected. The King considered that a democracy 
should be established progressively and only when people 
have attained a certain level of political maturity"(33). In 
a speech delivered in 1956 and he stated: 
It is necessary to proceed by stages to 
lay the grounds of the democracy, we want to 
establish, on the bases of political 
maturity, civic education and social 
promotion. 
(34) 
In Morocco, independence from France was the 
initial step in nation-building. Nationalism has continued 
to be stressed to ensure popular support, mobilization, and 
unification around the political elite represented 
principally by the king. The Monarchy has been since 
independence the major institution transcending any other 
institution, giving to the king supreme authority in terms 
of decision-making, or in accepting or rejecting any policy 
proposed by the government. Claiming his descent from the 
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Prophet himself, the king is the temporal and spiritual 
leader of the Moroccan nation(35). His 'Divine' power 
(expressed in his title of the 'Commander of the Faithful') 
places him above the struggle for power between the 
different political parties. 
Morocco clearly reflects the tensions and 
contradictions, at the political level, between adopting, in 
the process of nation-building, a traditional (Monarchial) 
or a modern type of state on the Western model with a 
constituent assembly and different parties. King HassanII, 
coming to the throne in 1961, continued to exercise control 
over key policy sectors. However he undertook to concretise 
the option for a 'democratic' political organisation through 
a constitutional assembly(36). 
The Prime Minister is appointed by the king, and 
he appoints his own Ministers. The role of the King, in 
terms of decision-making, has been to formulate the general 
principles leaving to the government and parties the 
responsibility of establishing programmes and formulating 
specific policies. However the king and his Cabinet hold the 
power to veto any decision the Assembly and the government 
might pass (according to the Article 62 of the 1962 
constitution). In fact the parties have little influence in 
changing any policy approved by the king or in enforcing one 
rejected by him(37). Royal cabinet members as well as 
government members are nominated by the King and are 
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responsible to him. He also held the ultimate legislative 
powers and had exclusive control over the police and the 
army(38). 
Thus the ultimate power and authority are 
concentrated in the hands of the monarchy whose legitimacy 
is drawn from 'people as well as God'(39). The king is the 
living symbol of Arabo-Islamic national identity bestowed 
onto him through ancestral right. Hence his emphasis on the 
Arabo-Islamic identity of Morocco, expressed through the 
Arabic language, which constitutes an essential element in 
the King's legitimacy. The building of a modern state and 
socio-economic development following the modern Western 
example, has also constituted a major source for the 
monarchy's legitimacy. In this context the established 
modern political institutions are an extension of the 
Monarchial power. 
The three officially recognized parties at 
independence were the Istiglal party, The Democratic Party 
of Independence(PDI), and the Liberal Party of 
Independents(PIL). The Istiglal Party has been the most 
representative of the parties and has claimed legitimacy 
through its important contribution in bringing about 
independence and its support to the King. The two other 
parties (PDI and PID) were relatively much smaller than the 
Istiglal, in number and influence(40). It is assumed that 
these small parties were maintained by the King for the sole 
purpose of balancing the power held by the Istiglal 
Farty(41). 
None of the different parties in Morocco has 
offered open opposition to the Monarchy. Their opposition, 
since independence, has been directed against each other and 
their energy concentrated in the race for power reflected in 
securing a majority in the government(42). 
This struggle for power and the important discord 
between the different parties resulted in the dislocation of  
the first government dominated Istiglal members soon after 
independence(in 1956). The political situation was so 
unstable that the government was torn by party rivalries and 
their lack of consensus on the one hand, and on the other 
hand by loyalty to the king, as the ultimate power, and its 
duties towards the Parties(43). Other parties emerged after 
Independence, each claiming to represent and defend national 
interests and/or the interests of a specific national 
group. 
The bases of the new nation-state were therefore 
laid in a confused atmosphere. A race for power and 
political legitimacy characterized the Moroccan political 
scene and directly affected policies, including language 
policies. 
The air of political rivalry was so 
bitter that important matters could 
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not be brought up in meetings of the 
Council of Ministers and the Highest 
Council of Government became useless 
as a decision maker... The political 
Parties role in decision-making process 
was purely dilatory. Unable to force a 
measureCsic3, they were frequently 
successful in enforcing their will only 
by blocking action. 
(44) 
For the Monarchy, as well as the different political 
parties, Arabization has therefore constituted a central 
theme in political discourse and a priority aim to be 
achieved in the process of nation-building. But the process 
of modernisation and economic development (on western 
lines) was as strongly emphasized as was the need to 
maintain the use of French language. 
As indicated earlier, the contradictions which 
emerge in the Moroccan political context are mainly due to 
the dilemma faced by the political leadership between 
maintaining tradition, represented by the Monarchy and its 
power, and modernisation, i.e. establishing adequate and 
efficient institutions and legislation. There is on the one 
hand an emphasis on the 'privileged' role of Morocco as a 
link between East and West and on the other hand there is 
the claim for a unifying authentic culture, Arabo-Islamic in 
essence. 
These contradictions are reflected at the level of 
foreign relations which are clearly Western-oriented. 
Because of its political system and model of development and 
Western capitalist based, Moroccan foreign relations have 
been since independence increasingly closer to the West, 
principally France, the United States, and the EEC 
countries. Interrelations and exchanges with the Arab world 
have been comparatively more restricted, generally to 
similar regimes such as Saudi-Arabia and Gulf countries. 
Language policy in Morocco clearly reflects many, 
if not most, of the contradictions of the political system 
and its oscillation between modernisation and tradition, 
between its past and its future, between Arabo-Islamic 
culture (through the Arabic language) and Western culture 
(through the French language). It also, and above all, 
reflects (in the process of nation-building) the 
contradictions between the search for power and national 
construction. 
It is therefore the argument at this point that 
the Arabic language, as the sacred language of Islam, is 
used as a powerful instrument for reinforcing the 'divine' 
origin of the Monarchy. However the need for the Monarchy to 
establish modern institutions for its survival requires the 
maintenance of the French language. The constantly opposed 
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political Parties, also primarily concerned with power and 
political legitimacy, have constantly used the issue of 
language as a major instrument in their ideological 
discourse(45). Hence, language has been a powerful device 
for nationalistic manifestations of the different political 
forces in Morocco, and has more often been rhetorically 
stressed rather than actually applied. 
Consequently language policies in Morocco, and the 
extent of their implementation, has been dependent upon, and 
reflected, the political orientation of the group in power. 
c) Language Policies 
Language is considered in Morocco, as in the two 
other countries, as primarily a political issue because of 
its roots in the onset of the nationalist movement. It 
constituted a central part of the message of nationalism as 
an essential element of national identity(46). Therefore, 
once political independence achieved it was presented as an 
integral part of the overall national policies and one of 
the major priorities in the process of national 
construction(47). It was enlisted among the principal means 
of decolonisation and the establishment, or recovery, of the 
national cultural identity and the achievement of national 
unity. This ideological value given to language was 
expressed in the Preamble of the Constitution (1962) which 
defined the kingdom as: " a sovereign Muslim state, whose 
official language is Arabic"(48). 
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As stated above the Monarchy, draws its legitimacy 
essentially from Islam and identifies with the Arabo-Islamic 
world. Consequently the option for Arabic as the national 
language is claimed as a national priority: 
With Arabisation, Morocco must recover its 
first vocation. Mohamed V considered the 
preservation of the Arab character of Morocco 
as one of his dearest principles, and it is 
thanks to him that Morocco remained an Arab 
country by its language and its traditions 
(49). 
However, King Hassen II who reigned from 1961 to 
the present day, is known for his Western oriented stand. 
His conception of the image of Morocco (present and future) 
is that of a 'crucible' for Eastern and Western 
civilisations, Africa and Europe(50). In this case the 
French language is not only necessary because of 
modernisation requirements but is also desirable as a link 
with the Western world and its civilisation. The King once 
stated that language, like culture, is international: it is 
not the 'province' of any people(51). Hence, as much as the 
Arabic language is important for the Monarchy as the 
expression and symbol of Islam, the French language is 
important as the means for modernisation and international 
integration. 
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As indicated earlier, language policies in 
Morocco have been marked by ambivalence and hesitations, 
especially at the practical level. This has resulted in 
important contradictions between the stated aims (choice of 
Arabic as the national official language) and practice 
(maintenance of French as an operational language)(52). Even 
policy formulation at the political level has been shaped 
by, and reflects, the trend and influence of those in power 
whether they are in favour of an Arabo-Islamic-Nationalist 
cultural policy or a Western-based, international one(53). 
Hence the first years of independance were marked by a 
strong claim, and practical attempts for an immediate 
implementation of the Arabic language at all levels of 
national activities, particularly in education(54). This was 
the approach of the Istiglal Party which was then the most 
important and influential Party. 
The Istiglal Party, emerging at the foreground of 
the Moroccan political scene with its members occupying 
important governemental positions, continued to emphasise 
its extreme Arabo-Isiamic nationalist doctrine. Arabic 
language and culture, their restoration and reinforcement 
were presented as the major themes in the party's political 
discourse and a priority in its political programmes. The 
claim of the party was mainly that language was central in 
the process of decolonisation and a necessary condition for 
the affirmation of national sovereignty and identity. 
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The enthusiasm for Arabisation was expressed in the 
rapid ad hoc policy of Arabisation, which was launched at 
the beginning of independence in 1956(55). Mohammed Al Fassi 
one of the founding members of the Istiglal Party, known for 
his radical pro-Arabs-Islamic position, was appointed 
Minister of Public Instruction and Fine Arts in December 
1955. He remained in his post until late 1957 and early 
1958(56). During his short term in the first Moroccan 
government, he undertook to implement the Arabisation of the 
educational system. In this context he proposed a programme, 
in 1956-1957, for both rapid Arabisation and universal 
education(57). However the lack of preparation, the lack of 
human and material means, the change of government in 1958, 
and the fading prestige of the Istiglal Party, all 
contributed to a reconsideration of, and a more cautious 
approach to the Arabisation policy which was highly 
criticized by the other Parties, teachers, and public 
opinion(58). 
No real practical provisions were made for the ways 
in which this policy was to be implemented through, taking 
into account the existing socio-cultural and economic 
possibilities of the country. Furthermore, the role and 
place of the French language in the Moroccan society was 
still perceieved as important, even for those in favour of a 
rapid and complete Arabisation. Mohamed Al-Fassi stated: 
... In the future, Arabic will be called 
upon to play the leading role both in 
the administration of industry and in 
commerce. It is in the interest of 
Moroccans to learn French just as it is 
in the interest of the French [in Morocco] 
to learn Arabic. In the Northern zone, we 
will naturally keep an important role for 
Spanish, as we do for French in the rest 
of Morocco ...French will really be the 
second national language...(59). 
The failure in the first attempt at implementing 
the Arabisation policy called for more moderate approach and 
more time. A Royal Commission for educational reform was 
therefore set up in 1958 to examine the ways in which a more 
objective approach to the introduction of Arabic in the 
educational system could be achieved. In April 1961 the 
First Congress of Arabisation was organised in Morocco 
(Rabat) and an 'Institut d'Arabisation' was set up(60). The 
approach adopted was for a gradual and progressive 
Arabization of the educational system. 
However the trend to Arabic-French bilingualism was 
increasingly felt in Moroccan political and intellectual 
circles. King Hassen II himself stated in the speech before 
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the Commission mentioned above that: "We are for 
Arabisation. But if this is a duty, bilingualism is a 
necessity..."(61). 
It is suggested here that the implementation of a 
rapid and complete Arabisation was therefore not only 
impossible but in fact not really desirable. The maintenance 
of the French language was necessary, as recognised by 
Moroccan officials themselves after the first hasty 
experience(62). This view was strongly expressed by the 
political elite stressing modernisation and economic 
development as the national priority. 
Mehdi Ben-Barka, a fervent modernist(63) has been 
expressed the attitude of most Moroccan modernists 
(including the King): 
We intend to conserve the use of French 
not so much through love of France but 
by the necessity of having an opening 
into the West ... we are firmly decided 
to go ahead with Arabisation ... and 
to affirm our Islamic culture but we 
also propose to open windows onto 
Western culture by using French as a 
complementary language ... so as not 
to remain in asphyxiating isolation 
(64) 
It is the major argument of the thesis here that 
Morocco, as in Tunisia and Algeria, the main dilemma of the 
governing elite has been in finding a balance between the 
two ideals of achieving economic and industrial development 
and establishing a national authentic identity which is 
Arabo-Islamic based. It is also the argument that the Arabic 
language is not in its present condition competitive with 
the French language in the areas of scientific and 
technological knowledge, international exchanges and so on. 
M. Lakhdar, General Secretary of the Institute of 
Arabisation has himself affirmed: "...If theArabic language 
can easily express literary and abstract notions, it cannot 
at the present time express, with such ease technical and 
scientific notions"(65). 
Therefore a rapid and complete adoption of Arabic 
as a working language at all levels of national activities, 
proved difficult if not impossible. This was because of the 
lack of human and material resources required to implement 
this language, at least in the educational system were not 
available. French was necessary for at least a transitory 
period until the Arabic language could become operational. 
M. Benhima, Minister of Education in 1966, expressed clearly 
and officially the governmental option for bilingualism 
which in fact means the maintenance of French language as a 
necessary medium for modernisation, mainly in scientific and 
technical studies. He pointed out that: "...It appears that 
for a transitory period, the use of a foreign language 
[French] as a tool of work remains unavoidable in scientific 
fields"(66). 
This desire to maintain the French language as a 
more operational language was again emphasized by the same 
Minister of Education when he stated that the "French 
language is indispensable for us. It is the language of 
technique. In Africa, what we are lacking is not verbal 
expression, but technique"(67). 
This seems to have been the prevailling attitude 
of the majority of those involved in decision-making about 
the policy of Arabisation. The principle is retained that 
Arabic is an indivisible part of national identity and 
sovereignty, while in practice the French language remains 
an unavoidable necessity. 
The issue of language has remained in Morocco a 
major subject of controversy among the different parties, 
each government, and the opposition. It has been the major 
means used by each political party to criticize and oppose 
the policies of the party in power. For instance, the 
Istiqlal Party after its time in the government constantly 
accused its successors of substituting the French language 
for the national language and hence hampering the process of 
decolonisation(68). In the Party's daily paper l'Opinion  
(French version), it was stated in headlines that "There is 
no difference between military occupation and linguistic 
colonisation"(69). 
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However in its programme of action, apart from 
constantly stressing the urgent need for a complete and 
rapid Arabisation, the Party has not proposed any efficient 
methods to put this into practice. In fact once this Party 
was back in the government in 1977, its approach to language 
policy was less intransigent towards Arabisation than in its 
first mandate. Faced with real needs and pressures, 
especially in the educational system, this Party was forced 
to call upon French 'technical assistance' (about 1700 new 
French teachers were recruited for the academic year 
1978(70). 
An Istiqlal member, appointed as Minister of 
'Education and training' (Ministere de l'education 
nationale et de la formation des cadres) in 1977 stated 
that : 
... We arabise because we are condemmed 
to arabise: the level of knowledge of 
French has become so low in our schools 
that we cannot teach in this language 
fundamental disciplines such as physics, 
chemistry or mathematics. I intend to 
arabise only the primary and secondary 
cycles, where the scientific notions 
remain basic; at this level the Arabic 
language does not create any problem... 
The question is not even raised (in 
in higher education) as long as we have 
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not educated the teaching personnel. In 
any case, the essential vocation of the 
university is scientific research which 
cannot be done efficiently without foreign 
languages. 
(71) 
This underlines the fluctuations of language 
policies in Morocco. As in the two other countries, a major 
contradiction appears between the stated aim for Arabic as 
the official language while French is maintained as an 
instrumental language. Such a statement also underlines the 
awarness of the political elite regarding the present 
inadequacy of the Arabic language to convey efficiently 
scientific and technolgical knowledge. So far no real effort 
have been undertaken to make Arabic more appropriate to 
modern requirements. 
This is because the Arabic language has remained the 
major means of political opposition and conflicts. Each 
party, depending on the political orientation it defends, 
uses the issue of language to criticize governmental or 
other parties policies. For instance, the socialist Union of 
Popular Forces Party (USFP) used the issue of language to 
criticise governmental policies of Arabisation. For this 
party, these policies denote: 
... a reactionary conception related to 
the dominant class... and... the 
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principal axis for class struggle in 
education... Arabisation remains 
therefore linked with the ideology of 
the dominent class and could not be 
used to fight the roots of cultural 
alienations. 
(72)  
This Party was not overtly opposed to the option 
for Arabic as the national language. However they wanted it 
to be conceived within a 'socialist order'. Members of this 
Party also expressed their concern for local languages 
(colloquial Arabic and Berber): 
... The use of popular culture must find 
its due place in our educational system. 
Hence University Chairs must be devoted 
to the study of the local dialects and 
the cultures they convey. 
(73)  
The other left wing Party, the UNFP (The 
National Union of Popular Forces) was in favour of the 
principle of Arabic as the national language. However like 
the USFP they have claimed a recognition for local 
languages, mainly Berber, as an integral part of national 
culture and identity as well as an Arabic-French 
bilingualism for international integration: 
... We are attached to the principle of 
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Arabisation and we defend Arabic as the 
language of Islam and national unity. 
But, an institute to the Berber language 
should also be created in order to 
preserve this language from 
disappearing... Moreover, we think that 
a bilingualism (French-Arabic) - positive 
and not uncontrolled - is indispensable 
in our time... because, to make our 
country lose its vertical cultural 
dimensions (with Europe and Africa), 
when opting for a horizontal monolinguism 
(exclusively Arabic), would be, for us, 
simply and purely killing our national 
cultural genius which must remain Arabic, 
African,and Mediterranean. 
(74) 
It is the argument here that the different 
parties and all those concerned with the language question 
have in common this contradictory approach between a strong 
emphasis on the Arabic language as the only official 
language and the equally strong desire to maintain in 
practicethe use of French. So the policy of Arabisation, in 
the absence of efficient measures for its implementation, 
has remained in Morocco mainly a subject for political 
debates used politically by those involved in decision 
making. The dilemma of the governing elite of choosing 
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between authenticity and modernity is reflected in the 
contradictions expressed in their proposed policies as 
regards to the two languages (Arabic-French) and even 
regarding local languages (spoken Arabic and Berber). The 
main contradictions emerge from their double desire to 
return to the sources of culture (Arabo-Islamic) and to 
embark on a Western model of development. 
Whatever the desire, the process of modernisation 
undertaken in this country has some exigencies. The French 
language plays an important role in the process of 
development, not only because it is a Western international 
language but because the Arabic language, at the present 
time cannot fulfill adequately the role played so far by the 
French language in scientific and technological knowledge 
and international relations. The process of modernisation in 
general, and economic development and industrialisation in 
particular in Morocco, as in the two other countries, have 
reinforced rather than reduced the role of French language 
and its impact in the nation-state. 
d)The economic context 
It is in relation to the economic context and 
economic policies that the contradictions, problems, and 
fluctuations in terms of language policies emerge clearly. 
Modernisation, especially economic development and 
industrialisation are as basic, in the process of 
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nation-building, as is national identity. Strong emphasis on 
both has created problems and contradictions in Moroccan 
society. 
In this context each language is therefore, 
implicitly (sometimes explicitly) in political discourse, 
attributed a specific role. This clashes with the stated 
option for Arabic as the only official national language. 
Arabic is perceived as the symbol and means of access to an 
authentic national identity, while French is linked and used 
in the process of modernisation. 
Morocco was therefore at its independance an 
essentially agricultural society, and by definition (in 
Western economic perpective) a traditional society. Hence 
modernisation was to be initiated; and because modernisation 
has been equated with Westernization, industrialization, and 
economic growth, these were to be imported from the West in 
their totality; bringing along Western thought and practice. 
It was difficult in such a context to undertake this 
development and at the same time establish a distinctive 
national cultural identity drawn from a completely 
different, if not opposed, source. 
Modernisation in Morocco, because it was at 
independence in its early stage of development, had limited 
potentialities and therefore has been increasingly dependent 
on the West in general and France in particular. The 
Moroccan economy emerged from the colonial period weak in 
its potential and structure, with a large undeveloped 
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agricultural sector and a small modern one. The industrial 
sector in its initial stage of development(75). The 
traditional economy was essentially agricultural and 
constituted the most important sector of the national 
economy. 
The small modernised agricultural sector 
occuppied 20% of the most fertile land, half of which was 
taken back by the Moroccan authorities, the rest remained in 
free hold and was usually in the hands of Europeans(76). Its 
production was entirely absorbed by the foreign markets, and 
consequently received most attention from the state because 
of its importance to the national economy, especially in 
terms of foreign currency revenues(77). 
Hence even the agricultural sector has been geared 
towards trade, in other words towards economic growth 
rather than social development. Agricultural products were 
defined by Western market needs and economic exchanges. 
Consequently the whole of the Moroccan economy in 
its structure, organisation, and lines of production was 
heavily conditioned by the West. This clearly had direct 
bearing on the socio-cultural context of the country and has 
led to greater dependence on the French language as a link, 
and means of access to Western scientific and technological 
knowledge and practice. 
Industrialization in Morocco was initiated only 
around the forties and early fifties with the important 
immigration of Europeans following World War Ii and above 
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all the capital brought in and invested in industrial 
projects. However the agricultural sector was little 
affected, except for the emergence of the small modern 
subsector. It was during this period that the principal 
industries emerged. A few light industries such as sugar, 
textile and consumption goods industries along with 
important extractive industries were set up(78). 
Thus, overall, the whole industrial sector was in 
fact heavily dependent on foreign investments and 
enterprises. So with the departure of most of the European 
population at independence and the capital leakage 
(evaluated at about 1.417 million Francs)(79) the early 
attempts at industrial activities were greatly affected. 
The economic situation therefore experienced a 
drastic decline at independence and necessitated greater 
reliance on foreign capital investments. Morocco was 
financially closely linked to France, as a member of the 
French Franc Zone during the early years of independence. 
The international value of the French Franc as well as the 
economic development in France directly influenced the 
Moroccan Franc. This membership also implied free 
circulation of capitals and trade between the two countries. 
But in 1957, French aid to Morocco was discontinued for a 
period of five years (because of political and economic 
controversies(8°). However technical and cultural assistance 
as well as commercial relations were little affected. 
Furthermore, in spite of this discontinuity of financial 
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aid, France continued to allocate a loan of 5 milliards of 
French Francs to the Moroccan budget as a balance of the 
remainder of the aid planned during the protectorate 
period(81). The principal source of financical aid during 
this period was the USA which financed 57% of the capital 
goods budget of 1957. Between 1957 and 1966 Morocco 
received, in loans and aid, around $510 million(82). 
It is the argument at this point that the 
economic development of Morocco was almost entirely reliant 
upon the West, whether financially or technologically. This 
has maintained this country in the Western 'orbit'. Access 
to political independance, consequently, did not alter the 
existing structures imposed by the colonial situation 
whereby economic and commercial activities (and 
consequently socio-cultural patterns) were strongly 
influenced by Western rather than national needs. 
It is also the argument that the commercial 
structure, which prevailed after the colonial period, 
reinforced this situation of dependence. It was reflected in 
the nature and volume of imports and exports and the balance 
of payment deficit. The exports were mainly of raw 
agricultural and mineral (mainly phosphate) products (at 
very cheap prices), whereas the imports were expensive 
manufactured products (consumer goods and industrial 
equipment). In 1956, it was assumed that one ton of imported 
goods, for instance, cost five times the price of an 
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exported one(83). The deficit in foreign trade was 
increasing as the imports of consumption goods and 
equipement increased. 
This imbalance between imports and exports in 
the Moroccan economy underlines some of the contradictions 
generated by the imported Western economic model and the 
unfair terms of exchanges it establishes and which serve 
more Western interests than the Moroccan ones. 
However, the government had to base its industrial 
policy on foreign investments and trade, and the role of 
foreign multinational firms became increasingly important in 
Moroccan economy. These were expected to finance and set up 
industrial units and serve as main agents for the transfer 
of technology. With a liberal economy, nearly all industrial 
sectors and projects are open to private capital in which 
the Multinationals play a vital role(84). These almost 
exclusive economic relations and exchanges with Western 
countries, especially France, have maintained the Moroccan 
economy in a subordinate situation and controlled by foreign 
interests. 
In reaction, from 1973-1974 the Moroccan 
government initiated the 'Moroccanisation' (nationalisation) 
of most foreign enterprises. But this measure has remained 
only partial since the state, or national investors, would 
participate to about 50% of the invested capital along with 
the progressive introduction of Moroccan personnel in its 
management(85). So foreign capital and enterprises continue 
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to have a major share in the Moroccan economy. This 
'nationalisation' was also limited mainly to financial 
changes, which were beneficial to only a minority and 
therefore resulted in reinforcing rather than diminishing 
the control of multinational corporations in the country's 
economy(86). 
In fact, even when the government or national 
private investors contribute 50% or more of the needed 
capital (often acquired through loans or aid), they still 
depend, almost exclusively, on foreign technology, 
equipement and experts. In this context the European 
Community has been the major partner of Morocco, absorbing 
56% of its commercial exports, and providing 51% of the 
total commercial imports(87). 
Among the European countries, France, because of 
its historical link and geographical proximity, its 
industrial, equipment, and socio-cultural impact, has 
occupied a privileged place in the Moroccan economy. 
'Co-operation' between the two countries covers a wide range 
of industrial and commercial activities in Morocco and 
related fields such as the administration, transport, 
health, communication, tourism, and education. 
Morocco has remained one of the principal 
beneficiaries of French aid and France is Morocco's most 
important source of foreign assistance. In 1979 French 
financial assistance amounted to 1200 million French 
Francs(B8). The Moroccan economy also depends highly on 
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tourism and the contribution of the Moroccan imigrant labour 
force in Europe. Tourism is increasingly contributing to 
foreign currency revenues. In 1979 the total number of 
tourists in Morocco was around 1,549,000; and the revenues 
from this source were of about 1,560 million DH(89). 
Europeans (mainly French, Spanish, British) constitute the 
greatest proportion of tourists coming to Morocco. 
Tourism is also an important agent of cultural 
contacts and exchanges with the West. It plays a major role 
in the maintenance of French language and culture. The 
national language and culture are relegated to a secondary 
role because they are economically less rewarding. 
In addition to tourism, emigration was a source of 
revenues for the economy. The number of immigrants in Europe 
has been steadily increasing since the 1960s. Most of them 
are in France. During the period 1970-1978 their number 
increasd from 170,835 to 385,991(90). Their financial 
contribution to the Moroccan economy consists in 
transferring parts of their earnings home; in 1973, for 
instance, their financial transfers to Morocco contributed 
24.7% of the total external revenes(91). This again 
constitutes an aspect of economic dependence as it 
reinforces relations and exchanges with the West. It is 
hoped that these workers, when they return, would help in 
the process of the transfer of technology, but considering 
that a large proportion of these immigrants are neither 
educated nor qualified and considering the nature of work 
they are allocated, mostly low grade jobs(92), the transfers 
they might make are only cultural. 
Thus it is being argued here that the process of 
nation-building in Morocco, in spite of the claims for 
economic and cultural decolonisation, has been increasingly 
reliant on France in particular. Opting for an 
industrialisation-based model of development, within limited 
means and its inherited economic structure, Moroccan ties 
with France particularly have increased rather than reduced 
since independence. This has led to contradictions between 
the stated aim of decolonisation and the establishment of a 
distinctive national identity (symbolised by the Arabic 
language), and the increasing foreign economic and 
socio-cultural penetration requiring the increasing use of 
the French language. 
The different and various interractions with the 
West and France are made through the use of the French 
language in work and communications. Spoken by the vast 
majority of the political and intellectual elite, French has 
retained a privileged position at all levels of national 
activity, especially in scientific and technical fields. 
There seems to be an interdependence between the supremacy 
of French partnership in the Moroccan economy and the 
maintenance, even the increasing use, of the French 
language. 
In spite of political fluctuations in the two 
countries' relations, and in spite of increasing competition 
in this area from countries like Japan, Germany, and the 
USA, with their important technical and technological 
competence, France has remained to the present time 
Morocco's major partner. The status of the French language 
and its impact on the Moroccan society as a whole make 
direct contact easier, and therefore facilitate economic and 
industrial operations. The need to call upon French 
personnel, French equipment, and its maintenance and 
replacement have all contributed to reinforcing the role of 
the French language as the language of economic development 
and modernisation. Consequently the national language, 
Arabic, has become relegated to a secondary role in practice 
while it continues to be at the forefront of political 
discourse. 
This ambiguity over the role of the national 
language in relation to the French language within the 
general process of nation building and the contradictions 
and problems generated, is also faced by Algeria and Tunisia 
though somewhat differently because of their specific 
socio-political and economic contexts. 
B. Tunisia. 
a) the historical context. 
The particular historical experience of Tunisia 
has, as argued earlier, shaped the course of its development 
and has, to some extent, defined its language policies. As 
was the case in Morocco and Algeria, the Arabic and French 
penetrations have left the strongest impact on Tunisia, 
politically, economically, and culturally. 
The Arab penetration, with the advent of Islam, 
has marked the historical setting of Tunisia with a 
distinctively Arabo-Islamic imprint(93). In fact, the Arabic 
influence has been deeper in Tunisia than in Morocco and 
Algeria. This is reflected in the complete Arabisation and 
Islamisation of the Tunisian population and the very small 
proportion of Berber-speakers(94). 
The consolidation of Arab penetration in Tunisia, 
between the tenth century and the fifteenth century, in 
addition to the Islamic Faith and Arabic language, brought 
social transformations. Important economic, political and 
cultural developments were noted in this country which 
gradually became one of the most important Arabo-Islamic 
centres for cultural and commercial contacts and 
exchanges(95). However this socio-economic and cultural 
prosperity began to decline from the fifteenth century with 
the weakening of the central power, the Hafisides Dynasty, 
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and the increasing threat of the emerging Western powers. 
This period also coincided with an expansion of the Ottoman 
empire and the consequent arrival of the Turks in Tunisia in 
1574(96). 
However European expansionism became increasingly 
attracted to Tunisia, because of its important geographical 
position as an open door to Africa. From the late 
seventeenth century, with the decline of the Ottoman empire, 
European penetration began in Tunisia. This penetration was 
first in the form of commercial activities, but gradually it 
began to be transformed into political and eventually 
military attacks. These attacks came principally from Spain 
and Italy and later on from Britain and France(97). 
It is suggested that it was with this European 
penetration, especially the French, that the established 
Arabo-Islamic socio-cultural features of the Tunisian 
society were disrupted and the course of its development 
affected. As a strategic route for commercial activities, 
Tunisia drew European interest from the fifteenth century. 
But it was France which managed to strengthen its commercial 
privileges. The French invasion of Algeria in 1830, in 
addition to Tunisia's then precarious political and economic 
situation, precipitated the intervention of France in 
Tunisia. A protectorate-form of colonisation was established 
by a treaty signed between France and the Turkish 
administration on 12th March 1881. 
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This 'protectorate' type of colonisation implied 
indirect rule, leaving administrative autonomy to the 
Turkish regent, the' Bey'. In fact, the maintenance in power 
of the Bey was ficticious as French domination covered all 
national activities, whether political, economic, or social. 
Important economic and political reforms were undertaken by 
French authorities. Controlling the national and 
international policies of Tunisia, France began to establish 
socio-economic infrastructures, such as the introduction of 
new judiciary and educational systems, and the construction 
of roads, hospitals, and ports. Important agricultural 
reforms and early industrialisation were undertaken, 
especially with the increasing number of European settlers 
(mainly Italians and French). Until 1911 France managed to 
maintain peace and a relative economic prosperity in Tunisia 
which was often cited as an example of French colonial 
success(98). 
But this economic prosperity was beneficial almost 
exclusively to Europeans. The early industries were 
export-geared, and Tunisians were excluded from 
representation in the politics of their country and had no 
power in decision-making. This, with time, led to 
discontent, especially among the youth who started to 
question this exclusive foreign domination. 
From 1911 onward there started to emerge the early 
manifestations of Tunisian nationalism. These manifestations 
were at the beginning merely claims for political 
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representation, but they were quickly stamped out by the 
French authorities. However, after the First World War, and 
mainly from the 1920s, France undertook socio-economic and 
political reforms. A Constitutional Assembly was established 
with a Tunisian Party, the 'Destour'. The members of the 
Destour party represented the bourgeoisie principally, and 
therefore served mainly their interests and not those of the 
rest of the population. This also contributed to the growth 
of Tunisian nationalism(99). 
The effects of the Second World War in the 
spreading of nationalism in different parts of the world, 
the worsening political, economic, and social conditions of 
the Tunisians, the increasing dissatisfaction with French 
colonial policy, prompted the emergence of a nationalism 
directed against France. From the early thirties an 
organised nationalist group appeared under the leadership of 
a young intellectual, Habib Bourguiba. This group formed a 
Party with the name of ' Neo-Destour' as a reaction to the 
previous Party, which was accused of serving colonial and 
bourgeois interests. By the late 1930s the Party managed to 
rally, organise, and gain support of many sections of 
society. The popular revolts and riots organised by this 
party were severely repressed the French, resulting in the 
dissolution of the party and the imprisonment of its 
leaders(100). 
The period following World War II was marked by 
French efforts for Tunisian reconstruction after it became a 
war arena with British and American forces stationed there. 
It was also an attempt to restore calm and prevent the 
reemergence of nationalism. But with Bourguiba's return 
from exile in 1949, the party was reorganised and the 
leader's prestige restored among the Tunisian population. 
His exile in fact contributed to his image as the hero of 
Tunisian nationalism(101). Bourguiba quickly began to 
negotiate with France for self-determination, and the 
establishment of a sovereign state, but without success. 
This led the party to organising an armed force. 
The strengthening of Tunisian nationalism and 
pressure for independence, along with the problems faced by 
the French in Indochina and the arrival of Mendes France to 
power in June 1954, all contributed to the speeding up of 
negotiations for unrestricted national autonomy. 
Consequently, agreements were signed in 1955 and confirmed 
by the Protocol of the 20th March 1956 whic announced the 
independence of Tunisia from France. One year later the 
Turkish Bey was deposed and the Tunisian Republic was 
proclaimed(102). 
The end of French colonisation marked a new 
phase in the history of Tunisia. Nationalism was nurtured by 
the desire to reestablish national identity in a sovereign 
state with a distinctively Arabo-Islamic culture. In this 
context, the Arabic language constituted the symbol and 
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expression of this cultural identity and was therefore used 
as a major means to sustain nationalist sentiment and 
popular adhesion to the new state(103). Hence its adoption 
as the official national language upon Tunisia's access to 
independence. But modernisation, on the Western model, and 
the almost total dependence of this country on external aid 
has not only maintained but increased the use of French 
language in Tunisia. Furthermore, the primacy of the state, 
another colonial legacy, and the related struggle for power 
and political participation has greatly affected the issue 
of language in this country as in the two other countries. 
The Arabic language has become a central theme of political 
discourse and a major instrument for political legitimacy. 
b) The Political Context 
It is the argument in this sub-section that 
language in Tunisia, as in the two other countries, has been 
tackled as a primarily political issue. Hence, it has been 
affected by the political trends in this country and the 
tensions and conflicts of the political elite. Language 
policies, in turn, reflect the contradictions and dilemmas 
of the governing elite in the process of nation-building. 
However in spite of the centrality of language in the 
Tunisian politics, the approach has been more moderate as 
compared to the two other countries, especially Algeria. 
This is because in Tunisia access to independence and the 
transfer of power went through rather smoothly and without 
as much violence as was the case in Algeria. 
The transitional period, specifically from the 
signing of the French-Tunisian conventions in June 1955, was 
a period marked by internal and external difficulties. The 
Bey was in theory the holder of power, but it was in 
practice the Neo-Destour Party which was in charge of the 
negotiations and the related decisions for independence. 
Consequently, this Party quickly managed to estabilsh its 
political supremacy. Its emergence as the symbol and 
representative of the nationalist movement and the leader of 
the victory displaced the role of the Bey and eventually led 
to the collapse of the Monarchy and its replacement by a 
constitutional republic(104). 
The main problems that emerged at this time among 
the Tunisian leadership and the internal tensions within the 
Neo-Destour Party were related to the different conceptions 
of the future image of the new sovereign state. Some party 
members were in favour of a complete 'delinking' with France 
(in dependency theory terms) politically, economically, and 
above all culturally. The second view was, in the name of 
modernisation, more in favour of maintaining strong ties 
with France. Important conflicts around these two approaches 
emerged within the Tunisian political elite(105). 
In this context two almost equally influential 
political leaders, with different ideas, became opposed in 
the early period of independence, namely Bourguiba and Salah 
Ben Youssef. The controversy between them was related to the 
French-Tunisian conventions which were signed by Bourguiba 
and were questioned by his opponent who described them as 
producing a 'step backward' and as a form of continuous 
dependence on France. Ben Youssef was in favour of a more 
radical attitude towards France for a complete and immediate 
independence within an Arabo-Islamic framework(106). His 
criticism was principally about Bourguiba's approach to the 
process of decolonisation which he considered as being 
undertaken too moderately and hence hampering the 
establishment of national economic and cultural sovereignty. 
In fact the agreements with France were based on 
an 'interdependence' compromise, which granted Tunisian 
leaders home-rule but not really complete independence. 
France maintained control over Tunisian foreign affairs, 
defence and the economy as well as many administrative 
functions. The most controversial clause, denounced by Ben 
Youssef, was the granting to France of control of internal 
security services and the police(107). Using this argument 
Ben Youssef managed to rally support, principally from 
shopkeepers and small traders and from some urban youth, and 
mostly from traditionalists: predominently religious groups 
and old Destourian members. These were the people who saw in 
the Neo-Destour a Western oriented Party diverging from 
Arabic and Islamic values. 
However, during the Congress of the Neo-Destour 
held in Sfax in November 1955, Bourguiba was able to 
overcome this opposition by winning the highest votes. He 
was supported by the Trade Union (U.G.T.T) and other 
national organisations backed by important popular support. 
He also managed to win control of the Constituent Assembly 
elected on the 25th March 1956 where Neo-Destour members 
gained about 90% of the seats. Expelled from the Party and 
faced by his opponent's victory, Ben Youssef and his 
followers resorted to armed uprising, leading the country to 
the verge of a civil war and causing alarm in political and 
public spheres. The political 'crisis' was overcome by 
Bourguiba's Party in January 1956 and Benyoussef was 
compelled to leave the country(108). This put an end to any 
overt opposition. Nevertheless opposed political factions 
continued to exist, often as a response to the exlusive 
power of the Government and the Party and resulting from the 
feeling of insecurity created by Ben Youssef's 
opposition(109). 
The Arabic language as a political issue, and 
closely related to the reestablishment of the national 
cultural identity, held a central place in these political 
conflicts. It was one of the major arguments used by Ben 
Youssef in his opposition to Bourguiba. It was also used by 
-168- 
the political elite in general to underline their 
nationalistic character and hence legitimate their power. 
They justified their maintenance in power by their 
dedication to the reinforcement of national sovereignty 
through the establishment of a distinctive Arabo-Islamic 
cultural identity with Arabic language, as the official 
national language. 
However, the Tunisian political elite under the 
leadership of Bourguiba was also strongly dedicated to 
modernisation as the principal element in nation-building 
and consequently favoured a 'convergence-with-the West' 
approach to development. This clear option for the supremacy 
of modernisation in Tunisian political concerns has been 
reflected in the language policies adopted since 
Independence. 
A French-Arabic bilingualism has increasingly 
become a feature of Tunisian society, especially its elite. 
The strengthening of Bourguiba, a bilingual himself and a 
fervent modernist, in his position at the head of the 
nation, favoured the trend towards a Western type of 
development and modernisation. The Arabic language as the 
national language is emphasised in political discourse only 
moderately as compared with the two other countries. The 
requirements of modernisation more strongly voiced(110>. 
Tunisia's general policies, including language 
policies, have been characterised by a relative consistency, 
principally due to the maintenance in power of the same 
political elite and the absence of effective opposition. 
The supremacy and exclusiveness of the single 
Party in fact contradicts the stated doctrine of the Party 
prior to independence: to establish a 'liberal democracy'. 
The 'liberal' competition of rival parties was shortlived 
with the exception of the Communist Party which remained 
officially tolerated, but with little influence on 
national policies, until 1963 when it was banned(111). It 
was difficult for the opposition to achieve strong political 
organisation because of the single Party system. Opposition 
could only be perceived from debates within the Party and 
national organisations. However tensions over some issues, 
such as language, sometimes surface indicating differences 
behind the image of unanimity and cohesion in the Tunisian 
political elite. 
The traditionalists, mostly fundamentalists, who 
stress a return to the Arabo-Islamic tradition, have 
remained the major force of opposition to the leadership. 
They have been against the clearly modernist Western 
oriented policies of Bourguiba and his Party(112). But their 
influence has been so far rather limited as the leadership 
has managed to secure its position. 
Stability and continuity are the distinctive 
characteristics of Tunisian politics since the same elite 
bringing independence has continued to govern national 
policies for decades; in comparison with Morocco and 
Algeria, where instability and continuous change of 
politicians has been characteristic. 
President Bourguiba played a central role in the 
consolidation of the Tunisian state and hence has become the 
predominent political figure. His role as a founding member 
of the movement for liberation and his strategy in bringing 
about independence gave him great prestige. He is considered 
by the Tunisians as the 'Father' of the nation and is called 
the 'Supreme Combatant'. Bourguiba is often described as a 
charismatic figure (Tunisia's Mao). He managed to surround 
himself by people who are convinced by his 'rational' 
policies(113). His popularity and legitimacy have been 
reinforced by his strategy in maintaining a coherent Party 
with committed members, and by concentrating the power of 
decision-making in his own hands (with the full support of 
the Party). 
In the Tunisian polity, it is difficult to 
distinguish between government and Party, and hence locate 
those really involved in decision making. The relationship 
between the Party and the State, and the government, is so 
interlinked that apart from the presidential figure there is 
almost no distinction in the structure, membership, and 
actions of both the government and the Party. This close 
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relationship was even strengthened by the 1958 reform of the 
Party, which was renamed 'The Socialist Destourian 
Party'(114). By integrating the Party into the government 
(Ministers were recruited from the Central Committee of the 
Party) and integrating the members of the government into 
the Party a higher level of of political mobilisation and 
stability was achieved. 
The Tunisian National Assembly has had, as in 
Morocco, little power in decision-making. It is the 
Destourian Party which plays the role of the mediator 
between the government and the national organisations and 
between the leadership and the masses(115). 
In this context the language issue, like other 
national issues, is characterized in Tunisia by paragmatism, 
rationality, and consistency, especially in comparison with 
the two other countries (mainly Algeria). In spite of the 
option for a socialist form of politics with a single Party, 
in Tunisia (unlike Algeria for instance) ideology in its 
abstract form is not preponderent in Tunisian political 
discourse. Bourguiba himself emphasised stated that: 
The ideology of Destour Socialism 
is practical (as well as pragmatic) 
in two senses: it connects the 
aspiration to transform the society 
with concrete policies and realities, 
and it represents the convictions 
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and beliefs not of a few ideologues, 
but of a relatively large number of 
the Party activists and supporters. 
(116) 
The Tunisian leadership, because it has been 
clearly and strongly committed primarily to modernisation, 
has had to draw its legitimacy from practical and pragmatic 
achievements rather than ouspoken ideology. Bourguiba has 
criticized ideology as the basis for national politics. He 
has argued that ideology is: 
a lure and a scapegoat...Men must 
assume responsability for their acts 
(and not put) responsibility for our 
failures on the back of such scapegoats 
as Neo-colonialism, imperialism and 
reaction. 
(117) 
Thus, overall, the approach to language in the 
Tunisian context was not defined by ideological 
considerations. It was determined by practical necessities. 
The primacy of modernisation (based essentially on 
industrialisation and economic growth) along with the option 
from the early seventies for liberal economic policies 
favouring private enterprise and increasing international 
relations, have influenced language policy in Tunisia. They 
have reinforced the use of the French language as the major 
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instrument for national development. Moreover, faced by 
practical constraints in implementing the Arabisation 
policy, a practical bilingualism was adopted and is 
followed. 
However, in spite its relative homogeneity, 
continuity, and pragmatism, the Tunisian political system 
illustrates many of the contradictions observed in the two 
other countries. These contradictions, characteristic of 
most emerging nations, are those related to the tensions 
between nationalism versus internationalism, socialism 
versus capitalism, complete decolonisation versus reliance 
on the former colonial power, and finally national 
authenticity versus international acculturation. These 
contradictions are reflected in Tunisian language policies. 
These contradictions are visible in the ambivalence and 
hesitations between the two languages, Arabic and French, 
and the confusing political discourse regarding each 
language. This is also reflected in the important gap 
between the stated aim of one official language and the 
adoption of bilingualism in practical terms. 
c) Language Policies 
In Tunisia, as in Morocco and Algeria, Arabic is 
claimed as the national official language and as a major 
expression of Arabo-Islamic cultural identity. In the 
Constitution promulgated in June 1959 it was stated that it 
was "The will of this people...to remain faithful to the 
teaching of Islam, to the unity of the Greater Maghreb, 
to belong to the Arab family"(118). Article One of the 
Constitution establishes Arabic as the language of the state 
and Islam as its religion. In a speech delivered in June 
1958 the President Habib Bourguiba stressed this link(119) 
and asserted that the educational programme should be "able 
to reinforce the national character of Tunisia which is 
rooted in the Arab culture and Islamic religion and a past 
of glory..."(120). 
However, unlike the two other countries, the 
language issue in Tunisia, especially among the political 
elite, is far less passionate and radical. It is certainly 
used for political legitimacy, and to nurture nationalist 
sentiment, but it has not really constituted a strong 
ideological doctrine. This is due to the priority given by 
the Tunisian leaders to modernisation as the basis of 
nation-building and to the fact that among the three 
countries, Tunisia is relatively the most Arabised. Also, 
during the colonial period Arabic and French coexisted, 
especially in the educational system. 
Language policies are conceived within the 
framework that economic development and national 
modernisation constitute the first priority in Tunisian 
politics. Hence the emphasis on the Arabic language is 
important; but mainly in so far as it does not hamper the 
process of development which necessitated the use of French 
language. 
While the Tunisian leadership constantly stresses 
its attachment to the Arabic language and the Islamic Faith, 
neither extreme Pan-Arabism, nor religious fanatism are 
claimed or accepted. On the contrary cultural archaism and 
religious dogmatism are considered as obstacles to 
development(121). Even in the early period of nationalism, 
puritanical reformism never had a strong hold in the 
movement. 
Bourguiba, although placing the state in an 
Islamic and Arabic framework, has been supporting 
"modifications" of some important values which he saw as 
irrational or contrary to 'the true spirit of Islam' as well 
as modernity. Examples of these modifications include the 
introduction of the 'Personal Code' adopted in August 1956, 
bringing fundamental changes in family relations. Polygamy, 
for instance was outlawed, and divorce, previously a 
prerogative of men, became a prerogative of the court, and 
Tunisian women were given the freedom to marry within 
another Faith(122). 
These modernist changes and decisions led to the 
idea that Islam itself is to be adapted to national 
evolution. Bourguiba has stated that: 
Islam... is finally a sense of measure 
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and recourse to reason. It teaches us 
that religious commandments must be 
adapted to the evolution of social 
structures... In Tunisia we will not 
let our religion disappear and our 
society become perverted... we 
believe in a necessary evolution of 
the religion. 
(123) 
Therefore, language policies have been in practice in 
favour of an Arabic-French bilingualism. The Maintenance of 
French is not only due to the needs of modernisation but also to 
a pro-Western political orientation. This is expressed in the 
desire to remain open to the external world through the French 
language. In Tunisia, as in the case of Morocco, the political 
leadership constantlty emphasizes the privileged role of the 
country as a link between the Eastern and Western civilizations: 
Providence established Tunisia in 
a privileged location at the centre 
of the sea which is the mother of 
civilizations... The Latin and 
Germanic West and the Punic and 
Muslim East first confronted each 
other and later intermingled there. 
and in a world in search for 
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comprehension, Tunisia offers itself 
as a land of reconciliation among 
men, religions, and nations. 
(124) 
There has been therefore in Tunisia a readiness to adopt 
Western thought and practice and a determination from the 
political elite to remain in the Western orbit via France and to 
conserve and increase the use of the French language. The French 
language is seen in this context as the means of access to 
this Western civilization, and an instrument for modernisation. 
The instrumentality of the French language in 
Tunisia was emphasized by M.Messadi (former Minister of 
Education (1958-1968), when he declared to a Press 
conference in 1967 that: 
... French has an important role to play 
in certain countries of the Third World; 
we belong to the developing countries, 
we have to catch up with industrialized 
countries. For this we possess the French 
language which is both a language of work 
and culture. For us it is less a learning 
of a foreign language than the utilization 
of an instrument which would help to make 
up for the centuries which separate us from 
the developed world. It [French] would 
grant our access to modernity. 
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(125) 
This is the opinion of a Minister of Education who early in 
his period of office initiated the process of Arabisation in 
education and who assisted in excluding French from the 
first three years of primary education(126). 
The faith in the important role of French for 
modernisation has led this country, where Arabic was more 
widely used at independence, to an increasing use of this 
language. The desire for a 'happy co-existence' of the two 
languages, Arabic and French, was expressed by M.Masmoudi. a 
member of the government who declared: 
In order to discover and penetrate rapidly 
and efficiently the secrets and mysteries of 
modern techniques, Tunisia like other 
countries, has chosen to have recourse to the 
French language which history has 
particularly equipped with a 'supranational' 
function. This does not mean that we are 
unaware of the problems which would arise 
from the confrontation of this language with 
ours. This certainly does not mean that we 
neglect the work of innovation necessitated 
by the attachement we have for the Arabic 
language. This means above all that the 
confrontation of the two languages 
requires from us a vigilant action and 
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constant effort of research and adaptation 
so that this confrontation would not be in 
the sense of elimination but that of a 
happy continuation. 
(127) 
Thus there is an awareness of the limitations of 
the Arabic language and the need to develop it and adapt it 
to the contemporary requirement of development through 
innovation and constant research. However, this wish has 
been confined to rhetoric as no practical policies have been 
formulated for the development of the Arabic language. 
In the meantime the official adoption of 
bilingualism, which is contradictory with the option for a 
single national language, has not been overtly questioned. 
This is mainly due to the type of regime, with a single 
Party, and the overwhelming power of the state and the 
absence of effective oppsition. 
Nevertheless, there has been growing pressure 
related to the language issue(128). For example at the 
Party's VIIIth Congress, in the Report of the High 
Commission of the Party it was stated that: 
... It is recommended that the government 
elaborate, in the earliest time possible... 
a national plan of a general dimension, 
which should be applied within reasonable 
stages, aiming at making Arabic the 
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language of education, of the administration 
and of social and cultural activities in the 
country. 
( 129 ) 
But the Report goes on, indicating that if this is the 
principle, its application is much more complex. It requires 
important human and material means, which are not available. 
Furthermore, the commitment to modernisation necessitates 
the use of French. Hence in spite of pressures for the 
national language, and the previously stated 'concern' for 
the reinforcement of this language, the stand for 
bilingualism is again underlined by the political 
leadership(130). 
In Tunisia, therefore, as in the two other 
countries of the Maghreb, there emerges a gap between the 
stated aim of the establishment of the national language and 
the practical use of French. The use of French in Tunisia 
particularly increased from the 1970s onward. This coincided 
with the increasingly liberal policies of openess to the 
West which has reinforced the need to use the French 
language. This has in fact generated dissatisfaction in both 
political circles and in public opinion(131). 
These difficulties in terms of language 
policies and practices have been complicated by 
thediaglossia characterizing the Arabic language and the 
difference between the official language (Classical Arabic) 
and the spoken variety. However in Tunisia, the moderate 
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approach to language is reflected in the offical attitude 
towards this variety, and President Bourguiba is known for 
his 'popular' speeches where he mostly uses the spoken 
variety of Arabic when addressing his people rather than the 
Classical form, as practiced by officials in Morocco and 
Algeria. In one of his speeches he even declared: "...No, 
really, Classical Arabic, is not the language of the 
people..."(132). 
However the official national language is 
Classical Arabic and when formally stressing the importance 
of Arabisation, Tunisian officials, including the president, 
refer to this form of the language. But in Tunisia there 
seems to be a real desire to bridge the gap between the oral 
and written languages by simplifying classical Arabic and 
bringing it nearer to the spoken one. This is a different 
attitude from that of the two other countries, the rest of 
the Arab world, and the Arab academies, where classical 
Arabic is viewed as 'sacred' because it is the language of 
Koran. Therefore it has to remain 'pure', insulated from any 
influence of the spoken varieties, which are but a common 
and vulgarized form of the Classical language. 
Thus in Tunisia, too, in this attitude to 
diaglossia, the approach to language is less emotional and 
relatively less ideology-based. More generally, this 
attitude is also seen in the increasing use of the French 
languge along with the national language which is in fact 
relegated to a secondary position. The primacy of 
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modernisation in Tunisian national planning, based on 
industrialization and economic growth, has led to greater 
reliance on the West and France. This has reinforced the 
need for the use of the French language. 
d) The Economic Context 
The economic context in Tunisia and the policies 
adopted from Independence for its development, have had a 
direct bearing on the issue of language. The strong emphasis 
in Tunisian politics on modernisation on the Western model 
has helped consolidate relations and dependence on the West 
and particularly France. This reliance on France has been 
even more important because of the relatively restricted 
economic potential of Tunisia at the time of Independence. 
This led to the necessity of increasingly using the French 
language as a priveleged means of access to scientific and 
technological knowledge and a link with the Western world. 
The economic conditions of Tunisia did not suffer 
radical breakdown at the end of the colonisation as was the 
case in Algeria. There was a pragmatic approach by the 
political leadership in negotiating post-indpendence 
economic relations with France. This helped maintain the 
inherited economic structures established during the period 
of colonisation. However, the country's political and 
economic sovereignty were quickly confronted with pressing 
problems, made crucial by the decision to embark 
immediately on industrialization with scarce domestic 
resources(133). As in Morocco and Algeria, the economy 
inherited from the protecorate period was dual, with a large 
traditional sector providing a living for the great majority 
of the population and a small modern sector in an early 
stage of development. 
An underdeveloped agriculture was the major 
characteristic of the Tunisian economy at Independence. For 
a country engaged in industry-based modernisation this meant 
severe dependence on external contributions not only to 
intiate the processes of industrialization and economic 
growth, but also to maintain a reasonable standard of living 
for its population. The agricultural sector could not, at 
Independence, even satisfy basic consumption needs. 
The contribution of the agricultural sector to 
the G.N.P was less than 254, and animal production was not 
sufficient for domestic consumption. In 1956, Tunisia 
imported meat, milk, butter, and cheese(134). The modern 
sector of agriculture was until Independence largely owned 
by Europeans, who, using only a ninth of the total 
productive agricultural land, managed to achieve the highest 
rate of production(135). 
In Tunisia, therefore, as in the two other 
countries of the Maghreb, economic development was rather 
limited at Indpendence. The colonial policy in this context 
had concentrated on developing an infrastructure in relation 
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of its own needs. The small proportion of the agricultural 
sector which was modernised was owned by European settlers 
and being commerce-oriented, it served their own needs. At 
Independence most of this sector was either privately 
bought by Tunisians or by the government. However until 1960 
an important proportion was still in the hands of Europeans. 
In spite of its high yields this sector could not respond to 
the consumption needs of the population and imports of soft 
wheat from France were necessary, which exceeded one million 
quintals(136). 
This specific type of agricultural production, 
inherited from the colonial period, therefore led to an 
almost total reliance on imported goods for subsistence. 
Furthermore, this production (such as wine) has created 
after Independence a form of dependence in terms of markets, 
which entailed specific relations with Western countries. 
France remained, in fact, the principal, if not the only 
market, of this type of production. Even the best quality 
dates which Tunisia produced in the South of the country, 
amounting to about 400,000 Quintals a year, were shipped to 
France to be conditioned for exports(137). 
Thus, the argument is that agriculture in 
Tunisia, because of its structure, organisation, and type of 
production, has reinforced the dependence of this country on 
the former colonial power which has largely contributed to 
the increasing need for the use of the French language and 
the strengthening of its cultural impact. This economic, 
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cultural, and linguistic dependence on France has become 
even stronger by the process of industrialisation 
undertaken after Independence. 
This reliance was even more necessary because 
industrialization was very limited in Tunisia upon its 
access to Independence. Industrialization was restricted to 
mining, with small light industries, and parts of the 
agricultural sector. Industrialization was initiated, as was 
the case in the two other countries, only after the Second 
World War and was initially limited to the extractive 
industries with their required infrastrucuture, such as 
transport, energy and ports(138). The main resources were 
phosphate, iron, lead, and zinc, but the reserves were not 
important and do not constitute a potential basis for the 
nation's economy. 
Among the three countries of the Maghreb, Tunisia 
is economically the poorest. Its small reserves of raw 
materials were over-exploited by Europeans especially during 
the peak period of the late forties and early fifties(139). 
The production of natural resources was therefore quite 
limited, and the little produced was exported in its raw 
form because of the scarcity of the means for its 
transformation. Manufacturing industry was limited to small 
industrial units, most of which specialized in the 
processing of food produced by the modern agricultural 
sector. 
Consequently, the industrial sector, considered by 
the Tunisian leadership as the central aspect of 
modernisation and national development, was almost 
nonexistent. Its development needed important human and 
material resources which this country did not have and this 
generated a greater reliance on the West. The industry 
developed in the modern agricultural sector, for instance, 
was almost exlusively financed, controlled, and run by 
foreigners at Independence(140). This almost total reliance 
on Western thought and practice was dramatically felt in the 
economic sector during the first years of independence, with 
the departure of the European settlers. 
The departure of more than 100,000 Europeans 
greatly disturbed economic activities: the rate of economic 
growth dropped during the period 1950-1953. In 1956, 110 
industrial units were stopped and investments decreased from 
9 milliards French Francs in 1953, to 7 millards in 1956 and 
3.2 milliards in 1957(141). To maintain a minimum of 
economic activity, the Tunisian government opted for an open 
economy to attract private capital. It had to rely heavily 
on foreign aid, mainly from France and the U.S.A. This 
situation was complicated by an important deficit in the 
trading balance. In 1956, imports were about 20% higher than 
the total exports and cost up to six times the cost of 
exports(142). 
It is suggested at this point that commercial 
relations with the West and principally France were in 
Tunisia, as in the two other countries, based on unequal 
exchanges, regulated by the Western countries. In Tunisia 
the deficit of the trade balance has maintained its need 
constant for Western, principally French, aid. This 'aid' 
has entailed political, economic, and cultural forms of 
dependence, which if altered would have affected the 'aid' 
flow. French aid to Tunisia diminished after Independence, 
and was increasingly replaced by American aid: nearly 60 
million dollars were provided in grants for general economic 
support(143). 
It is the argument here that the emphasis on 
modernisation, through industrialization, in Tunisia has 
conditioned its political and economic orientations towards 
an imported capitalistic and open model of development. This 
orientation was necessary to stimulate foreign private 
investment which was vital to sustain the industrializing 
economy. The relative political stability of this country, 
its adoption of an open economy, and the increase in export 
revenues, in fact attracted foreign capital to Tunisia. In 
addition to private investments, financial support is also 
acquired through aid and loans from the World Bank, Western 
nations, and some Arabic nations(144). 
Economic relations with the Arab countries have 
been developed only recently, mainly since the transfer of 
the Arab League in June 1979 from Egypt to Tunisia, but the 
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Tunisian government has never been in favour of exclusive 
Pan-Arabic relations. Its moderate, sometimes ambiguous, 
political solidarity with the Arab countries,and in 
particular the desire to strengthen relations with the West, 
has contributed to the relatively restricted economic and 
financial cooperation between Tunisia and other Arab 
countries. With its pragmatic and universalist aproach, the 
leadership has always based its international relations on a 
broad perspective with a wide range of nations from East, 
West, and African countries. 
Mainly because of the adopted model of development 
and the economic structure, inherited from the colonial 
period, Tunisia' relations with Europe have remained in a 
previleged position within its foreign policy. In this 
context the relations with the European Community were 
reinforced when agreements were signed in 1969, for five 
years initially, with the aim of intensifying commercial and 
industrial exchanges between Tunisia and the E.E.C. These 
agreements were renewed in 1976, for an unlimited period 
with the aim of extending the Community's economic, 
financial, and social assistance. The finacial aid allocated 
to Tunisia within the frame of these agreements was of 95 
million European Currency Units in the form of a donation or 
loan with special clauses for repayment(145). 
These increasing interrrlations with the E.E.0 have 
reinforced the use of the French language as the major 
instrument of interractions and exchanges. 
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It is the argument here that these increasing ties 
with Europe have led to a defined and restricted frame of 
exchanges and relations which entail the use of the French 
language and consequently a. cultural dependence, in addition 
to the economic one. This has created some contradictions in 
a society claiming complete independence, specifically from 
French influence, and claimimq an authentic cultural 
identity as the ultimate aims. 
France, in fact, has remained the principal 
Tunisian partner not only in economic and financial terms 
but also in social, cultural, and educational fields as 
well The French government and French private entreprises 
contribute largely to national development plans. In the 
period 1981-1982, the financial loans provided by France, at 
a low rate of interest and a long term period for payment 
amounted to 450 to 500 million Francs(146). The Tunisian 
government is likely to ask for an increase of the financial 
aid from France as a result of the present political 
developments between the two countries. France remains also 
one of the principal markets for Tunisian goods absorbing 
the highest proportion of its exports, and is still its 
major supplier in equipment and consumer goods(147). 
The important number of Tunisian emigrants in 
France also constitutes another crucial aspect in the two 
countries' relations. The high rate of unemployment at home, 
has generated a notable movement of the Tunisian population 
to Europe seeking work. Their emigration to Europe has been 
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steadily rising from Independence(148). Their financial 
transfers to Tunisia have had an important share in the 
national economy(149). Tourism is also a major element in 
Tunisian economy and one of the most important sources of 
foreign exchange and relations with the West(150). 
It is suugested that these multiple relations with 
Europe and France have therefore reinforced the status and 
the role of the French language as the predominent tool of 
work and the medium of interactions. The (semi-official) 
option for bilingualism, whereby the French language has 
become the privileged language in scientific, economic, and 
even political and cultural fields is not only due to the 
historical imprint of the past but also to present policies 
of modernisation. The economic policies, principally, have 
reinforced the ties with France and have contributed to the 
maintainance of its influence in many sectors of national 
activity. 
Among the three countries, Tunisia fits most 
clearly into the "convergence-with-the West" approach to 
modernisation, as a process of nation-building. Consequently 
it reflects the problems and contradictions generated by the 
importation of the Western model into a different context. 
The economic policies adopted after Independence, based on 
industrialization have had disruptive effects in this 
society possessing greater agricultural than industrial 
potentialities. This has engendered continuous dependence on 
Western, especially French thought and practice. This, in 
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turn, has created important contradictions in the 
socio-cultural context, between the imported French culture 
and language, and the claimed identification with the 
Arabo-Islamic culture and language. 
So, in Tunisia, the contradictions and problems in 
terms of language emerge most strongly in relation to the 
heavy stress given to economic development with relatively 
little attention to the socio-cultural aspects. The 
practical adoption of bilingualism, in this context, is 
strongly conflicting, in its form and objective, with the 
stated objective of Arabic language as the only official 
language and the symbol and means of establishing an 
authentic cultural identity. In Tunisia - as in Algeria and 
Morocco - the attempt to institutionalize a rapid 
Arabisation has generated severe problems and 
contradictions. 
C.Algeria 
a) The historical setting 
The history of Algeria is predominently a history 
of colonisation and foreign penetration. The different waves 
of colonisation, from the arrival of Phoenicians and then 
the Romans in this area to the French intervention, have 
gradually and deeply transformed the existing Berber 
socio-cultural, political and economic features(151). 
As was the case in Morocco and Tunisia, the 
Arabo-Islamic culture has become the salient feature of the 
Algerian character and identity. Though the process of 
Islamiation and Arabisation was met in this country, as well 
as in the rest of the Maghreb, by a strong resistance which 
lasted for centuries, they were finally accepted and 
integrated. They even become the salient features of 
national identity in the face of French colonisation. 
It was therefore, with the advent of Islam that 
Algeria, in the same way as in Morocco and Tunisia, 
experienced gradual but profound transformations, mainly the 
adoption of Islam and its religion. The majority of Berbers 
were converted to the Islamic religion, but many of them 
have preserved their language to the present time. During 
the period extending from the eleventh to the fifteenth 
century, with the consolidation of the Arabo-Islamic culture 
and civilization in the area, an important economic, 
political, and cultural renaissance is noted. The mingling 
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of the two civilizations, the Berber and the Arab, the 
development of commerce and trade, the creation of cultural 
centres, the rise of urbanisation, all led to an 
unprecedented prosperity in the whole area. This was 
increasing with the expansion of commercial routes to Africa 
in the South and Europe, through Spain in the North(152). 
However this economic prosperity and cultural 
dynamism began to decline, as in Morocco and Tunisia, 
because of internal divisions and conflicts, the weakening 
of the central authority, and the development and expansion 
of European powers. The Spanish were among the first 
Europeans to take a grip on the littoral of the Maghreb 
during the early sixteenth century(153). This period marked 
also the arrival of the Turkish Corsairs in Algeria; they 
were called upon for protection against Spain. However, they 
quickly took complete control of the coastal towns and 
managed to found a central authority with the help and 
protection of the Turkish Sultan. The expansion of the 
Ottoman Empire helped the Turks to reinforce their control 
in Algeria(154). 
The Turkish intervention in Algeria was as 
disruptive to the socio-cultural context of the country as 
was later that of the French. Furthermore, their 
administration in fact facilitated European penetration 
rather than protected against it. The decentralized form of 
political system established by the Turks with a weak 
central authority and an increasingly stagnant economy, 
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opened the way to European, principally French 
intervention(155). The Turkish leaders were mainly concerned 
with collecting taxes from the population; hence commerce 
with European powers was encouraged to increase their 
profits(156). 
This gradual penetration through commercial 
treaties and exchanges culminated in the French invasion of 
Algeria in 1830. It was a new form of domination, a real 
process of colonisation. The 'assimilationist' policy 
adopted by France through the imposition of its 
culture, language, and way of life to the detriment of the 
local culture and values present a case of cultural 
imperialism, the consequences of which continue to affect 
the present history of the country. 
The military occupation of Algeria was the first 
step in the process of colonisation which with the arrival 
of the European settlers began to take a distinctive shape. 
A gradual but systematic dispossession and oppression of the 
Algerian society began, not only in political and economic 
terms but also in cultural terms. The French Army and the 
settlers institutionalized their control in the 1848 
Constitution with the official annexation of Algeria to 
French territory(157). 
A civilian regime, under the administration of a 
governor, was set up and the country was divided into three 
main 'departments' and subdivided into 'arrondissements' as 
in France. But within this administrative structure, three 
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zones were clearly distinguished: the Civilian, the Mixed, 
and the Arab. Civil zones were those occupied mainly by • 
Europeans; the Mixed zones were where two communities 
co-existed; the Arab zones were those where the majority of 
the native population lived. These were under military 
rule(158). 
The second phase of French colonial policy was in 
fact the concretisation and consolidation of the French 
conquest in Algeria. The most fertile lands were taken over 
by the settlers (Colons) and their owners uprooted, and 
since the native population was predominently agricultural, 
it was almost the whole Algerian society which suffered from 
such a policy(159). 
The cities, as the administrative and economic 
centres, attracted the highest density of European 
populations. The Arab community in these urban centres was 
confined to guetto-type areas, the suburbs, or to the rural 
areas. The increasing power of the Colons, controlling more 
and more of the economy, often determined the policy of the 
Metropole in Algeria(160). They constantly resisted any 
policy favouring the integration of the native population 
and the development of its socio-political conditions. They 
strongly opposed the policy of assimilation of the native 
population, especially in terms of rights and political 
representation. 
The policy of assimilation adopted by France in 
Algeria specifically was the ultimate phase of the process 
of colonisation. Its aim was the complete integration of 
Algeria, its land and people, into the French 
socio-political and economic framework. This led to the 
establishment of political, economic, social, and 
educational French structures. 
However, this assimilation was paradoxical and 
inconsistent. The Algerians were considered as French 
'subjects', but were not French citizens(161). This policy 
of assimilation was not in fact resisted only by the French 
settlers. It was also strongly resisted by the Algerians 
themselves. This was because in order to acceed to the 
French Citizenship the Algerians had to renounce to their 
Islamic Faith and their own culture. 
Hence, in spite of this so-called policy of 
assimilation and integration, the Algerian population 
continued, throughout most of the colonisation period, to be 
deprived of its most basic rights in its own country. It was 
relegated to a secondary position economically, socially, 
and politically. In this process, strong efforts were made 
by the colonial power to stiffle Algerian cultural identity. 
The Algerian population was neither represented politically 
nor protected legally(162). 
The Algerian population therefore was subjected to 
a planned disintegration of its culture and identity. 
Social mobility for this population was rather limited, and 
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only possible through knowledge of French culture and 
especially the French language. This language was the 
language of schooling, of communication, and of work. 
In fact cultural assimilation was one of the 
major objectives and one of the strongest colonial 
strategies. The French Minister of Public Education under 
the Third Republic stated: 
The first conquest of Algeria has been 
accomplished by weapons and was ended 
in 1871 by the disarmament of Kabylia. 
The second conquest was achieved when 
the indegenous population accepted our 
administration and Justice. The third 
conquest will be achieved through 
schools: it should ensure the 
predominence of our language over the 
different local idioms, Cit should) 
incuiculate to Moslems the idea which 
we ourselves have of France and its 
role in the world... 
(163) 
Cultural subjugation was therfore a clearly 
stated aim in French colonial policy in Algeria. Hence the 
policy of dispossession and uprooting of the Algerian 
population from its land was paralleled and completed by a 
systematic destruction of the pre-colonial social structures 
and values. 
The French cultural agression was 
based on a political and economic one. 
The land confiscation was accompanied 
by the destruction, more or less 
achieved, of the precolonial structures. 
In addition to the imposition of the 
French language, a whole European ethos 
used as a means to exercise power, was 
induced into Algerian society. 
(164 ) 
Resistance to these processes took different 
forms, mainly revolts and armed insurrections(165). 
Throughout French colonial history in Algeria, and until 
Independence, opposition to this foreign penetration was 
expressed in terms of the national cultural identity. 
Precisely because of the assimilationist French policy and 
its form of cultural imperialism, Arabo-Islamic cultural 
values and language were most strongly perceived in this 
country as the symbols and means to resist French 
colonialism(166). 
The Islamic religion and the Arabic language 
constituted therfore, for the Algerian population, a refuge 
and a major means of nationalistic assertions against French 
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domination. But it was in the period after the First World 
War that an organised nationalist movement began to take 
shape under the leadership of the Emir Khaled, raising the 
question of rights of the Algerian population(167). 
The late Twenties and early Thirties witnessed the 
emergence of an organised nationalist movement expressing 
specific objectives and claims: the independence of Algeria 
from France and the establishment of an Algerian nation. In 
fact two major movements appeared during the period between 
the two Wars: the first under the leadership of Messali 
El-Hadj formed a Party called 1 1'Etoile Nord Africaine' 
(E.N.A), and the second was formed by the movement of the 
'Association des Oulema' (scholars), a religious group under 
the leadership of Sheikh Abdelhamid Ben-L'adis. The two 
movements had in common their emphasis on an Algerian 
cultural identity drawn from the Arabo-Islamic 
tradition(168). 
The role of the 'Association des Oulema' in the 
Algerian nationalism was principally related to the claim 
for cultural rights. They stressed the recognition of the 
Islamic religion and the Arabic language as the essential 
features of the Algerian identity. The Oulema's slogan was " 
Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, Algeria is my 
Country...Independence is a natural right for every people 
of the Earth"(169). 
However they did not propose any practical 
programme to achieve this purpose. Furthermore, they seem to 
have accepted the idea of French supremacy and their action 
was mainly confined to bourgeois-intellectual circles and 
urban centres. But their assertions did constitute later a 
moving force in the movement for liberation. Because of 
their threat to the French, the Oulema's movement was 
severely repressed and their schools were closed down and 
their members were persecuted(170). 
On the other hand the E.N.A Party was a 
labour-based movement. Initially it recruited mainly from 
emigrant workers in France, then it expanded to Algeria. Its 
major aim was mobilize the population and fight for the 
indpendence of Algeria from French colonialism(171). This 
party was in fact the first organized and structured party. 
It raised the Algerian problem in political terms and worked 
to attract international attention(172). Consequently, this 
movement constituted a real threat to French colonisation 
and was therefore even more severely repressed. Its members 
were either arrested, exiled or went underground. 
A third nationalist movement was to emerge during 
the inter-War period. It was made up of some 'Liberal 
politicians', under the leadership of Ferhat Abbas, and they 
were among the very few allowed to engage in political 
action within French political insitutions(173>. They, 
unlike the two other movements, believed at the beginning in 
the virtues of assimilation. They insisted on equal rights 
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between Muslim and European citizens and asked for 
socio-economic reforms and the preservation of the cultural 
identity of the Algerian population within the French 
socio-cultural framework. A few of these liberals managed to 
obtain Seats in the French parliament but their 
participation and influence were limited(174). The rigid 
French political system and intensive opposition from the 
colons gradually weakened their political actions. The break 
of the Second World War, the spread of nationalism, and the 
unchanged conditions of the Algerian population led to 
disillusionment with France and its insitutions. They 
increasingly realised that there would be no real 
assimilation for the native population. They became 
convinced that autonmy from France was the only path for the 
Algerians to recover their legitimate rights. 
The extreme nature of French colonisation - a type 
of apartheid policy towards the Algerian people's most basic 
rights - contributed to the strengthening and eventually to 
the radicalisation of the nationalist movement. This 
movement was by the end of the Second War, still latent but 
expanding and the claim for independence was more overtly 
expressed. 
Different parties emerged in the post-War period 
such as the 'Parti du Peuple Algerien' (P.P.A), which later 
changed into 'Mouvement pour le Triomphe de la Liberte et de 
la Democracie'(M.T.L.D). This party was under the leadership 
of Messali El-Hadj founder of the E.N.A. The 'Liberals' on 
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the other hand formed a party called 'Union Democratique des 
Musulmans Algeriens' (U.D.M.A) under the leadership of 
Ferhat Abbas. These parties though different in their 
approaches were united in their objective of national 
independence(175). The extreme repression adopted by the 
French to eradicate all forms of nationalism in Algeria 
helped consolidate a unity among the various nationalist 
strands and led them to feel the need for an equally extreme 
means to achieve the aim of national liberation. Hence, a 
military branch 'l'Organisation Secrete'(0.S) was formed in 
1947 with the principal objective of creating an armed 
revolt. 
The creation of the 'Comite Revolutionaire d'Union 
et d'Action' ( C.R.U.A ) between 1953 and 1954 managed to 
rally all these different movements for national liberation. 
This was to become in 1954 the 'Front de Liberation 
Nationale' (F.L.N ) and the instigator of the outbreak of 
the Algerian revolution on 1st November 1954(176). The role 
of the F.L.N Party in the organisation and continuity of the 
war against France has constituted its major claim to power 
and to its leading role in national politics to the present 
time. 
The armed action against French colonisation 
lasted for seven years and was a bitter and violent war. It 
ended in March 1962 with the ceasfire and the beginning of 
negotiations between Algerian representatives of the F.L.N 
and the French(177). Independence was proclaimed on the 5th 
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of July 1962, and Algeria became after one and a quarter 
centuries of French colonisation an independent sovereign 
state. 
It is the argument here that the impact of such a 
long history of dependence and external influence has 
generated in this country a strong need to assert its 
distinctive national cultural identity. This need was such 
that it became the central issue and the major objective in 
the process of nation-building. French colonial policy, and 
especially its advocated assimilation, and the systematic 
repression of the Arabo-Islamic culture and language were 
the major forces for this strong identification and the 
weight given to the Arabic language and the Islamic religion 
as the most important features of the Algerian identity. 
The Arabic language, because of its tight 
relationship with Islam and because of its role as a major 
protection against French cultural influence, has 
constituted a potent means of mobilization and reaction 
against colonialism. Hence, because of its centrality in 
Algerian nationalism, the Arabic language, continued after 
Independence to be a major political issue and therefore an 
important source for political legitimacy. 
b) The political context 
As a primarily political issue, the establishment 
of the Arabic language was claimed by the political elite as 
an integral part of a real independence from French 
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colonisation and its effects. Thus language policy has 
influenced, as it has been influenced by, the political 
context of the country. 
The long period of colonisation and nearly eight 
years of war created important problems for the emerging 
political elite; the most important of which were the 
establishment of a central authority and, hence, access to 
power. The organisation of political units during the 
nationalist movement for liberation period was dictated by 
war conditions with the supremacy of military affairs over 
the political. This already constituted a source of 
antagonism and dispute among the groups involved(178). 
The F.L.N Party regrouped, during the process of 
liberation, militants from the different spheres of society 
and with different political trends. This political elite 
were united behind the objective of independence, but the 
dissidence emerged once this objective was achieved. 
Internal conflicts, in fact, appeared from the eve of 
Independence during the congress of the Party held in 
Tripoli (Lybia) in May 1962(179). It was during this 
congress that the major decisions about the future 
political, economic, and social policies were made. It was 
therefore in an atmosphere of conflict over access to power 
that the language policies were adopted. These emphasised 
Arabic as the national official language and the need to 
restore it in Algerian society. 
However, it is suggested that because access to 
power was the priority for the political elite, major 
political issues, such as language, became means more than 
ends. The conflicts were not about the policies themselves 
or the ways in which to achieve them, or about major 
political options but were related to who would lead. There 
were for instance intensive debates regarding membership of 
the party's Political Bureau, which was to constitute the 
central-cell of Algerian political organisation. There were 
also bitter criticism of the provisional government 
(G.P.R.A)(180) which was in charge of the negotiations about 
the Evian aareements(181). These agreements were denounced 
by some members of the Tripoli Congress as a form of 
neo-colonialism which provided for an increasing dependence 
on the former colonial power. 
Two major groups emerged at the eve of 
Independence: one was characterized by a radical attitude 
towards France, and was in favour of a sharp cut-off, 
through the rejection of the Evian agreements. The other was 
more moderate and favoured the continuity of the relations, 
in accordance with the Agreements. They also stressed the 
need to maintain the same political leadership which was 
formed during the revolution. 
The first group was led by Ahmed Ben Bella(182), 
and backed by the army, whereas the second group was 
constituted principally by members of the provisional 
government and were mostly politicians. The tension between 
the two groups culminated in a crisis which almost ended in 
violence during the summer 1962(183). 
The emergence of Ben Bella's group as the leading 
group, their radical position vis a vis France, and their 
strong emphasis on decolonisation as their major programme 
directly affected language policy. The option for Arabic as 
the official national language became the major slogan and 
the central theme of political dispute. Closely linked with 
nationalism and national identification, it constituted an 
important means for political legitimacy and hence was 
extensively used as a claim to have access to power. 
The President Ben Bella managed to strengthen his 
position rapidly after independence and was able to oust his 
oponents. He extented his control over the government, the 
Party, and the National Assembly. He became officially the 
Head of the Government, President of the Republic, and 
8eneral Secretary of the Party. Here again the Assembly had 
no effective power. The only task it was allocated was to 
elaborate a project for the Constitution, but even that was 
later denied. It was the presidential group in the Political 
Bureau which finally established the Constitution which was 
'unanimously' approved in a general referendum organised in 
September 1963(184). 
The centrality of power in the first Algerian 
government was reflected in the confusion and overlap 
between party and government. The President took decision 
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making into his own hands which led to the resignation of 
the President of the National Assembly, former G.P.R.A 
president Ferhat Abbas, as a protest(185). The F.L.N Party 
instead of being a major political insitution, as stipulated 
in the constitution, came under the president's 
control(186), which narrowed even more the scope for debates 
concerning important national issues such as the national 
language. Decisions were therefore imposed rather than 
debated. 
An authoritarian regime was in fact established 
in Algeria, based on the president's personal rule, an 
abstract type of socialism, and an affiliation with the 
Eastern Bloc. This in itself was a major contradiction with 
Islam as the religion of the state - a religion essentially 
opposed to the Comunist-Socialist ideology - but in the 
Algerian context, both ideologies were used to legitimate 
the state as the defender of the majority's rights, and the 
national cultural identity, through the intended 
establishment of the Arabo-Islamic culture and language. The 
political leadership emphasized that socialism in Algeria 
would be a 'specific', even a 'scientific' socialism(187). 
Such a regime and the highly abstract form of 
politics quickly led to increasing problems and 
contradictions at political, economic, and social levels. 
This justified the overthrow of Ben Bella and his 
government, in June 1965, and the access for power of Houari 
Boumediene who was then at the head of the National 
Army(188). The military 'Coup d'Etat' was therefore 
organised by those who in fact brought the former President 
to power. Their arguments were based on criticism of the 
authoritarian regime established by Ben Bella, his 'cult of 
personality', and above all his inefficient national and 
international policies. 
Thus, it was mainly the practices rather than the 
major choices of the previous regime which were questioned. 
Hence socialism and the reestablishment of the national 
cultural identity remained among the priority objectives of 
the second government, and became used in the same framework 
with the same power-related objectives. 
However, Boumedienne, with his own personality and 
specific views established a new type of leadership which 
was in fact more radical. The 'Conseil de la Revolution' was 
formed by the new president and his close allies as a 
collegial system, an alternative to the centralized control 
of Ben Bella. This Council was to become the central unit of 
decision-making for more than ten years (1965-1979)(189). In 
spite of this collegial organisation, the system was highly 
centralized and decision-making was unilateral. Furthermore, 
it was principally the President, Houari Boumedienne, who 
held power and directly influenced policies, such as those 
related to lanquage(190). 
Boumedienne was known for his clearly radical 
positions, especially his strongly expressed 
anti-colonialist and anti-capitalist stands, his 
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unconditional support for and identification with 
Pan-Africanism and Pan-Arabism. Possessing himself an 
Arabo-Islamic education, he was among the few who were 
fluent in Classical Arabic. He always gave his speeches in 
this language, which was for him the basic and the most 
essential element of national character. To achieve complete 
independence, in political, economic, as well as cultural 
terms from the former colonial plower, was constantly 
stressed as a principal objective. He was overtly critical, 
even opposed, to Western capitalism, and consequently was a 
protagonist of the idea of a 'delinking-with-the-West' 
approach to development and 'self-reliance' rather than 
'convergence-with-the-West'. He was among those who strongly 
denounced the unequal international relations based on the 
domination of industrialized nations and and on the 
dependence of the industrializing ones(191). 
At the national level, Boumedienne's strategy to 
achieve complete independence from the West was based on 
what he called the three revolutions: the first one was 
political and aimed principally at the strengthening of the 
state apparatus; the second was the economic and 
concentrated on industrialization and economic growth and 
state control (nationalisation) of economic resources; the 
third one was the cultural revolution and aimed at 
reestablishing and reinforcing national cultural identity. 
The Arabic language was considered as the most important 
element in this cultural revolution, the means to react to 
and eradicate the consequences of colonisation and protect 
against neo-colonialist infiltration. 
It was during Boumedienne's leadership (1965-1978) 
that the Arabic language was most strongly stressed and the 
bases for its implementation were laid. The process of 
Arabisation was part and parcel of the policy of 
'decolonisation' recognized by Boumedienne and was 
considered as one of the most important foundations of the 
Algerian nation(192). 
However, it is suggested that modernisation, based 
essentially on economic developoment through 
industrialization, was equally, if not more strongly, 
stressed as a pressing major aim to attain self-reliance and 
hence real independence. But such a programme necessitated 
reliance on Western thought and practice and mainly the use 
of French language as the instrument of access to it. This 
constituted one of the major contradictions in terms of 
language policies in Algeria during Boumedienne's era, to a 
higher extent than in Morocco and Tunisia. 
After the sudden death of Boumedienne in December 
1978, the Party F.L.N designated Chadli Bejeddid as the 
Party's leader and the only candidate for presidency(193). 
He became Algeria's third president, since independence. in 
April 1979. His arrival to power within the same political 
framework as his predecessors underlines the continuity of a 
centralized form of government and decision-making and an 
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authoritarin regime with one Party system and hence the 
continuous need for ideological discourse as a major means 
for political legitimacy. In this context, the Arabic 
language continues to be central in the restricted political 
debates. 
c) Language Policies 
In Algeria, language policies have been mainly 
concerned with the process of Arabisation since the 1962 
Tripoli Programme. Arabisation was integrated into the 
process of decolonisation as a political issue and used to 
define radical reactions against the French assimilationist 
policies. The Arabic language was considered as the symbol 
of national identity and unity; hence its use as an 
ideological instrument for political legitimacy. 
Unlike Morocco and Tunisia, there has been, in 
Algeria, no official claim favouring the French language or 
bilingualism, especially from 1965 onward with a more 
nationalistic and radical regime(194). It is therefore 
difficult to find official statements questioning the 
adopted policies of Arabisation. Official debates have 
concentrated on the means and ways of speeding up the 
process of Arabisation to reinstate as quickly as possible 
the Arabo-Islamic character of the nation(195). These 
debates remained however theoretical and divorced from 
reality and its constraints. 
The contradictions in terms of language policies 
in Algeria can be identified mainly from the gap between 
rhetoric and practice, that is between the official claim 
for the urgency to use the Arabic language effectively and 
the maintenance of French as the working language. These 
contradictions are also reflected in the fluctuations in 
implementing the Arabisation according to the political 
trends of those involved successively in decision-making. 
These fluctuations varied from radical options by 
nationalists and tradionalists, to moderates or modernists. 
In the 1962 Tripoli Programme the option for 
Arabic as the national official language was stated among 
the main political options: 
...The Algerian culture will be national, 
its role as a national culture, will 
consist in the first place, to restore 
the Arabic language, which incarnates the 
cultural values of the nation, its dignity 
and effectiveness as a language of 
civilization... Our culture must be 
Algerian, based on the Arabic language 
which is deeply rooted in the nation. It 
will be used to fight cultural 
cosmopolitanism and the Western imprint 
which contributed to inculcating in many 
Algerians a contempt of their language 
and their national values. 
(196) 
This statement underlines the radical position of the 
Algerian political leaders towards language policy. It 
stresses their clear view of the Arabic language as a 
political and cultural means to react to and fight French 
cultural influence. This option for Arabic was confirmed in 
the first Algerian constitution (1963) where in Article 2, 
the new state was defined as "... an integral part of the 
Arab Maghreb, of the Arab world and of Africa"(197) 
In its Article S it was stated that Arabic is the national 
official language(198). During the first period of Algerian 
Independence, Ben Bella constantly stressed the principle of 
Arabisation and related it to the option for socialism. For 
him there would be no socialism without Arabisation(199). 
This political option and institutionalization 
for the Arabic language was again emphasized in the second 
government's constitution of 1976 under the leadership of 
Houari Boumedienne. It was stated in Arcticle 2 and 3 of the 
constitution that Islam was the religion of the state and 
Arabic its national language. It was added that the 
government will work to generalise the use of the national 
language at the 'official level'(200). Hence, Arabisation 
was even more strongly stressed in this government as one of 
the most important national priotities. Boumedienne was a 
fervent partisan of Arabisation, which he considered as a 
'revolutionary objective'(201): 
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Without recovering that essential element 
which is our national language, our 
efforts would be useless, our personality 
incomplete, and our entity a body without 
soul... Opinions may differ concerning 
means and methods, but there cannot be a 
a divergence concerning the option itself. 
This option is an established and definitive 
fact. 
(202) 
This statement shows the radical option for the 
officially adopted language policy, the intransigent 
approach and Boumedienne's conviction that such a central 
issue as language cannot be subjected to questioning or 
revision. 
In terms of language policy in Algeria two 
periods can in fact be distinguished during the leadership 
of Boumedienne. The first period from 1965 to 1964 was 
characterized by an intensive implementation of Arabisation. 
This was principally in the educational system and the 
administration along with the setting up of the Party's 
national Commision of Arabisation. In 1973 a Congress of the 
Party was held to evaluate the achievements of this policy. 
In 1975 Boumedienne stated that: 
... The day when the Arabic language will be 
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a tool of work and communication in the 
petro-chemical plants of Skikda and the 
steel plant of El Hadjar (Annaba), it 
will be the language of iron and steel... 
(203) 
This statement can be considered as an 
indication of the beginning of the second period, where a 
relatively more cautious approach can be noted. In fact, in 
the process of modernisation with the economic policies 
based on intensive industrialization, hasty Arabisation 
proved difficult. In this context the French language was 
used as the operational language. 
The appointment in 1977 of M. Lacheraf at the 
Ministry of Primary and Secondary education and A. Rahal at 
the Ministry of Higher Education (both were fervent 
modernists) marked a pause in the process of Arabisation and 
even a return to French-Arabic bilingualism. Lachref's views 
about the national language can be summarised in the 
following statement: 
... As long as Arabisatian does not 
fulfill all these conditions Cits 
adaptation to science and modernity], 
in order to respond to the imperatives 
of a fruitful rationality and a never 
ending creativity, it will risk 
remaining vulnerable, decried even, and 
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will not be able to 'dislodge' the 
more appropriate foreign language... 
which is qualitatively more functional. 
It is up to those who master the Arabic 
language to make this possible, by 
creative acts,..Ewhile) using French 
and other foreign languages in the 
indispensable professional information 
of teachers, pupils and students. 
(204) 
Mostefa. Lachref was among the very few politicians who 
overtly questioned the rationality of a rapid Arabisation in 
the Algerian context. He was concerned with efficiency 
rather than ideology in terms of language policies. For him 
the language question, because highly ideologised, has 
become "un otage du nationalism"(a hostage of 
nationalism)(205). 
But this rational approach to language policy was 
never applied since, with the government which came after 
Boumedienne (1979), the trend was in favour of a return to a 
speedy Arabisation. During this period Arabisation was again 
inscribed among national priorities, and measures were taken 
to arabise further education and administration. A new 
National Commission of Arabisation was set up to spread the 
use of the national language. It was also the period where 
an Academy of the Arabic language was created in 1985. 
In contemporary history, with this government 
having established its authority, reforms have been 
undertaken since 1988, in the national economy. Hence the 
necessity to adapt the educational system to these reforms 
stressing the necessity to hasten the process of 
modernisation. The language issue, however, has remained 
among the privileged themes of political discourse and 
closely related to the notions of national sovereignty, 
identity, and nationalism. But the increasing importance 
given to the economic and specifically to the industrial 
sector requires the maintenance of the French language as 
the language of work and communication. 
d) The Economic Context 
The major contradictions in terms of language 
policy are more strongly reflected in Algeria than in the 
two other countries in relation to its economic context and 
policies. This is not only because of the double emphasis 
on both national identity, through Arabic, and 
industrialization, through French, but also because of the 
dramatic state of the Algerian economy at independence which 
necessitated a higher reliance, for its development, on the 
West and France. To develop the national economy required 
greater dependence on Western aid, thought, and practice; it 
especially required the maintenance of the French language, 
already deeply rooted in the socio-economic context, as a 
major instrument of interaction. 
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In 1962, the Algerian economy was characterised 
by a dual system, that is a largely traditional agricultural 
sector, and an industrial sector in its early stages of 
development. The difference between the traditional and 
modern sectors within the agricultural sector was even more 
important in this country than in Morocco and Tunisia. The 
traditional sector which provided a living for the greatest 
proportion of the population, was producing mainly cereals 
and olive oil in the Northern part of the country and dates 
in the South. This sector was characterized by scattered, 
poor, and unsufficiently irrigated lands. Hence yield was 
low and the production barely sufficient for subsistence. 
The devastating war for liberation further affected this 
sector, where fields and forests were burned. About 8,0 ►0 
villages were destroyed and a large proportion of animal 
breeding stocks were liquidated (206). The 'ressettlement' 
policy 	 adopted by France during colonisation resulted in 
the uprooting of about two million peasants who became 
landless and were deprived of their main source for 
subsistence(207). 
The modern sector of agriculture which was 
developed was relatively small and was exlusively in the 
hands of Europeans before Independence. It was located on 
the most fertile lands of the rich coastal plains and 
represented less than 16% of the total agricultural lands. 
Modern and sophisticated techniques were used in this sector 
including irrigation, fertilizers, qualified manpower 
coupled with underpaid local labour(208). 
This modern sector was abandoned by the European 
settlers at Independence. it was taken over by the state and 
organized into cooperatives. This sector represented the 
must valuable part of the agricultural sector because of its 
modern means and good quality products, but it also was an 
important source of dependence on France with its products 
dependent on demand from the French market. 
So, the long period of French colonisation 
lasting for over a century was never geared to the economic 
development of Algeria. The modern structures set up during 
this period were geared towards exports, and as was the case 
in Morocco and Tunisia, to the French economy. 
Agricultural production on the whole saw an 
important decrease during the first years of Independence. 
This was due to the sudden departure of the settlers, the 
lack of qualified and skilled manpower able to use the 
available equipment left by the Colons. Added to this was 
the disorganisation in the processes of distribution and 
marketing systems(209). 
It was with such a poor potential that the 
process of modernisation was launched in Algeria after 
Independence. Industrialization was considered, by the new 
Algerian political leadership, as the principal means of 
access to this modernisation. However, the industrial sector 
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was almost nonexistent then and its development required 
tremendous human and material means which were not 
available. Consequently heavy dependence on the Western 
industrialized nations was unavoidable. 
Industrial activities were more strongly affected 
than agriculture with the departure of Europeans. About 80% 
of this population had left within the first six months of 
Independence, and among these were most of the technical and 
administrative personnel(210). Industrial activity therefore 
dropped by about 50%. This European exodus was accompanied 
by important capital outflow which in fact had started 
before Independence. Algeria was part of the French Franc 
zone, consequently circulation of capital between Algeria 
and France was simple. The total investment dropped 
dramatically from 464 billion French Francs in 1961 to 84 
billion in 1963(211). Overall production dropped by 35% in 
1962 as compared to 1960. Only hydro-carbon production 
continued to increase without interruption because it 
remained in the hands of multinational firms(212). 
The rise in national expenses, the need for 
capital investment and qualified manpower to build the 
economy, made it necessary to remain closely linked with 
France for technical assistance and financial aid. This 
technical and financial dependence generated specific 
exchanges with France, regulated by French needs and 
conditions. 
The trade balance with France was always in 
deficit, as in the cases of Morocco and Tunisia. The 
Algerian exports were far from covering the imports from 
France. The imports from France were principally 
manufactured and consumption goods, capital goods, food and 
agricultural products. The exports towards France were 
mainly crude oil, wine, and citrus fruits(213). 
In addition to this trade imbalance, financial 
dependence, whether aid or loans, was the other major 
characterisitic of the Algerian economy after 
independence(214). The exploitation and development of the 
oil and gas resources had remained, until 1971, largely 
financed by the French government and the Multinationals. In 
1963, France invested 30 million French Francs in this 
sector as stipulated by the Evian Agreements(215). 
The nationalisation of natural resources and 
foreign banks and entreprises, in 1971, was a step to reduce 
this financial dependence and foreign control over the 
Algerian economy. In this context, Algeria was economically 
more privileged than the two other countries with its 
important natural resources, mainly oil and gas. These 
resources in fact have consituted the major sources of-
revenues which were invested in the industrial projects. In 
1979, for instance, they constituted 60% of the total 
national revenues and covered 97% of the total exports(216). 
Their income has been used almost exclusively to finance 
industrial imports. 
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However, considering the ambitious economic 
policies, especially the option for heavy industry as the 
basis for development, the large revenues from oil and gas 
do not cover the needed investment. Hence, the increasing 
need for foreign aid and borrowing to finance industrial 
projects and general imports. 
The major argument put forward by the political 
elite in developing heavy industry has been that it will 
generate other basic industries which will contribute to 
agricultural and industrial development. This policy has 
been based on the notion of- "industrialising 
industries"(217). It was an economic strategy which aimed at 
achieving, in the long run, 'effective' economic growth in 
the different sectors of the national economy. The idea was 
to create a 'snow-ball' effect, whereby heavy industry would 
eventually provide the necessary tools and products needed 
in agriculture and light industry; and consequently 
gradually achieve the ultimate aim of self-reliance. But, 
the implementation of this model has needed capital, high 
technology, and skilled manpower which were to be imported. 
The economic policies adopted since Independence 
have therefore, required close relations with the Western 
world and France. In this context relations with the 
European Community have been increasing since Independence 
and have involved different aspects of economic and 
industrial exchanges. Agreements between the E.E.0 and 
Algeria were signed in 1976, for an unlimited period,and 
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were based on the principle of 'interdependence and 
equality". These agreements were enforced in 1978 with the 
main objective of favouring the economic and social 
development of Algeria, as well as commercial exchange, and 
financial and technological 'cooperation'. The financial aid 
granted by the EEC was 114 million ECU(218). The prinicpal 
Algerian exports to the EEC have been essentially oil and 
gas; the imports include principally heavy machinery, 
transport equipment, manufactured goods, consumption goods, 
and chemicals. Along with these commercial exchanges the 
European Community agreed to participate in the realisation 
of programmes for industrial development, and to help 
accelerate the transfer of technology through cooperation in 
the scientific and technological fields. Algeria has also 
developed relations with individual countries of Europe 
mainly West Germany, Italy, and France(219). Relations have 
also been developed recently with the U.S.A and Japan as 
well as a wide range of socialist countries. 
The Algerian government has been claiming the 
necessity to diversify its economic relations in order to 
reduce the country's dependence on France. This claim has 
been stronger especially from the 1970s when relations 
between the two countries started to deteriorate. But if 
France is today only the third commercial partner of 
Algeria, after West Germany and the United States, its 
geographical proximity, its linguistic and cultural 
influence, and its maintained administrative and economic 
structures, have secured its place as one of the most 
important economic and cultural partners. 
The other important area of French-Algerian 
relations, and which has been often the source of the 
detoriation of their diplomatic relations, has been the 
great number of the Algerian immigrants in France. Their 
migration has constituted, as in Morocco and Tunisia, an 
important outlet for the pressure on the limited job market, 
and their financial transfers contribute to national 
revenues. In this country also, it was hoped that the 
emigrants would eventually participate in the process of the 
transfer of technology. But, since the majority of them are 
unskilled they have been allocated the lowest jobs. It is 
the conditions of their work and living, the lack of their 
training, and the clauses for their eventual return home, 
which have created tensions between the two countries. 
However, in spite of areas of conflict and 
disagreement between France and Algeria, their economic and 
political exchanges have always been re-established after 
short periods of tense relationS. The strong impact of 
France in the different domains of national activities, 
especially in the economic policies adopted since 
Indpendence, have helped in maintaining privileged relations 
and exchanges with France which, in spite of strong 
political rhetoric, have been strengthening rather than 
diminishing. 
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One of the major aspects of these relations is the 
cultural and principally the linguistic. The French language 
has been particularly in the Algerian context, deeply 
rooted not only because of the assimilationist colonial 
policy, but because of its identification with modernisation 
and its use as an instrument for the acquisition of 
scientific and technological knowledge. Furthermore, the 
model of development and the specific relations it entails 
has maintained the French language as the means of 
interaction with these countries. 
The Algerian experience of development and 
modernisation has led to an increasing dependence and 
therefore contradicts the major aim of economic and social 
independence. This experience underlines the principal 
argument of the thesis stressing the inadequacy in use of 
the Western model. Furtheremore, the adoption of this model, 
in addition to reinforcing economic dependence, has affected 
cultural options and policies and generated contradictions. 
The economic contacts and exchanges formed a basis for 
cultural influence and necessitated the increasing use of 
the French language as the major, and efficient, means of 
interaction with the Western world. This constitutes a major 
contradiction with the aim of reestablishing an authentic 
Arabs-Islamic cultural identity, of which the Arabic 
language is the unique expression. 
These contradictions seem to be more visible in 
this context because of the radical Algerian approach to the 
language issue in political discourse, where ideology, 
rather than reality and efficiency, holds a central place in 
the national politics. 
In Algeria as in the two other countries language 
policies and the contradictions they generate in relation to 
the historical, political, and economic contexts of each 
country, are clearly perceptible. Furthermore, with their 
specific characteristics and constraints, the social and 
educational contexts of these countries, constitute 
themselves obstacles to this policy. 
Conclusion. 
Nationalism in the three countries of the Maghreb 
has contributed to the mobilization and participation of the 
population in the struggle for liberation. It continues to 
be used as a powerful means to sustain this mobilization for 
national construction and especially the consolidation of 
the nation-states. In this context, cultural identity, 
because of its unifying power, has been strongly stressed as 
a major aim in the process of nation-building to ensure 
people's adhesion. 
A common language has generally been considered 
as a distinctive and important feature of national identity 
and consequently a potent means in the creation of 
nationalism. The importance of language in national 
identification is mainly due to the central place and role 
it holds in culture: 
...national language, accepted by 
all members as the natural medium of 
social intercourse and as an outward 
symbol of their nationality...as the 
repository of racial and national 
memory, should be considered as the 
most important influence in the 
formation of national character. 
(220) 
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A unifying language is an attractive ideal in national 
formation and construction: it constitutes an important 
source of unity. However, nationalism and the emphasis on a 
unifying language in a heterogeneous social context, can be 
divisive rather than unifying. It can create within a nation 
conflicts and problems. 
In the particular case of the Maghrebian 
nation-states the issue of language has been closely linked 
with nationalism. It has been therefore conditioned by 
ideological considerations whereby language has become a 
major means of political legitimacy and assertion of 
national sovereignty. Consequently policies specifying one 
unifying language, the Arabic language, in a rather complex 
linguistic situation, have generated in the three societies 
important problems and contradictions. 
The issue of language in the three Maghrebian 
states has been analysed in this chapter around the 
following major arguments: 
- There has been in the three countries, with 
varying degrees, an undervaluation of the impact of the 
historical process in cultural and linguistic formation. 
The strong influence of French colonisation cannot be simply 
eradicated by ideological claims. 
- The centrality of politics in these states, with 
the predominence of ideology and search for power has not 
only conditioned but also obscured approaches to language 
policy. Thus the language issue has become an instrument for 
political legitimacy rather than efficiency. 
- The process of economic development undertaken 
in the three countries, based the Western model, has 
particularly affected language policies and accentuated 
their contradictions. It has particularly reinforced the 
role of the French language in these societies which also 
claim an authentic cultural identity based essentially on 
the Arabic language. 
The three countries of the Maghreb share many 
similarities in the process of their nation building. They 
face a similar set of problems and constraints, and their 
contradictions appear to be of the same nature. However, 
each one of these countries, for specific historical, 
political, economic, and social processes and 
characteristics, presents a distinctive case in terms of 
language policies, emphases, and contradictions. 
Hence, in comparative terms, there are as many similarities 
as there are differences. 
Morocco and Tunisia, having gained independence 
before Algeria, initiated their development process at an 
earlier period. But Algeria, with its intensive 
industrialization policies and its important natural 
resources, has managed to achieve a higher degree of 
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industrialization. In Morocco and Tunisia, this process has 
been relatively slower due to a more cautious approach to 
development and relatively limited natural resources, 
especially in the case of Tunisia. 
One of the major problems shared by the three 
countries is the dilemma generated by their desire to 
achieve modernisation, in the earliest time possible, and at 
the same time to establish an authentic national cultural 
identity. The model for their modernisation stems from the 
West while their national identity is linked to the 
Arabo-Islamic culture. Modernisation in the three countries 
is based essentially on industrialization and economic 
growth requiring continuing reliance on Western countries. 
This economic process has reinforced the predominance of the 
French language. Arabo-Islamic identity is closely linked 
with, and expressed principally through, the Arabic 
language. 
The historical process, especially the type and 
length of French colonisation, has affected approaches to 
language in these countries. Their respective economic and 
political systems have also influenced these policies. The 
Moroccan Monarchy with its identification with Islam and its 
emphasis on modernisation justifies the use of the two 
languages, hence there is, in this country a semi-official 
adoption of bilingualism. Tunisia, the most arabised of the 
three, more strongly stresses modernisation as a major aim, 
and has adopted more clearly policies of bilingualism. 
Algeria, spite of a de-facto situation of bilingualism and 
its process of intensive industrialization, more strongly 
emphasizes Arabic as the only national official language. 
The French colonial experience with its economic, 
political and socio-cultural legacies has contibuted to the 
shaping of the Maghrebian states' approaches to development 
as well as their language policies. Algeria, among the three 
countries, was particularly affected by its colonial 
experience. The long period of this colonisation, for one 
hundred and thirty years, has had a major impact. At the 
same time Algeria has generated a more radical response to 
this influence, especially in cultural and linguistic terms 
- hence the centrality of language in the Algerian politics. 
However, the inherited economic and socio-cultural 
structures and the adopted policies of development have 
maintained if not increased relations with France. 
In Morocco and Tunisia the colonial experience 
was shorter than in Algeria and because of the indirect type 
of colonial rule, as protectorates, the French impact was 
less important. However, after Independence, relations and 
dependence on France have steadily increased. These 
relations with France, especially in economic terms, have 
affected language policies in Morocco and Tunisia. The use 
of the French language has increased since independence. 
Hence, in the three countries of the Maghreb, the 
two-fold objective of establishing a national cultural 
identity and achieving modernisation has generated 
contradictions. However, Tunisia with its moderate approach 
is comparatively facing a smaller degree of contradiction 
than in the two other countries. Tunisia, because of its 
clearly Western oriented economic policies and its 
acceptance of the Western model as the source of reference 
for modernisation, fits in the 'convergence-with the-West' 
approach to development. Hence its language policies favour 
a French-Arabic bilingualism. 
However the problems faced by Tunisia in its 
process of nation-building reflect more strongly the 
contradictions of this model in a different context. The 
most important of these is the disruptive effects such a 
model has in the social and cultural context of this 
country. The policy of bilingualism has generated, as will 
be related in the next chapter, important contradictions and 
problems in the social and educational contexts 
particularly. 
Morocco, a constitutional monarchy, with a 
'democratic' political system and a capitalist-based economy 
also fits, in this respect, in the 'convergence' category of 
development. However, the monarchy draws its legitimacy from 
its affiliation and identification with the Islamic religion 
and the Arabic culture and stresses its strong emphasis on 
Arabic language as the only national language and the 
expression of national identity. This has created tensions, 
not only in terms of ultimate national aims and objectives, 
but in terms of the roles and status of each of the two 
languages, Arabic and French, in Moroccan society. 
Algeria, with its clearly socialist-oriented 
political and socio-economic policies, its radical and 
overtly expressed anti-Western and anti-capitalist stand, 
fits well into the 'delinking' category of development. This 
is also reflected in its language policies emphasizing 
Arabisation as a means of self-assertion against the West 
and particularly France. However, the clearly Western 
oriented policies of development, requiring an increasing 
use of French, contradict the claim for Arabic as the only 
national official language. 
In the three nations of the Maghreb, the 
process of nation-building has been affected by their social 
and economic policies. In these policies, often ideology 
transends efficiency which led to the use of language as a. 
major means to gain access to power and legitimacy. In 
addition the adoption, without adaptation, of the Western 
model and the primacy of the economic over the social and 
cultural as well as the lack of attention to the specific 
and real socio-cultural characteristics, have generated 
tensions and problems in the three societies. Education, 
supposedly a means of human development, is a major source 
and recipient of such problems and contradictions. 
Chapter III 
Notes and References. 
1. Contradiction is used here, and subsequently, in its 
general meaning. That is to express inconsistency in the 
aims and practices in the formulation and implementation 
of policies related to language in the three countries of 
the Maghreb. 
2. "Fluctuations" is used in this thesis to mean 
oscilliations in the formulation and implementation of 
the adopted language policies, especially in terms of 
emphasis between the Arabic and French language. 
3. The three selected countries of the Maghreb share a 
number of similarities. The most important of which 
are: geographic proximity, ethnic, religious, and 
linguistic unity, and a relatively common historical 
experience. 
4. Liberal approach to the international relations is one 
based on free exchanges and circulation of capiltal and 
goods. 
5. 'Smoother' refers to the (relatively) non violent 
process of access to Independence. 
6. During the period following Independence, the Tunisian 
government relied on the private sector for the economic 
development of the country. In 1961 a centralized and 
planned economy was established in order to ensure an 
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'integral' development of the Tunisian economy. However, 
by 1969 this economic "dirigism" failed and the 
government had to return to a liberal economic system. 
7. This continuity was, however, altered shortly 
after independence with the conflict over the 
previously agreed terms of negotiations. France's 
continuing influence was implicitly stated in 
maintaining French troops on Tunisian soil. But to 
guard its long term interests, even after the Bizerte 
crisis in 1959, France opted for a compromise: its troops 
left the country. Thus a complete rupture of its 
relations with Tunisia was avoided. 
See: Aron, R., and Poncet, J 
., La Tunisie, P.U.F, Paris, 
1971. 
U. This land of the Berbers, the original inhabitants of 
Northern Africa, attracted a number of foreign 
invasions. The most important were: the Phoenicians and 
Greeks, followed by Romans and Vandals, then came the 
Arabs with the advent of Islam, the Turks (in Tunisia and 
Algeria), and finally the French. For the history of the 
period previous to the Islamisation of the Maghreb see: 
Julien, C.A., Histoire_ de I_2Afrioue d Nord, des origines 
a la  conquete  Arabe. Tome I, Librairie Payot, Lousane, 
1964. 
9. The usage of the term "nationalism" as well as its 
roots is situated in nineteenth century Europe. It 
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emerged in Western Europe, especially in France and 
England during the late 16th to early 19th century as 
a result of the reaction to the expanded monarchial 
powers of the state. 
10.However, nationalism, as a concept, has remained an 
abstract, ambiguous and controvesial concept. This is 
because its meaning varies from period to period, from 
language to language, and from person to person. There 
are, in fact, as many different conceptions of 
nationalism, just as there are different doctrines and 
ideologies underlying the phenomenon. See: 
Fishman, J.A. 	 Language and Nationalism: Two  
integrative essays, Newbury House Publishers, 
Rowely, Massachussets, 1975, p.3. 
11.The idea of 'nation' was based on the notion of 
the right to the plurality of societies 
according to their ethnic, linguistic and/or religious 
identities. To set up independent nations on these 
bases was seen as an alternative to the "inclusive" 
and centralizing monarchial systems. 
12.For a thorough and more extensive treatment of the 
concept "nation" see Zernotto, G., "Nation: The History 
of a Word" in Review  of Politics, No 6, 1944, 
pp.351-366. See also Rustow, D.A., "New Horizons for 
Comparative Politics" in World Politics, 1975, 
pp.530-542. See also Edwards, J., Language, Society,  and 
Identity, Basil, Blackwell, Oxford, 1985, pp.37-46. 
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13.See Gellner, E. , Nations and Nationalism, Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1983. See also Breuilly, J., 
Nationalism and the State, Basil Blackwell, Manchester, 
University Press, Manchester, 1985, pp.352-365. 
14.The idea of nation has been generally described as a 
'subjective', and 'emotional ' phenemenon, because it is 
based principally on 'presumed' ethno-cultural common 
characteristics, and with common values and aims. Hence, 
it appeals to affective solidarity, based on sentiments, 
symbols, and specific values. Whereas the idea of a 
state was a firmly established reality in Western Europe 
before the advent of modern nationalism. The term 
'state', unlike 'nation ', refers to a more tangible 
politico-geographical unit under the control of a 
specific government. See: Fishman, J., Op.cit., p.25. 
The term ' nation-state' is presently more commonly 
used to combine the 'subjective' and emotional apects 
of nationalism, with 'objective' statehood aspects. 
See: Edwards, J., op.cit., pp.37-4b. 
15.These notions of cohesion, consciousness, solidarity 
have been used, by nationalists, as the the major 
and most integrative arguments, from the early 
nationalist manifestations during the 19th century. 
A distinctive identity has been used as a central 
feature of nationalism. See Edwards, J., op.cit., 
pp.16-17., see also Fishman, J.A., op.cit., pp.1-10 . 
16.The role of language in determining a group's 
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community or a nation's ioentity, its centrality 
in nationalism, prompted intellectual interest 
and has generated an important amount of literature on 
language and identity. Language has been subjected 
to a multi-disciplinary approach, it has been treated 
and analysed according to each specific disciplinary 
perspective. See barker, E., National Character and  the 
Factors in its Formation, Methuen, London, 1977. See 
also Connor, W., "Ethno-nationalism in the First World: 
the present historical perspective", in Ethnic Conflict  
in the Western World, by Esman, M., (ed.), Cornwell 
University Press, New York, 1977. See also Edwards, 
op.cit. See also Fishman, J.A., (ed.), Head.i. no  
Sociology of Language, Mouton, The Hague, 1968. Also 
Fishman, J.A., "Studies of Language as an Aspect of 
Ethnicity and Nationalism: A bibliographic introduction", 
In Sociolinguistics Newsletter, 14 (2) 1984, pp.1-6. See 
also Fishman, J.A., Language and Nationalism..., op.cit. 
See also Fishman, J.A., Ferguson, C.A., and 
Das Gupta, J., (ed.) Language problems of Developing 
Nations, Wiley Editions, London, New York, 1968. See 
also O'Barr, M.W and O'Barr, F.J, (eds.) Language_ and 
Politics. Mouton, the Hague, Paris, 1976. 
17.Edwards, J., op.cit., pp.23-27. See also Fishman, J.A., 
Language 	 op.cit., p.49. 
18.0uoted by Fishman, J.A, ibid., p.49. 
19.Edwards, J., op.cit., pp.16-19. 
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20.Fishman, J.A., Language and Nationalism..., op.cit., 
pp•44-45. 
21.In the Maghreb, the Arabic language is valued more as a 
symbol of cultural identity and authenticity than as a 
tool of expression, work and social interaction. 
22.See Laraoui, A., L'histoire du Maghreb, un essai de 
sypthese, Maspero, Paris, 1967. See also 
Terrasse, H., Histoire du Maroc, des Origines a 
l'etablissement du Protectorat Francais, Editions 
Atlantides, Casablanca, 1956. 
23.About Western rivarlies in Morocco see 
Brockway, F., The  colonial Revolution, Hart Davis 
and Mac Gibbon. London, 1973. See also: 
Laroui, A., l'Histoire du Maghreb...,op.cit. 
24.See Amin, S.,l'Economie du Maghreb.Tome 1 
Editions de Minuit,Paris,1966. pp.25-37. 
25.See Nickerson, S.J, A short History of North Africa 
Lybia. Tunisia. Algeria,  Morocco. From Pre=Roman times 
to the present. Derin-Adair, New York, 1961. See also 
Berque, J.. Depossession du Monde, Editions du Seuil, 
Paris, 1964, chapter III. 
26.For the history of the Moroccan Nationalist Movement 
see Duclos, L.J., and Al.. Les Nationalismes Maghrebins. 
Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques. Paris, 1966. 
27.Zouggari, A., Islam_ t Nationalisme__au 
1912-1956, These de Docotorat 3eme Cycle, Paris V 	 1977. 
28.See Salmi, J.M., "L'Acces aux Langues Occidentales au 
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Maroc a la Veille du Protectorat Francais". 
In Proceedings of the First Congress on Miditerranean  
Studies  on Arabo-Berber Influence, S.N.E.D, Alger, 1973, 
pp.266-268. 
29.The influence of the original culture and language , 
the Berber, is still omnipresent in the customs, 
habits, social structures and organisation in the 
Maghreb. The spoken Arabic, for instance, contains 
many Berber words and expressions. In fact, it is 
this surviving influence of Berber culture and 
language which principally distinguishes the Maghreb 
from the other Arab countries. See: Marthelot, P., 
"Maghreb, Machrek: Quels problemes?", in Proceedings of 
the Second International Congress of Studies on  
Cultures on  the Western Miditerranean II. S.N.E.D, 
Alger, 1978, pp.454-459. 
30.See Palazolli. L., Le Maroc Politique de l'Independence 
a 1973, Biblioteque Arabe, Sindbad, Beirout, Paris, 1973, 
pp.6-24. 
31.Because the Moroccan monarchy claims its descendence 
from the prophet, the king asserts his 'ansectral' 
legitimacy as the protector and defender of Islam 
and thus the Arabic language. See Leveau, R. 
" Islam et Controle Politique au Maroc", in Maghreb 
Review., Vol 6, No 1-2, London, January-April 1981, 
pp.10-18. See also Waterburry, J., The Commander of the  
Faithful: the Morrocan political elite. A study in  
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Segmented Politics., Widrenfeld and Nicolson, London, 
1970. 
32.See Ebrard, P. " Assemblee Nationale Consultative 
Marocaine", in Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, 
C.N.R.S., Paris, 1962, 1962, pp.35-59. See also 
Moore, C.H., Politics in North Africa: Algeria, 
Morocco, and Tunisia., Lttle Brown and Co., Boston, 
1970, pp.107-110. 
33.See Camau,M., La Notion de democracie dans la Pensee  
des Dirigeants Maghrebins., C.N.R.S., Paris, 1977, 
pp.3-20. 
34.Ibid., P.27. 
35.Leveau, R., op.cit., pp.12-17. 
36.Ibid., pp.16-17. 
37.Moore, C.H., op.cit., pp.107-109. 
pp. 3-20. 
38.See Palazzoli, L., op.cit., pp.18-25, see also 
Ebrard, P., op.cit., p.45. 
39.An expression borrowed from Brueilly, J., 
op.cit., p.360. 
40.Most of these parties emerged after Independence. 
These were: The "National Union for Popular 
Forces" (l'Union Nationale des Forces Populaires: 
UNFP), formed in 1969-1960, a Socialist Party 
claiming to represent Morrocan Labour force. From 
this party was to emerge another party (1972) called 
the " Popular constitutional Demcratic Movement", 
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(Mouvement Populaire Consitutionel Democratique: MPCD). 
The "Popular Movement" ( Mouvement Populaire: MP) was 
formed in 1957 and claimed to represent rural Berbers. 
The " Democratic Front for Constitutional Institutions", 
(Front Democratique pour les Institutions 
Constitutionnelle: FIDC ) was formed in 1962; in 1964, 
this party became the " Demcratic Socialist Party" (le 
Parti Socialist Democrate: PSD), which, in spite of its 
name, supported the Monarchy's interests. See: 
Zartman, W., Problems of New Power: Morroco., Atherston 





45.See Grandguillaume, G., Arabisation et Politique..., 
op.cit., pp.135-161. 
46.See Waterbury, J., op.cit., pp.266-267. 
47.The Istiglal Party emerged at the forefront of the 
political scene, its members occupied important 
governmental positions. Mohammed Al-Fassi, a leading 
figure in the party, was the Minister of education in 
1956. The political doctrine of this party was claimed 
as strongly nationalistic and identified with Islamic and 
Arab culture and language. Arabisation has been one of 
their major themes and strongest assertions. See 
Zartman, W., Problems of..., op.cit., pp.264-270 & 
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Chapter IV 
Language, Society, and Education in the Maghreb. 
the purpose of this chapter is to locate 
comparatively, the relationship and effects of the political 
and economic policies on the social and educational contexts 
of the three contries. Firstly the contradictions, and 
inconsistencies between these policies and practices at the 
social and educational levels will be emphasized. Secondly, 
there will be an analysis ot the socio-cultural context OT 
the three states, that is the complex linguistic situation, 
and the type of education favouring bilingualism. 
the argument in this chapter moves through four 
stages. First the contradictions at the political and 
economic levels are located in the social and educational 
contexts. second, it is argued that these policies have 
generated conflicts and divisions in society, heightening 
the dichotomy between modern versus traditional sectors, and 
leading to a new type of stratification and mobility via 
identification with, ana mastery ot, each of two major 
languages (Arabic and French). French has come to be 
identified with modernity; Arabic with traditionalism and 
the cultural heritage. This dichotomy is also reflected in 
the educational system through the different roles allocatea 
to each language in the curriculum. thirdly, it is suggested 
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that economic and technological transfer, with its cultural 
packages and specific needs, has reinforced not only 
economic dependence but socio-cultural and educational ties. 
In this context the role of French instead of deminishing, 
in accordance with political principles and statement, has 
increased. Fourthly, the complex linguistic situation OT 
these societies has reinforced the contradictions of the 
language policies. This situation is characterized by the 
coexistence of different vernaculars. There are two spoken 
varieties, Arabic and Berber and also classical Arabic and 
French, Each has its contexts and roles, though they often 
overlap in social interactions. 
However the linguistic situation, and role and 
impact of each language in the social and educational 
contexts, vary from one country to the other. 
Morocco is characterized by a complex linguistic 
situation with the coexistence of French-Arabic bilingualism 
among the educated population, Colloquial Arabic is the 
major means of communication, and Berber is spoken by an 
important proportion of the population (40% to 60%)(1). the 
language policies in Morocco have created different language 
related attitudes or identifications. Although classical 
Arabic is accepted in the society as a symbol of 
Arabo-Islamic national identity, this language is generally 
perceived as a 'traditional' one, confined to formal and 
religious communication. Spoken Arabic and Berber are used 
in informal interactions and family circles. The French 
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language, although not as deeply rooted in the society as in 
the case of Algeria, is increasingly used in Moroccan 
society not only as a tool of work and education, but as a 
means of social interaction and communication. In the 
economic and educational arenas, French with its modern 
'cultural connotations', is used as a working language which 
has increased its prestige in Moroccan society. Although the 
Arabic language has been introduced in schools since 
Independence, with varying degrees of emphasis, French has 
been increasingly used as the major means of instruction, 
especially for scientific and technical subjects. Education 
is seen, here, as in the two other countries, as one of the 
major means for modernisation. 
In Tunisia, the linguistic situation is less 
complex than in Morocco and Algeria, principally due to the 
very small proportion of Berber-speakers. However, as in 
Morocco and Algeria, there is both an Arabic-French 
bilingual situation and spoken Arabic is the medium of 
communication of the majority of the population. The 
political and economic policies of the country which 
emphasize modernisation have increased the role and use of 
French, which was weakly rooted here prior to independence. 
The dedication of the Tunisian leadership to the aim of 
modernisation, on the Western model, has emphasized overtly 
the need for adequate social and cultural changes. 
However while Arabic is claimed as the national 
language, French is increasingly used at all levels of 
national activities. Arabic is stressed as the symbol of 
national identity, but it is considered by most people, 
especially the young, as a less efficient and less 
instrumental language than the French(2). 
The educational system remained French in its 
general form, structure and organization. The official claim 
has been that the educational system will be the principal 
field of implmementing the Arabic language, and the main 
channel for spreading it. In fact it is the French language 
that the eoucational system is reinforcing and spreading. 
The bilingual language policies adopted in education (with 
the use of French in scientific, technological, and higher 
education, and Arabic in the arts) has increased the 
prestige of the French language and its role as the means of 
access to development and modernisation. 
In Algeria, the linguistic situation is as complex 
as in Morocco, if not more so. The French language is deeply 
rooted in the society, due to one hundred and thirty years 
of French colonisation and the type of colonisation, which 
stressed the supremacy of the French language. The official 
language, classical Arabic, has been until recently, 
mastered by a small proportion of the population: the very 
few who had access to Arabo-Islamic schools during the 
colonial period. Colloquial Arabic is the major medium of 
communication of the vast majority of the population. 
-db2- 
Berber, with at least three varieties, is still spoken by an 
important proportion of the population (about 25'4)(3). in 
this context, the French language, not only because of its 
historical impact but mainly because of its identification 
with modernisation, and its use for scientific and 
technological knowledge and skills, has been reinforced. 
The educational system was also the major field of 
implementing and spreading the national language. Although 
there is no official recognition of bilingualism, the two 
languages are used as mediums of instruction in the schools. 
Rapid and systematic introduction of Arabic into the 
educational system has been pursued in this country, more 
than in the two others, although as indicated Arabic remains 
largely confined to the Arts, while French is used in most 
other subject fields. 
The major argument in this chapter is that 
language policies in the three countries of the Maghreb 
directly affect the social and educational contexts, which 
are themselves interrelated and interdependent. The social 
and educational contexts, as the principal fields of the 
implementation of the officially adopted language policy, 
strongly reflect the contradictions and problems noted at 
the political and economic levels. 
Thus the organisation of this chapter will be as 
follows: 
- (a) The social context. In thin section the 
characteristics of each country will be 
investigated. Fhe emphasis will be on 
the complex linguistic situation 
characterizing these countries, especially 
Morocco and Algeria. The contradictions, 
in terms of language policies, and the 
effects of these on the societies of the 
three countries will be underlined. 
- (b) The educational context. In this section, 
the organisation, the structure of the 
educational system and the actual language 
policies, will be analysed. 
The educational system, as the principal field of 
implementing language policies, is used in this chapter to 
underline the contradicitions and problems created by the 
language policies in each of the three countries of the 
Maghreb. However, as stated earlier in the thesis, each one 
of the three polities has its distinctive socio-cultural 
traits and specific approaches to national policies such as 
those concerning language. The social and educational 
contexts of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria will thus be 
treated separately but with comparative comment when this is 
useful. 
A. horroco 
a) The social context: 
As indicated, Moroccan society has particular 
characteristics resulting from its history, its geographical 
position, and its post-independence political and economic 
options. These have their bearing on the language issue and 
ought to be taken into consideration when formulating 
language policies. The lack of attention to these specfic 
characteristics has contributed to the emergence of problems 
and contradictions in terms of language in this society. 
The development of Morocco has been largely 
influenced by its geographical situation. The Mediterranean 
sea to the north, the Sahara to the south and the Atlantic 
to the west have made it a centre for cultural contacts and 
interactions. Separated from Europe by only a narrow strait 
of fourteen kilometres, Morocco has constituted a strategic 
place of cultural, economic, and commercial international 
exchanges throught history(4). These foreign contacts, often 
made through colonisation, have left their imprints in the 
socio-cultural framework of this country. 
Among the different waves of foreign penetration, 
it was, as indicated in the previous chapter, the Arab and 
the French which have marked this society (politically, 
economically, and above all culturally). The Arab 
penetration, particularly, has left a deeply rooted imprint 
with the Islamisation and then the Arabisation of the 
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society. However, as indicated earlier, Berber culture and 
language have been preserved by an important proportion of 
the population. The Berber language constitutes today one of 
the major featurs of the Moroccan social context. French 
colonisation, more recently, has also influenced the 
Moroccan social-cultural fabric. 
Therefore, Morocco can be described as a 
multi-cultural society, with the coexistence of three 
languages and cultures (the Arabic, the French, and the 
Berber). 
It is the argument of the thesis that the adoption 
of one official language, namely Classical Arabic, in this 
context, along with the economic development options, has 
created contradictions. The economic contradictions 
inherited from the colonial period, with an important 
imbalance between a dynamic modern sector and a stagnant 
traditional one, has led to economic as well as social 
disparities. These economic conditions, along with the 
policies adopted after Independence have maintained, if not 
increased, the disruptive effects of an imported model of 
development. 
Moroccan society was at independence largely 
rural: 70'/. to BO% of the total population was involved in 
agro-pastoral activities(5). The means of farming and 
agricultural exploitation remained archaic. Production was 
then barely sufficient for subsistence. This community did 
not suffer, during colonisation, from a systematic 
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dispossession, as was the case in Algeria and to a lesser 
extent in Tunisia. Its entire patrimony, with its tribal 
institutions and modes of organisation, was therefore 
maintained(6). The process of development and modernisation 
undertaken by the French with a limited participation from 
the native population had little bearing on the way of life 
of this community. 
The majority of the population of the cities 
continued to live in poor conditions where standards of 
living and income were low. In fact the Moroccan population 
as a whole had an unequal share in the national income as 
compared to the European population. In 1955 the total 
population was estimated at 9.7 millions of whom 6.3 
millions were in agriculture. The per capita income of the 
Europeans at this period was about 7 times higher than that 
of the Morrocan population(7). 
These low rates of income and living standards 
were further affected by the drop in the Gross National 
Product coupled with the high rate of population growth(8). 
The deterioration of the conditions of living of the rural 
population, due to decreasing agricultural output and the 
increasing population, generated the process of rural exodus 
towards the cities and emigration to European countries. in 
the cities, the taking over of the jobs left by Europeans 
could only absorb a small proportion of the unemployed 
population. During the early years of independence, 
urbanisation increased by 50V. and, in the major urban 
-267- 
centres, the total population almost doubled(9). In addition 
almost half of the total population(42%) were under twenty 
years of age, which created increasing pressures on both the 
educational system and the job market(1O). 
In the modern economic and administrative 
sectors, which remained the same as under the Protectorate, 
a limited number of jobs was offered to nationals. It was 
mostly foreigners who were called upon for the key managing 
positions in this sector. The inherited economic, 
administrative and cultural structures made it necessary to 
depend predominantly on French technical and cultural 
assistance in the first years of independence. In 1956, 
there were 34,000 French working in different areas of the 
Moroccan administration(11). This technical and cultural 
assistance with France was regulated by a Convention signed 
by both parties in October 1957, which stressed the 
necessity of a close 'cooperation' between the two 
countries. This Convention also established the legal 
framework and official status for the French nationals 
working in Morocco(12). 
In early 1957 there were 20,000 French Technical 
Assistants in Morocco. They constituted 40% of the total 
number of the government's personnel. Three quarters of this 
personnel was part of the Protectorate administration(13). 
This French presence in the administrative apparatus was 
partly justified by the transitional period of the transfer 
of power from France to Morocco, which was officially 
extended from March, 1955 to October, 1957. This has 
maintained ties with France. However, it was after this 
transitional period that the impact of the French culture 
and language has increased in Moroccan society. 
The technical and cultural assistance was 
institutionalized through the signing of three conventions. 
The first one was related to "Administrative and Technical 
Cooperation", concluded on 6 February, 1957; the second was 
the" Cultural Convention" initiated 30th May, 1957; and the 
third convention was related to the legal bases for this 
cooperation and was signed on 5th October, 1957(14). The 
judiciary system, in fact, remained (until 1966) 
predominantly French in its structure and content and was 
based on the Napoleonic Code with the use of French language 
as the main medium(15). 
It is suggested that the important number of 
French personnel in national activities not only maintained 
but reinforced French-based institutions and their 
organisational methods. In this context, the role of the 
French language seems to be increasing which has affected 
the already complex linguistic situation of the Moroccan 
society. 
In the Moroccan context, in addition to the 
expanding French-Arabic bilingualism, there is 
Berber-Arabic bilingualism, and the important diaglossia 
between the two varieties of Hrabic (the spoken and written 
forms). Furthermore in the Northern part of Morocco, besides 
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Arabic and French, Spanish was also used, as a result of 
Spanish influence in this area. At Independence four schools 
were still teaching in Spanish. About 10% of the total 
population spoke Spanish language, with varying degrees of 
fluency(16). Berber is still spoken by an important 
proportion of the population which was estimated at the time 
of Independence at around 40% of the total population. They 
constituted about two thirds of the rural population and 
were concentrated in montainous areas, especially in the 
Atlas and Rif zones in the North of the country. Their 
geographic isolation accounts to a large extent for the 
preservation of the Berber customs and language(17). 
Moroccan spoken Arabic is the predominant means 
of communication of the greatest majority of the population, 
except the few Berber monolinguals. Hence the problems and 
contradictions generated by the adoption of Classical Arabic 
as the only national official language and the symbol of 
local cultural identity. This language (the Classical) was 
the privilege of only a limited few, those who had received 
a formal education at the 'Medersas' or 'Ecoles Libres' 
during the Protectorate period, or those who followed their 
studies at the lkaraouiyine University'. These constituted a 
small proportion and were mainly concentrated in urban 
areas where a sound knowledge of French and Arabic is 
limited to a few. In the rural areas, where the rate of 
illiteracy is very high and estimated at over 90% of the 
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total population(18), Classical Arabic because of its 
religious connotations was prestigious but not much used in 
daily life. 
By contrast, the French language has been 
increasingly connected with modernity and economic welfare. 
Its use in public administration and its role in social 
mobility has reinforced its position as a symbol of power 
and progress. The Arabic language remained relegated to a 
secondary role, in the spiritual realm particularly, and for 
many of the young generation it symbolises the old fashioned 
and retrograde. Hence, in Moroccan society as well as in the 
Tunisian and Algerian societies, the modern and traditional 
sectors, represented mainly by the rural and urban social 
groups, were in constant competition and conflict. 
Linguistic interactions helped reinforce differences in 
social relationships. 
The dominant language [French] 
occupies the domain of the secular, 
that is everything to do with every 
day life, administration, technology, 
politics, studies etc...while the 
dominated language [Arabic] is driven 
back to the domain of the sacred. 
Thus the dominated-dominating language 
opposition is converted into an 
opposition between old and new. 
(19 ) 
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This situation stemming from the colonial 
period has intensified with the increasing Western 
socio-cultural products. In the different socio-cultural 
activities such as cinemas, radio and television programmes, 
French is predominently used. In bookshops and news agents 
it is mainly French books, newspapers, and magazines which 
cover the shelves(20). This has contributed to the creation 
of a new kind of stratification (Francophones vs 
Arabophones). Therefore language has become, through the 
already highly selective educational system of Morocco, a 
major means of social mobility and prestige. 
More than literal [classical] Arabic, 
French constitutes a redoubtable 
instrument for social selection and 
elite "reproduction". It is through 
the different stages of the Moroccan 
educational system, a great supplier 
for the administrative apparatus, that 
such selection is performed. 
(21) 
Therefore the issue of language in Morocco, as in 
the two other Maghrebian countries, has become an indicator 
of social ditterences, and a measure of and means to social 
status. The use of the French language tends to denote 
identification with modernism; whereas the use of the Arabic 
language, even if it is identified with nationalistic 
affiliation is nevertheless often regarded as belonging more 
to the past than the future(22). 
b) The educational context 
In Morocco as in Tunisia and Algeria, the 
educational system reflects the contradictions and problems 
related to language policies resulting from the double 
objective of achieving modernisation and establishing an 
authentic cultural identity. Education in this context is 
considered as the principal means for the implementation and 
diffusion of the Arabic language and the related political 
and social values. At the same time the educational system 
has been expected to provide the necessary qualified 
manpower for development and modernisation. However, because 
of the two different sources of reterences of these two 
objectives (Eastern and Western) the educational system has 
become an arena of contradictions and ambivalances between 
these two poles. 
The Arabisation policy was introduced into the 
educational system immediately after Independence in the 
primary cycle, as education provision expanded. This was 
expressed in El Fassi's plan for the schooling year 
1956-1957. The main goal of this plan was to achieve 
universal compulsory education for the first three grades 
within five years, with Arabic as the basic language of 
instruction(23). 
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The implementation of the ambitious policy was 
hampered by practical problems such as the lack of staff and 
teaching materials. This led to criticism of this policy 
which was seen as affecting the quality of education. Before 
the end of the school year 1956-1957, the Union of Secondary 
School Teachers passed a resolution demanding: 
... The suspension of the current 
experiment in Arabisation, until 
truly qualified 'cadres' can be 
formed. If the Minister persists 
in wanting to continue this harmful 
experiment in the present conditions, 
he alone must bear all the 
consequences of this action. 
(24) 
This policy was also criticized by the differnt political 
parties, especially the 'Modernists', who were concerned 
with national development which, they argued, can only be 
achieved through the use of French(25). 
The official dedication to modernisation and the 
increasing influence of the 'Modernists' in the government 
along with the general dissatisfaction with this first 
Arabisation policy led to the setting up of a "Royal 
Commission of Educational Research" (R.C.E.R.) in 1956 to 
work out a programme for a general educational policy 
including the language issue. The Commission concluded that 
Arabisation should be implemented gradually, in accordance 
with the existing possibilities and needs of the country. 
A more prudent approach was therefore adopted 
taking into account the available human and material 
possibilities, which in fact favoured the maintenance of the 
French language in the schools. The Commission stressed that 
the educational aims should be based on: 
...Unification of the country by the 
greatest possible extension of the 
Arabic language to the teaching of 
subject matter, every time that it 
can be done without harming the 
quality of the acquired knowledge. 
tat.) 
These recommendations are vague and ambiguous, 
especially in the tension between the aims of the 
educational system and the means for the implementation of 
the Arabization policy. They also hint at the use of 
language as a political issue for legitimacy, where language 
policies are shaped by, and reflect the influence, of those 
in power. 
Thus with the reorganisation of the government in 
1958-1959, Abdelekerim benjelloun was appointed at the 
Ministry of National Education. He came to his new post with 
special instructions from the King to reorganise the 
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educational system in its form and content and to define the 
general aims of education. Benjelloun's major role was to 
overcome the problems generated by the previous educational 
and linguistic policies. 
The new educational programme is still the major 
source for the Moroccan educational policies. The general 
principles of national education were essentially: 
- The unfication of the inherited diversified system. 
- Its Arabisation. 
- Its expansion (universal compulsory education was 
officially introduced later, in 1963). 
- Its Moroccanisation, that is, promoting the education and 
training of national teachers, and adapting the curriculum 
to the national context(27). 
These objectives were ambitious and impossible to achieve 
simultaneously, considering the available means. This new 
plan indicates once more the gap between stated aims and 
possible practices. 
Because of the lack of teachers of Arabic 
language, a call was made on the Middle East Arab countries 
to provide teachers. Most of them came from Egypt. At the 
same time, an accelerated teacher training programme was set 
up for national teachers. However, the principle of a 
cautious Arabisation was still stressed during this period 
(1958-1959). 
The Arabisation of the primary cycle introduced 
by Al-Fassi was maintained but arithmetic and natural 
science were taught in French because of the lack of 
specialised teachers and books in Arabic. The time allocated 
to the teaching of French was increased. In the last four 
grades of the primary cycle half the time of school hours 
was attributed to each language - about fifteen hours for 
each. The secondary cycle and higher education remained 
almost exclusively in French. 
Because of the claimed priority given to 
Arabisation, a new commission was set up, by the King, in 
1959, called 'le Counseil Superieur de l'Education 
Nationale'(the Superior Council of National Education). Its 
members, principally politicians, met in June 1960 to 
prepare a programme of Arabisation for the next Five-Year 
Plan. Their conclusions were again rather abstract regarding 
Arabisation, which was in fact missing in their statement, 
concentrated on the general objectives of education which 
were: 
...providing the country with the 
trained leadership necessary to 
permit it to attain the rank of 
modern nations...and to give to 
the citizen a moral and 
intellectual training which 




A second meeting of this Council was held in 1962 
and was presided over by the King. In its final report it 
was stressed that the medium of instruction should be the 
Arabic language for all subjects. The Institute of 
Arabisation (created in 1960) was required to study the 
means and ways of expanding Arabic to scientific subjects, 
and propose a programme for the Arabisation of the whole 
educationnal system over a period of fifteen to twenty 
years. However the head of this Institute, A. 
Lakhdar-Ghazal, a fervent supporter of Arabisation, has 
frequently insisted in his declarations that the policy of 
Arabisation should be based on realism and objectivity. 
According to him, attention should be directed to improving 
and modernising this language(29). 
Until 1965 Arabisation of the educational system 
was progressing rapidly: in the primary cycle all subjects 
were taught in Arabic. But French was also maintained to 
prepare pupils for secondary and higher education where 
French was predominently the medium of instruction. 
The quality of education was affected by this 
hasty Arabisation coupled with the lack of human and 
material means. Therefore, a new Minister of Education was 
appointed in 1965 to reconsider the Arabisation policy 
adopted since Independence(30). The Minister, M.Benhima, 
insisted on returning to the use of French in scientific 
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subjects in the primary cycle, and on giving priority to 
improving educational standards by introducing adequate 
programmes and modern teaching methods. He also suggested 
the adoption of a system of selection for access to 
secondary education. 
However, he also identified the now familiar 
dilemma: 
Arabisation of education remains 
since independence, the principal 
objective to be achieved. but if it 
is easy to adopt the principle, its 
implementation, with the lack of 
means, is not easy ... 
t3l) 
This statement, once again, underlines the gap between 
rhetoric and reality. The principle of Arabisation remains, 
for nationalistic reasons, central to any educational 
reform; while in practice, it is the French language which 
continues to be the major medium of instruction, especially 
in technical and scientific subjects, and in higher 
education. 
From this period onwards language policy in 
Morocco has been more moderate in terms of Arabisation in 
education. With the increasing concern for modernisation, 
and principally economic development, education became 
linked with training and has been aimed at providing the 
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necessary qualified manpower. Although Arabisation has 
remained at the forefront of political and social debates, 
especially in its relation to education, the use of the 
French language in education has been in fact intensified. 
The implementation of Arabic language in the 
educational system was made even more difficult because the 
Moroccan educational system is still largely based on the 
French model, in its structure and organisation. It has been 
regulated by the same selective principles as French public 
education. 
The Universities are in general based on the same 
administrative and academic organisation as the French 
universities, with the exception of the Kairawiyine 
University (Fes) which maintained its traditional role as an 
Arabo-Islamic centre of higher education. However this 
university was reorganised, by Decree, in 1963 with the aim 
of modernising its teaching and introducing scientific 
approaches to the study of Islamic Religion and thought and 
it was expected to play an important role in forming Arabic 
language teachers. 
Normal schools, based on the French 'Ecoles 
Normales' were gradually established all over the country 
for teacher-training and education, especially for the 
primary cycle. Secondary education teachers were recruited 
from the university. The teaching material, including books 
and manuals, is largely imported from France, especially or 
secondary and, above all, higher education. 
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The reliance on the French educational model in 
its content and form, and the ambivalent attitude regarding 
the place and role of the French language have generated 
problems: they also reflect the contradictions noted in 
language policies assessed in the previous chapter. 
Consequently, the process of Arabisation in 
Morocco, as in the two other contries, has remained 
difficult to accomplish in terms of the means and ways to be 
used for its implementation. Arabisation has also remained 
unclear in terms of its contribution in the process of 
modernisation. The French language has maintained its 
supremacy throughout the educational system. Its position 
has even increased from the seventies onwards because of 
demographic, economic and educational expansion. The 
educational system with its increasing enrolments and 
limited number of qualified teachers along with economic 
development needed more reliance on foreign technical 
assistants. 
In purely statistical terms a decrease in the 
number of foreign assistants is noted. In 196b foreign 
assistants in secondary education constituted 56% of the 
teaching body, in 1971 they were 35%, in 1978-1979 they were 
only 20%. Their proportion is decreasing in primary and 
secondary eduction, with the expansion of higher education 
and its role in providing teachers. However, in real terms, 
the number of foreign teachers remains important, especially 
in higher education. The proportion of foreign, principally 
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French, teachers in the academic year 1978-1979, for 
instance, was estimated at 30 to 40 per cent of the total 
teaching personnel in higher education(32). 
The number of this foreign teachers is still very 
high in scientific and technical subjects (in secondary and 
higher education) where they constitute about 454 of the 
teaching staff. In 1977 for instance, out of 1,895 teachers 
of maths, physics, chemistry and natural sciences teaching 
in the secondary cycle, 1,622 were foreigners, of whom 1,128 
were French(33). In the early eighties the proportion of 
French teachers in secondary and higher education was 14%, 
and it was 76% of the total number of foreign teachers in 
these cycles(34). Added to this is the important number of 
lecturers who come for short periods or as visiting 
scholars. 
In contemporary history, and in comparison with 
the first decades of Independence, there has been an 
important decrease noted in the number of foreign teachers, 
in general terms. This is due mainly to the an increase in 
the "Moroccanisation" of the teaching staff in secondary and 
higher education. However, it must be emphasized that this 
does not affect the language of instruction, in scientific 
and technical fields and professional training, which 
remains French. The other feature in the training of 
Moroccans, who are to take over from foreign staff, is the 
important number of students abroad: 25,000 in 1979-1980, 
most of them were trained in French Universities. For 
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example, during the academic year 1978/1979 out of the 
12,541 students on a scholarship abroad, 11,274 were in 
France (90%)(35). The total number of Moroccan students in 
France (with or without a grant) was 13,948 in 1979(36). 
This does not include the number of students on short 
courses or training programmes, within industrial and 
economic agreements. The expansion of higher education as 
well as primary and secondary education), the need to form 
highly educated and qualified university teachers, is likely 
to increase the proportion of students abroad, especially in 
France. 
The educational system therefore, considered as 
the major agent for dessiminating the national language, and 
national culture and identity, has, in fact, become one of 
the principal obstacles for implementation of the national 
language. It is in the educational system that the French 
language is maintained, and through it that French culture, 
thought and practice are expanded. 
From the primary cycle French is taught as the 
first foreign language, starting in the third grade, and 
there has been a controversy about whether to teach maths in 
Arabic or French. Scientific subjects are taught in French 
in secondary education almost exclusively, especially in 
'bilingual' schools. These so-called bilingual schools, 
where French is predominant mainly in the teaching of 
scientific and technical subjects, constituted in 1979 95% 
of the total number of secondary schools (446 schools out of 
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471). The largely Arabised secondary schools constituted 
only 3.35% of this total (16 Arabised schools and 18 
religious)(37). In addition to the French Mission for 
Culture(M.U.C.F.) and private secondary schools, using 
primarily French as a medium for instruction, there is, in 
the public sector, 1% of the total secondary schools, 
usually reserved for the notables, modelled on the French 
Lycee and teaching exclusively in French(38). 
In higher education, in spite of the increasing 
creation of Arabised sections, especially in Arts subjects, 
the number of students enrolled in branches taught in French 
is still high. For instance, among the 40,000 enrolled 
students in 1977, only about 11,000 were enrolled in 
Arabized sections(39). Most of the scientific research 
undertaken either in post-graduation or in other research 
arenas is carried out in French, while governmental plans 
are increasingly stressing the role of education in 
industrial development and its adaptability to national 
needs in qualified manpower. 
The supremacy of the French language, over Arabic, 
in technical and scientific training remains to the present 
time. The low rate of schooling in the rural areas, the 
important number of foreign teachers in secondary and higher 
education, the exclusive use of French in scientific, 
economic, political, and industrial activities, the job 
market with its limited possibilities tor monolingual 
Arabophones, are some of the main obstacles to an overall 
Arabisation. 
In the educational system, the coexistence of the 
two languages and the uncertainty about their respective 
roles and aims has resulted in a reinforcment of the 
educational problems characterizing a developing country. In 
Moroccan schools wastage and drop outs have achieved 
alarming prportions. For example in 1978-1979 the rate of 
wastage in primary and secondary education was 35% in 
primary and 21% in secondary education. In higher education 
it has reached about 50%(40). The dual system of education, 
French/Arabic, has also engendered a drop in the quality of 
education. Educationalists and members of the public often 
argue that pupils in today's Moroccan schools master neither 
the Arabic language nor the French language. 
The hesitant implemention of the Arabisation 
policy in the educational system is increasingly criticized. 
The dissatisfaction has had its effect on those directly 
involved, the students: unrest and demonstrations have 
become customary each academic year. Their pressure might 
lead to a postive rethinking of the educational system, the 
issue of language, their role in the society and the 
relation of aspirations to the possible means. 
Overall, the language policies and the noted 
fluctuations in their implementation have generated social 
conflicts and contradictions in education in Morocco. This 
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has resulted mainly from the undervaluation given to the 
socio-cultural features of the society and the lack of human 
and material means to fulfil the ambitious objectives in 
terms of education: parts of the pressing need to achieve 
modernisation while restoring national identity. This 
situation, as stated earlier in the chapter, is not unique 
to Morocco. It is also faced by Tunisia and Algeria, though 
with variations according to their specific aproaches and 
circumstances. 
B. Tunisia. 
a) The Social Context 
In Tunisia, as in the two other countries, the 
lack of attention to the specific characteristics and needs 
of the society, when formulating language policies, has 
created problems and tensions in the society. The social 
context, in turn, has affected the success of the official 
language policies, especially at the level of their 
implelementation. 
The social problems and contradictions which have 
emerged in Tunisia since Independence mirror the 
contradictions and oscillations, noted earlier in the 
political, economic and mainly linguistic policies. 
Tunisian society, for historical reasons, but also because 
of the developmental policies adopted is exposed to two 
sources of reference: the Arabo-Islamic and the Western, 
mainly the trench. 
Tunisian society has much in common with the 
Moroccan and Algerian societies, with their Berber origin, 
their geographic proximity, their shared history, and their 
religion and language. However, it has its own 
particularities which distinguish it from its neighbours. 
Its geographic position, the impact of history, and the 
adopted policies after independence have marked Tunisian 
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society in a specific way. Situated between the East and the 
West, Europe and Africa, and bordered by the Mediterranean 
Sea, Tunisia, as was the case in Morocco, has been 
throughout history the cross-roads for many civilisations 
with easy access to foreign penetration. 
In Tunisia also it was the Arab and French 
influencess which mostly marked this society. The Arab 
influence bringing the Islamic faith and Arabic culture and 
language has particularly shaped the present social context. 
In Tunisia, Arabic culture and language were more deeply 
rooted and dissiminated before French colonisation than in 
the two other countries(41). French colonisation and its 
cultural impact were more a result of the country's 
receptivity to other cultures than as a result of a 
systematic policy of assimilation as was the case in 
Algeria. 
With a relatively organised traditional 
educational system, with its primary schools (Kouttabs) and 
secondary schools (Medersas) and its prestigious university 
'Zeitouna', the Arabic language was maintained during the 
colonial period. Modern French and Arabic schools were 
gradually introduced. However, with a highly selective 
system, only a few Tunisians received a bilingual education 
in these schools, among whom were most of the political 
elite. This has assisted in maintaining bilingualism as a 
policy. 
The adoption of Arabic as the official language at 
Independence was linked to the aim of reestablishing 
national cultural identity, while at the same time 
undertaking modernisation on the Western model(42). This had 
resulted in a complex linguistic situation with two 
languages, each fulfilling a specific objective. 
This de facto situation of billingualism raised 
contradictions in this essentially Arabic-Islamic 
social-context; and with the universalisation of education, 
Tunisia, with its limited potentialities, could not cope 
with maintaining two languages. The language policies 
adopted since Independence have in fact accentuated the 
socio-economic problems inherited from the colonial period. 
As indicated earlier, Tunisian society emerged in 
1956 as a predominently rural society, with a large 
traditional agricultural sector, hardly sufficient for 
subsistance, and a small modern industrial sector in its 
early stage of development(43). The hard conditions and low 
standards of living of this rural population led to a 
massive migration towards the cities, especially after 
Independence. 
This rural exodus has had important social and 
economic repercussions, such as the uprooting of large 
numbers of the population, disruption of local 
socio-cultural organisation, a dramatic drop in agricultural 
production, the emergence of shanty towns, and the rise of 
unemployment(44). Unemployment has been one of the major 
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concerns of the Tunisian leadership. In spite of government 
attempts to reduce it, it has been rising steadily since 
1956, as every year about 28,000 new jobs are needed(45). 
As in the two other Maghrebian countries, 
urbanisation is a relatively new phenomenon in Tunisia. The 
movement to the cities started only after World War II with 
the creation of the industrial economy, but it was from 
Independence that it became more important. This was due to 
four main reasons: increasing unemployment and low standards 
of living in rural areas; mechanisation of the modern sector 
of agriculture; industrialisation in the urban centres and 
the fringe benefits it brought; and finally the rise of 
aspirations brought about by Indepedence for more wealth, 
education and better life. 
In addition, at Independence 41.7% of the total 
population were under 15 years of age and more than 50c were 
under twenty(46). This important feature of the Tunisian 
society produces pressures in a very tight job market and 
limits educational and training possibilities. In spite of 
the job vacancies (due to the departure of Europeans) which 
have been occupied by Tunisians, the rate of unemployment 
was still very high. Most of the jobs left by Europeans 
required skills which the majority of Tunisians did not 
possess, as the economic and administrative structures were 
created and managed almost exclusively by Europeans. This 
has led to dependence on economic and technical assistance 
from Europe in general and France in particular. 
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In 1956, the French presence in the political, 
economic and social spheres of activity was still very 
important and was expected to increase through bilateral 
conventions. The 1955 French-Tunisian Conventions stipulated 
that an important number of posts at management levels were 
to be reserved to French personnel. This was in order to 
ensure the 'transition' period. The French courts would 
transmit gradually their powers to Tunisian courts over a 
period of 20 years. Defence and foreign affairs would 
continue to be under French jurisdiction(47). 
Although many points of this convention were 
reviewed soon after independence, as was the case for 
defence, security and foreign affairs and later the 
judiciary system, many areas of national activity remained, 
for lack of competent Tunisian staff, in the hands of 
foreigners, mainly French where professional training and 
expertise were required such as civil engineering and 
telecommunication). In 1956, out of an estimated total 
number of 4,960 'highly skilled personnel' only 1,570 were 
Tunisians(48). During the same year, there were 12,500 
French civil servants in the Tunisian administration, with 
important positions which could not be filled by Tunisians. 
This French presence in Tunisia has increased dependence on 
French assistance and has contributed to the maintenance of 
the French language. 
Tunisian society, marked by a long colonial 
period, was still bearing its imprint after Independence. It 
was characterized by a striking imbalance between the urban 
and rural populations, and between the few literate 
(estimated at 25% of the total population) and a large 
majority of illiterates(49). In the urban centres, the 
Tunisian population, exposed to Western influences, in their 
contact with Europeans, mastered the French language to 
varying degrees. This was a necessity for economic reasons, 
since job opportunities were available only to those who had 
at least some knowledge of French language, and this 
situation continued after Independence. Classical Arabic was 
mostly used in relation to religious practices and was 
taught only in Koranic schools and at Zeitouna University. 
Spoken Arabic was the medium of communication for the 
majority of the Tunisian population. 
However the linguistic situation in this country 
was not complicated (as in of Morocco and Algeria) by the 
Berber language, which is almost non-existent since only 
around 1% of the total population, located in the Djerba 
Island, have kept the use of this language(50). 
It is therefore the co-existence between French 
and Arabic, and the different roles allocated to each, and 
the diaglossia between written and spoken Arabic, which 
constitute the contextual linguistic features of Tunisian 
society. 
Consequently, as a result of the colonial policy, 
the economic pressures and the political options, the 
French language emerged at Independence reinforced in its 
role as a modernising factor. This has increased its 
prestige among the population and its importance as a 
necessary means for social and economic and even political 
mobility. 
Classical Arabic, with its role mainly limited to 
traditional education with predominantly religious 
connotations, has remained in Tunisian society linked with 
the past; while French is perceived as being related to 
technological and scientific progress, and the future. This 
has resulted in different attitudes towards the use of each 
of these two languages among the younger generation(51). 
Often, a speaker shifts from one language to the other or 
uses the two or three of them in the same sentence. This 
characteristic is common to the three Maghrebian countries. 
The governing elite, with its emphasis on 
modernisation as the basis for nation forming, attempted a 
transformation of the social context to adapt it to the 
requirements of modernisation. This, in view of the transfer 
of technology, and the acquisition of modern Western 
know-how would not be possible unless social attitudes and 
mentalities were adapted, in a fight against 'backardness' 
in all its forms. This view was often expressed in the 
president's speeches. In an interview with a French 
television he stated: "in this race for progress, the new 
economic structures are secondary to new mental 
structures"(52). 
For example, Islam as the religion of the state (or Arabic 
as the national language) must not be an obstacle to the 
process of modernisation. National culture as a whole is 
conceived by the political leadership in relation to 
modernity and development. In this context the French 
culture and language play an important role in the Tunisian 
society, as ameasure of modernism. 
However, Colloquial Arabic remains the 
predominant means of expression and communication of the 
vast majority of the Tunisian population. In spite of the 
relatively higher rate of literacy in Tunisia, as compared 
to Morocco and Algeria, Classical Arabic is only used in 
education, formal lectures and speeches. As indicated 
earlier President Bourguiba himself is known for his 
populist rhetoric and he often uses Tunisian dialect in his 
speeches, rather than Classical Arabic(53). The main forms 
of bilingualism are the French/Arabic ones, and the two 
varieties of Classical and Colloquial Arabic. In 
administration both Arabic and French are used but the bias 
is toward French. Street names, road signs, and shop names 
are in both languages. In bookshops and libraries there is 
an abundance of French books, magazines,and newspapers. In 
entertainment, such as in cinemas, theatres, television and 
radio programmes, French language and culture have an 
important share. 
The argument here is that the contradictions in 
the Tunisian society emerge from the roles and status 
allocated to each of the two languages Arabic and French. 
The official claim for Arabic as the only national language 
and the maintenance of French as the de-facto working 
language and as a means for political, economic and social 
mobility, has emphasized these contradictions. 
In fact, access to the job market, especially to 
prestigious positions and political roles, is available to 
those who know French or at least to those who are 
bilinguals. The Arabophone monolinguals have very little 
access to important positions and little prestige. They 
remain marginal in national political and economic 
activities(54i. 
Most of these Arabophones were educated at the 
Tunisian traditional Zeitouna University, or in the trial 
arabized schools and the few Arabized arts and literature 
branches established in universities since the 1970s. 
These Arabophones are a pressure group in favour of a more 
rigorous implementation of Arabization. They have 
expressed their criticism of the governmental language 
policy and the role granted to the French language. 
Those who strongly claim Arabisation, called the 
'traditionalists', and those who favour French-Arabic 
bilingualism, called 'modernists', constitute the two major 
groups involved in the debates about the language issue in 
Tunisia today. The traditionalists' argument is mainly 
based on the claim for national identity and authenticity; 
whereas the modernists stress French as a means of access to 
desired economic and social change and a link with the 
modern world and universal civilisations(55). The different 
emphases on language and its role are mainly related to the 
choice of the medium of instruction. Hence, it is the 
educational system which has constituted the principal arena 
of debates and the field of contradictions over the adopted 
language policies. 
b) The Educational Contexts 
In Tunisia, the educational system was considered 
as the principal means through which national identity was 
to be re-established. The Arabic language was to be used and 
dissiminated through the educational system. The 
educational system was equally expected to promote the 
social and economic changes necessary for modernisation. 
The Tunisian educational system remained unchanged 
from Independence until 1958. During this period it was 
characterised by diversity, with three types of education., 
One was completely Arabised, represented mainly by the 
Koranic schools. The second was bilingual, providing 
secondary education, represented by the prestigous Sadigi 
College. The third was completely French, with the three 
cycles. 
The first reform of the Tunisian educational 
system was initiated two years after Independence in 
1958(56). This reform was undertaken with the major 
objectives of: 
- unification of the inherited diversified system, 
- its nationalisation, with the implementation of 
Arabisation, 
- its adaptation to the national context with its social 
aspirations and economic needs, 
- its expansion, with the aim of achieving universal primary 
education (57). 
These were the main aims of Tunisian national education 
which have constituted the general guidelines of 
contemporary policies of education including the reform of 
1968. 
The first aim, unification of the educational 
system, was considered as a crucial basis for Tunisian 
education, and therefore the diverse types of schools 
(Koranic French and bilingual schools) were replaced by 
national public schools. The Tunisian Ministry of Education 
was in charge of the organisation of the whole educational 
system including its universalization, curriculum 
elaboration, and teacher training. With the nationalisation 
of the educational system the Tunisian government aimed at 
achieving Arabisation within a period of ten years. 
Therefore, the first two years of the primary cycle 
were completely Arabised. Arabic was introduced gradually as 
a subject in the later years of this cycle. In the secondary 
cycle two sections were created (A and B). In section A, 
Arabic was the medium of instruction for all subjects. in 
section B, called the transitory section, French was used as 
the medium of instruction. 
Attempts were made, with the available human and 
material means to expand education for the maximum number of 
children of school age. Tunis University was created in 1959 
to promote higher education (58). 
The Arabisation of the educational system was 
characterised in this country by a rather pragmatic 
approach. The process of its implementation was, unlike 
Morocco and Algeria, prudent in spite of the claim for a 
complete Arabisation within ten years. In the 1958 reform it 
was stated that: 
... We cannot uniformly and at once 
impose the exclusive usage of the 
language that the ancient pedagogy 
has neglected: its brutal expansion 
would run, among other things, against 
the scarcity of qualified teachers and 
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the absence of adapted manuals. It is 
necessary to Arabise progressively 
taking into account the time factor 
and the subjects in order to ensure a 
harmonious continuity [between past and 
future]. 
(59) 
The ambitious programme of this 1958 reform 
could not be achieved. Rather it resulted in social 
conflicts and educational problems. Thus a new reform was 
undertaken in July 1968 with the appointment of Ahmed Ben 
Salah at the head of the Ministry of education. The major 
aim was to expand Arabisation within another period of ten 
years. But, a year later Ben Salah reintroduced French in 
the first two years of the primary cycle. In the secondary 
cycle section H (using French as the medium of instruction) 
became more and more important leading to the supression of 
section A (which used Arabic). Hence, with this second 
reform bilingualism in education was confirmed: 
... Tunisia, future oriented, has 
deliberately opted for bilingualism. 
French, a 'vehicular' language, and 
the language adjuvant of culture 
should be reinforced so that the 
pupil, open from an early age to 
the external world is able to 
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acquire practice of the French 
language; while penetrating the 
history of his country, that is 
Arabo-Islamic civilization and 
culture. 
(60) 
The general recommendations of this reform 
mainly stressed the need to improve the quality and 
efficiency of the educational system, to respond to the 
requirements of socio-economic development and to integrate 
the educational system into the national economy. The same 
Minister, Bensalah, was also made head of the Ministries of 
Planning, Economy and Finance. To explain this affiliation 
of the Ministry of Education to the other ministries, the 
Tunisian president declared: 
Experience showed that it would be 
suitable - if only for a certain period - 
to regroup in the same hand, the 
responsibility at the national level for 
the Ministry of education with that of 
social and economic development. In this 
way we shall ensure the organic integration 
of the two conceptions, educational and 
economic, not only because of their 
interaction, also because each is 
subordinated to the other. 
(61) 
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This structural change reaffirmed the role 
assigned to education as the promoter of economic 
development. This led to changes in the organisation of the 
educational system, its content and teaching methods. 
Emphasis was on professional training and the formation of 
the skilled manpower needed to ensure economic growth(62). 
In higher education, the university structutre 
and its organisation are modelled on French universities, 
and so are the centres for research and high schools(63). 
French is the language of instruction of almost all subjects 
in most branches. The Arabisation of some branches in the 
humanities was initiated only after 1970. 
The major role of the university has been to 
provide the necessary manpower for national development. The 
creation in 1979 of a new Ministry for Higher Education and 
Scientific Research (M.E.R.S.), separate from the primary 
and secondary education administration, was undertaken to 
devote special attention to this important cycle and adapt 
it to national needs. To achieve an adequate balance between 
higher education, training and employment is the main 
objective of this option. The integration of educational 
planning into overall national economic planning, and the 
priority given to scientific and technical training, has 
called for a greater use of French as the medium of 
instruction, especially in secondary and higher 
education(64). 
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The extension of education to all children of 
school age and the process of Arabisation have constituted 
the prinicpal objectives of Tunisian educational reforms. 
However the limited human and material means made it 
impossible to achieve these ambitious objectives. 
Consequently, to respond to the objective of educational 
expansion reliance on external assistance, mainly French, 
was necessary. This, in turn, affected the policy of 
Arabisation. 
The extension of education, in fact, made 
noticeable progress in the first decades of Independence. 
The rate of schooling rose from about 29% in the period of 
independence to around 73% in 1971(65). With the second 
reform and the emphasis on quality rather than quantity the 
system became more selective and access was limited. In 
primary education for instance the rate of enrollments 
dropped from 81.1% in 1965-1966 to 77% in 1974-1975(66). 
This increased to achieve a 95% rate for boys of school age 
by 1985(67). But girls are still underschooled at the 
present time, and disparity between rural and urban areas is 
still very high. Acess to secondary and higher education 
remains limited(68). 
The 'nationalisation' of the educational system 
was also among the major objectives of the Tunisian 
educational policies. This nationalisation referred to the 
adaptation of education (in its content and form) to 
national characteristics, needs, and values, with a Tunisian 
teaching personnel, and the implementation of Arabisation. 
However, apart from the introduction of a few 
changes in content (such as relating historical, literary, 
and geographic instruction to Tunisia and the Arab world), 
the rest remained based on the existing French model(69). 
The language of instruction has remained predominantly 
French. 
The Tunisification of the teaching staff has 
expanded especially in the primary cycle, but in the 
secondary cycle in 1981 the proportion of foreign teachers 
was still 16.2%. During the period 1977-1980 there were 940 
French teachers in secondary education(70). These teachers 
were to be replaced by nationals from 1980, but because of 
the increasing needs for scientific and tehcnical teachers 
in this cycle, the government decided to maintain the same 
number of French teachers. It is likely that the call on 
foreign teachers in general and French teachers in 
particular is to increase rather than decrease, considering 
the increasing number of students in scientific and 
technical branches and the still insufficient number of 
trained Tunisian teachers in these disciplines(71). 
The Fifth Plan for economic and social 
development (1977-1981), in fact, emphasises a more 
scientific and technical orientation of education. According 
to this Plan 73% of the total students in secondary 
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education were to be concentrated in mathematical-science, 
technical science, and industrial science branches against a 
proportion of 47.7'/. in 1972 and 66.4% in 1976(72). In higher 
education, because of this trend, the need in foreign 
teachers is still important. 
It must be noted that, as was the case in 
Morocco, the 'Tunisification' of the teaching staff does not 
necessarily mean Arabisation, as most of the Tunisian 
teachers who are replacing the French are French-educated 
either in Tunisia or in French universities. During the 
academic year 1978-1979, for instance, there were 9,625 
Tunisian students in France, of whom 613 were on a grant 
award by the French government(73). In 1980, 556 new grants 
were awarded for post-graduate studies in France(74). 
The option for Arabic language as the major 
medium of education and the most important element of a 
nationalised education, has remained only an aspiration. 
This is because not only are human and material 
possibilities limited, but also the political and economic 
options favour a situation of Arabic/French bilingualism. 
Decades after Independence, the French language is 
as present as ever in Tunisian society. It is still the 
working language, not only among the educated elite but also 
among the less educated and even among segments of the 
working class. Its privileged position and prestigious 
status in national activities has been perpetuated not only 
by the French-based model of education but also by its 
association with modernity and technological progress and 
universal civilisations. 
The Tunisian leadership seems to have achieved 
some support and consensus for its policies, and the vast 
majority of the population seem to have accommodated to this 
situation of bilingualism. But this apparent consensus is 
undergoing changes and rising dissatisfaction with the 
present political and economic order can be perceived in 
Tunisian society. The failure of the educational system to 
fulfil the high aspirations for a democratized knowledge and 
better chances for social progress has led to a 
re-evaluation and even questioning of the prevailing order 
and the prescribed formulas, especially in terms of 
language and educational policies. The present linguistic 
dual system is more and more considered as responsible for 
the ongoing process of stratification and at the base of the 
problems in education. 
The prevailing situation of bilingualism in 
education in Tnisia, with the de-facto supremacy of French 
over Arabic, has affected the quality of education. This is 
reflected in the high rate of wastage and drop outs of 
school children exposed to two mediums of instruction 
neither of which is in reality their mother tongue(75). This 
situation has also generated a confused bicultural situation 
where each language fulfils a specific role, leading to the 
emergence of a dual system in education with two types of 
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knowledge, one traditional and one modern(76). Hence 
languagse have become a means of educational and social 
selection and have affected social mobility by reinforcing 
social inequalities(77). 
Furthermore, the maintenance of bilingualism has 
raised important financial constraints for this emerging 
nation with its limited resources. However, the Tunisian 
approach to the language issue has been relatively moderate 
and pragmatic as compared with Morocco and Algeria. The 
leadership's dedication to modernisation has been clearly 
formulated, hence the overt option for bilingualism. This 
was not the case in Algeria where, because of its particular 
historical, political, and economic circumstances, the 
approach to language is much more radical. 
C. Algeria. 
a) The social context 
The Algerian social context has affected and is 
affected by the language policies adopted since 
Independence. It also reflects the problems and 
contradictions generated by these policies. This is 
principally because, when formulated, the language policies 
failed to take into account the socio-linguistic 
characteristics of this society which have resulted from its 
historical process and specific experiences. 
Algerian society was exposed to foreign 
domination and influence for the longest period among the 
three Maghrebian societies. Although Algeria experienced the 
same chain of colonisation, and approximatively at the same 
time, it was the French colonisation which has left the 
strongest impact after the Arabs. 
The particular length and type of the French 
colonisation has marked the Algerian social context. For 
more than a century, this country was integrated as a part 
of French territory, including European settlement(7B). The 
process of 'deculturation' was applied systematically on the 
Algerian society with the colonial policy of assimilation. 
The Arab penetration, however, with the adoption of Islam 
and the spread of Arabic culture and language is perceived 
in this society as a process of 'acculturation', though to a 
lesser degree than in Tunisia. As in Morocco a 
Berber-speaking population has remained to the present time. 
The post-independence period was marked by the 
adoption of radical policies, especially in terms of 
language, as a reaction to the French policy of 
assimilation. However, the option for modernisation and 
economic development has strengthened ties with the Western 
countries, especially France, and consequently has 
contributed to the continued use of French. 
This underlines the contradictions between the 
stated policies of Arabisation, and actual practices, with 
the maintenance of the French language. As the largest 
country of the Maghreb, and with important potentials in 
natural resources, Algeria was able to accelerate the 
process of industrialisation and economic growth which has 
also affected the social context. 
The development of the society, with one of the 
highest birth rates in the world(79), has been neglected in 
the race for industrialisation, in order to catch up with 
the modernisation led by the West. 
The Algerian society which emerged at the 
independence was poor after a long colonial period and a 
destructive war of liberation. The highest proprtion of the 
population 70% to 80%, lived in rural areas and depended on 
agricultural earnings(80). Colonisation and war affected the 
rural population to a much greater extent than the urban 
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population. It started with the dispossession of the 
peasants, initiated from the early days of colonisation. 
They had to give up gradually the most fertile land for 
either the French government or the European settlers(81). 
At the eve of Independence, the communal land 'domaine' was 
estimated at 11 million hectares and the total land in the 
hands of the settlers was over two million hectares, 
distributed over 8,000 large properties(82). The movement 
of the Algerian population was towards the mountainous and 
less fertile areas. The rural population was directly or 
indirectly involved in the liberation war. 
In addition to the losses in terms of lives, around 
one third of the population was displaced. This 
'resettlment' policy, adopted by the French authorities to 
isolate the rural population, had affected about 2.16 
million people by 1960(83), and has had far reaching 
consequences on the population as a whole(84). It has 
resulted in the disintegration of the social fabric of this 
population. The great majority had to seek work either in 
the European owned farms or in the nearest urban centres. 
The population exodus towards the cities was increased by 
the effects of the war. The rural population, moving to the 
urban centres for better prospects, aggravated the 
unemployment rate, which was already high. Urbanisation 
reached its highest rate during the war period and by the 
early years of Independence the population of most cities 
and towns had more tha doubled. In Algiers and its suburbs, 
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during the 1954-1960 period, the population increased by 
36%, reaching 4,307 million in 1966(85). The departure of 
the French population increased the rural exodus. During the 
period 1960-1963, around 800,000 people moved to the 
cities(86), creating a mass of shanty towns ('bidonvilles') 
and poor living conditions. 
In spite of the vacant jobs left by Europeans and 
taken over by Algerians, mainly in the administrative sector 
where the number of Algerian civil servants increased from 
30,000 in 1955 to 300,000 in 1963(87), the rate of 
unemployment at Independence remained very high. Around two 
thirds of the active population were unemployed(88). This 
situation was aggraved by a rapid growth of the population, 
estimated at a rate of 3% a year. From 1954 to 1964, the 
population increased from 9.530 million to 12.102 
million(89). Emigration constituted an outlet for the rising 
pressures on the job market. Morocco and Tunisia have 
received Algerian emigrants but the greatest majority left 
for Europe, France principally. By the end of 1963 there 
were about 610,000 Algerians living in France(90). 
In 1963, the new organisation of the agricultural 
sector was based on the 'Self-Managment' of the lands left 
by the settlers. Management Committees were set up by 
Agrarian governmental legislation with the major objective 
of reducing the rural exodus. But this new legislation 
concerned only a small proportion of the rural population, 
often those employed on the modern agricultural sector prior 
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to Independence. This organisation of the agricultural 
sector reinforced regional and economic disparities more 
than it solved the acute problems of the rural population 
which needed an immediate and systematic reorganisation of 
the agrarian sector as a whole(91). 
The Algerian population at Independence was 80% to 90'/. 
illiterate(92). Only a few had some training as most of them were 
kept outside the administrative apparatus, industry and schooling 
throughout the colonial period(93). Only in the last years of 
liberation were there attempts at their integration, with the 
'Plan de Constantine' launched in October 1958. This plan aimed 
at bringing about economic and social reforms for the native 
population(94). Those reforms came too late as the war for 
liberation was well engaged. The European population who left was 
estimated at more than 1 million, representing 80% of the 
Algeria's qualified manpower(95). 
As the economic and social structures remained in the 
French type of organisation, it was French technical personnel 
which continued to operate them. The foreign technical assistance 
was clearly spelled out in the Evian agreements(96) where 
important provisions were planned in terms of cultural, financial 
and technical aid. The French population who remained in Algeria 
after independence was less than 200,000. Nearly 18,000 of the 
French who left the country returned later the same year, within 
the frame of technical and cultural co-operation between Algeria 
and France(97). 
Because of the length of the colonisation period 
and the specific terms of of the French-Algerian 
relationship during colonisation, the French presence in 
Algeria was much more important than in Morocco and Tunisia. 
Its impact was therefore more deeply rooted in the 
structures of the country. French culture in general and the 
language in particular have been for a long period 
constantly used as a symbol and means of power, of prestige 
and superiority. This situation of dependence strongly 
affected the Algerian population. 
Islam and the Arabic language, often closely 
interlinked, were used as a 'protecting barrier' against a 
cultural and linguistic 'agression' which threatened the 
Algerian identity; and were used as major means in fostering 
nationalism in the population. 
However, at Independence, in spite of a renewed 
interest in Islam and the Arabic language and their equation 
with national identity, French remained entrenched in the 
society. It was almost exclusively used in the general 
administration of the country where about 47% of those 
holding high positions and 71% of management posts were the 
same staff who served under the French government(98). 
Moreover, with the French-Algerian agreement signed in 
August 1962, more than 20,000 French assistants were sent to 
Algeria, half of them to serve in the administrative and 
technical fields and the rest in education(99). 
The use of the French language in the different 
fields of national life, especially in education, economy 
and administration, has strengthened its association with 
development, prosperity and above all modernity; hence it 
has become in Algerian society a necessary condition of 
access to jobs and social promotion(lOO). The young, 
representing more than half of the population(101), tend to 
perceive the French language not only as a means of social 
and economic mobility, but also as an open window to the 
modern West. 
The Arabic language, in spite of its claimed value 
and relation to national identity, remained limited in its 
utilisation and expansion, because of the importance of 
French language, and also because of its place and role in 
the overall linguistic and cultural situation of the 
country. In Algeria also, the diglossia between the spoken 
and written forms of Arabic is quite important, a gap 
widened by the borrowing of a large number of French words 
introduced into the spoken variety of Arabic(102). 
The highly academic form of Classical Arabic, in a 
context of a low rate of literacy, was only accessible to a 
very limited proportion of the population who attended 
religious schools or had studied in the Middle East or at 
Tunisia's University or Morocco's Quaraouinine. Their number 
was much smaller than Morocco and Tunisia. The vast majority 
of the population used and understood only the spoken 
variety of Arabic or Berber. The Berber language is spoken 
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by an important proportion of the Algerian population, which 
was estimated at 25% to 30%, and it remained their mother 
tongue(103). This group of population is still characterized 
by its strong stand for clan and linguistic identification. 
Spoken Arabic and Berber are used in daily 
communication and social life, especially in the rural 
areas. In the cities French is predominantly used by the 
majority of the intellectual elite. It was and even is the 
language of literature, plays, films and an important part 
of radio and television programmes. The French version of 
daily papers had a wider distribution than the Arabic 
versions. In 1966 the national paper 'El Moudjahid' in 
French sold about 40,000 to 50,000 copies a day, whereas the 
Arabic version 'Al-chaab' sold around 15,000 copies a 
day(104). French newspapers and magazines remained popular. 
In the same year 'Le Monde' sold 10,000 copies; 'France 
Soir', 20,000; 'Figaro', 3,000 copies, and 'Paris Match'; 
12,000 copies(105). 
The linguistic situation was therefore quite complex 
in the Algerian social context at Independence, and has 
become even more confusing with the political ambivalence 
over the implementation of the Arabisation policy and the 
role attributed to each language within the language policy. 
The linguistic issues have not been subject to 
national debates in spite of the political tensions among 
members of the political elite and among the public in 
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general. The political debates on language have been centred 
mainly around the means and methods of Arabisation and have 
stressed the need to speed up the process. To question the 
principle itself or to raise the question of the role of the 
Colloquials in the society was "taboo 1 (106). 
During the decade 1970- 1980, the process of 
Arabisation has been accentuated with the partial 
Arabisation of the administration. Two ministries were 
completely Arabized, namely the Ministries of Justice and 
Interior (the Home Office). Their Arabisation mainly 
concentrated on producing, for the public, forms and 
documents in Arabic. But the structure of all ministries and 
their affiliated administrations has remained based on the 
French model and is run predominantly in French. The 
majority of civil servants work in French and communicate in 
this language or Colloquial Arabic. Administrative 
communication is done in French, and most civil servants 
require at least a summarised version in French of any 
report addressed to them in Arabic(107). 
At all levels of national activity, the French 
language is necessary for work and communication, and still 
is an important means of social and economic mobility. In 
day to day life, in social interaction and communication it 
is still extensively used by the Algerian population along 
with Colloquial Arabic and Berber. In entertainment such as 
cinemas, theatres, radio and television programmes the use 
of French is still strikingly high. In the cinema most films 
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are presented in French. In the centre of Algiers, Tor 
instance, out of fourteen main cinemas only two show Arabic 
films regularly. On television and radio a noticeable effort 
has been made to increase the amount of broadcasting in 
Arabic, but as most programmes are delivered in Classical 
Arabic, they have been criticized as being inaccessible to 
the majority of the population. A similar criticism was made 
of the range of films imported from the Middle-East, mainly 
Egypt, which was seen by some members of the public as 
transmitting values and a way of life different from the 
Algerian reality(10B). 
There is still an important number of films on 
television delivered in French. On the radio there are three 
channels: one in Arabic broadcasting in Classical Arabic, 
one in Berber using Kabyle exclusively, and the third is 
'international' with English and Spanish broadcasts for 
short intervals, but the rest of the programmes are 
exclusively in French. The bookshops and libraries host a 
wide range of French books, magazines and newspapers. Given 
the wide distribution of national papers and magazines in 
French, national Arabic newspapers and magazines have to 
compete with the French ones, even though the number of 
which has been reduced by governmental censure. But Le 
Monde', for example, still enjoys wide popularity, mainly 
among the intellectual elite(109). Therefore the French 
language is still present in the Algerian society, in the 
formal and informal activities of the population alongside 
spoken Arabic and Berber. 
The Arabisation of the educational system was 
followed by the Arabisation of the 'environment', including 
the administration, the mass-media, and shop names and road 
signs, which have been so far a mere translation of French 
ideas, values and appellations, to such an extent that their 
meaning in classical Arabic is completely missed. This is 
especially striking in shop names and road signs where only 
the spelling has changed from French to Arabic. The 
equivocal approach to Arabisation, often described as 
superficial and non-committal, has aroused public 
dissatisfaction and criticism. 
Three major group attitudes can be identified in 
Algerian society regarding the language issue. They 
represent the major political tendencies in the society. 
These different groups are commonly dissatisfied with the 
governmental Arabisation policy, and the process of its 
implementation. However, because of the restricted channels 
of expression and representation, their manifestation has 
been sporadic and emerges only occasionally in the national 
press and literature with little effect on decision-making. 
One of these attitudes favours the revival and 
modernisation of local languages namely colloquial Arabic 
and Berber, which they consider as a major component of the 
national character and the genuine means of its expression. 
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The Arabic language that the government is attempting to 
install in its classical form is seen as not related to the 
national reality and is seen as much as an imported language 
as French(110). This group has not rejected the principle of 
Arabisation but has focused its criticism on the methods for 
its implementation, mainly in what they see as an imitation 
of Middle Eastern thought. They also have pointed to the 
lack of effort in integrate oral languages into the language 
policy(111). 
The Berber issue appears more complex as, unlike 
Colloquial Arabic which is considered as a derivative of 
classical Arabic, it is a distinct language, identified with 
the original inhabitants of the area, and is still spoken by 
a large proportion of the population. At the present time 
there are four major varieties of this language spoken by 
the 'Chaouia' and the 'Kabyles' in the North,and the 
'Touareg' and 'M'zab' in the South. The pressure-group for 
linguistic recognition of the Berber language has often 
emerged from the Kabyles claiming a 'unified general Berber 
language'. This claim is however seen from different 
prespectives by different 'Berberists'. 
Three different views have emerged in the recent 
years over the issue of Berber language(112). One is in 
favour of the official recognition of cultural pluralism in 
Algeria, including the different varieties of Berber and 
spoken Arabic. This postion does not oppose the policy of 
Arabisation, but seeks a place for the Berber language as a 
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part of national culture. The second attitude is more 
extreme in its rejection of 'Arabism' as the characteristic 
of the Algerian society. The claim here is for the adoption 
of Berber and/or spoken Arabic as the national language(s). 
Therefore the Arabisation policy is seen as illegitimate on 
nationalistic grounds. 
The third attitude is that of those who criticise 
the political system as a whole, and its " authoritarian 
approach", especially on cultural and linguistic issues. 
Their request is for a 'democratic' policy including 
linguistic and cultural freedom for Algerians, in a liberal 
and democratic state. Their claim is therefore more 
political than cultural and linguistic. These different 
attitudes towards the Berber language culminated in the 
social unrest which took place in Kabilia during the spring 
of 1980. Demonstrations and riots took place for a few 
weeks, in an attempt to exert pressure on the authorities to 
reconsider the language policy taking into account the 
Berber language(113). 
The scale and importance of this movement seems 
to have alarmed the Algerian authorities, who were compelled 
to raise this issue in the National Assembly (the 
Parliament) and the Party's National Congress. The outcome 
was an official statement which stressed the Berber, Arabic, 
and Islamic character of the Algerian personality and the 
necessity to hasten the process of Arabisation(114). 
The second major attitude toward language in the 
Algerian social context involves those who favour the 
official recognition of bilingualism (French and Arabic), in 
order to achieve the two-fold objective of authenticity and 
modernity. They generally support the maintenance of the 
French language, as an important tool for modernisation, 
transfer of technology, and modern culture. They point out 
to the present inadequacy of the Arabic language to respond 
to the on-going technological progress (115). 
The third major attitude is identified with those 
who claim a more consistent and radical Arabisation policy. 
This involves primarily the Arabophones who see themeselves 
as marginal in a society where French remains predominant. 
Their dissatisfaction with the present language policy was 
expressed in the student unrest of the Arabophones in the 
winter of 1979-1980. This movement lasted for nearly three 
months of student strikes and demonstrations, which spread 
to the secondary schools. The main claim was for an 
immediate and complete Arabisation at all levels(116). 
It is the argument here that the already complex 
linguistic situation in the Algerian social context was 
made more complex by the language policies adopted since 
Independence. Instead of achieving the stated aims of 
reinforcing national cultural identity and unity, these 
policies have emphasized linguistic differences and 
generated important linguistic problems and contradictions, 
especially in the educational context where the language 
issue is central. 
b) The Educational Context 
The educational context as the principal field of 
implementing the Arabisation policy strongly reflects, and 
perpetuates, the language-related problems and 
contradictions in the Algerian society. The organisation, 
structure, and the different policies adopted and 
implemented in this context clearly show the ambivalences, 
and dilemmas between two sources of reference: the Arabic 
and the French. 
As in Morocco's early years of Independence, a 
radical and rapid Arabisation of the primary cycle was 
undertaken in Algeria. However the first attempt was 
hampered by obstacles, the most important of which were the 
high rate of illiteracy among the population and the even 
higher rate of unschooled children of school-age. This, 
coupled with the lack of human and material means and the 
general social and political situation of the new state, 
made it impossible to devise any concrete policy of 
Arabisation in the first years of independence. The most 
urgent task was to assure schooling for as many children as 
possible in relation to the Tripoli programme. 
Therefore the first Minister of Education, 
A.Benhamida, was faced by important constraints in 
formulating any definite policy of Arabisation. His efforts 
concentrated on schooling and recruiting teachers at home 
and abroad. The school year 1962-1963 was operated with the 
contribution of the French government within the 
transitional clauses of the Evian Agrements. French 
assistance remained important in the educational system, 
especially during the first decade. Hence, French types of 
schools and the French language were maintained(117). 
It was mainly with the second government that the 
process of implementing the Arabisation policy was 
undertaken. The Arabisation of the first year of the primary 
cycle was introduced in 1964 by the newly appointed second 
Minister of Education, Cherif Belkacem. This government 
clearly stated in 1965 that the policy of Arabisation of the 
educational system was one of the major national aims. These 
were: 
- democratisation of education, 
- its Algerianisation (in its content and form), 
- its Arabisation, 
- and promotion of scientific and technical education(118). 
The aim of 'democratisation of education' refers 
to the expansion of education to all children of school age. 
Its 'Algerianisation' concerns the replacement of foreign 
teachers by nationals and the adaptation of the content of 
curricula to the Algerian context. Arabisation aimed at the 
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use of Arabic as the medium of instruction instead of 
French. The fourth aim is related to the economic and social 
options, stressing development by adapting education to its 
requirements. 
However, these aims would obviously require 
tremendous human and material means which, in the specific 
Algerian context with its limited means could hardly be 
achieved. Furthermore this would require greater dependence 
on foreign, principally French, economic and cultural 
assistance, which contradicts the ultimate aim of the 
educational system: national authenticity. 
There emerges also a contradiction among the 
objectives themselves especially between the first three 
aims and the fourth. The promotion of scientific and 
technical education would require the exclusive use of the 
French language since Arabic cannot, at the present time, 
fulfill these roles. But because of the radical approach to 
Arabisation as the central theme of any educational retorm, 
the process of its implementation in the educational system 
was rapidly undertaken. 
In 1967, the National Commission of Arabisation, 
created the same year, proposed four methods of implementing 
this policy; "horizontal Arabisation", starting with the 
first of primary school and moving upward year by year; a 
"vertical Arabisation", subject by subject; a" regional 
Arabisation", the selection of specific geographic zones to 
be Arabised; and a "punctual Arabisation", on certain 
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subjects and in a particular time. These four methods were 
applied simultaneously during the period 1967-1968. Fully 
Arabised pilot schools were also created(119). 
In 1971 a structural change within the 
government resulted in the creation of two distinct 
Ministries of Education: a Ministry of Primary and Secondary 
Education led by A.Benmahmoud and a Ministry of Higher 
Education and Scientific Research led by Ben Yahia Mohamed. 
Both Ministers were given the task of pursuing the process 
of Arabisation. This year was also proclaimed the year of 
Arabisation, as it was decided by the Algerian President 
that Arabisation was to be implemented widely, methodically 
and without delay. It was in the primary and secondary 
education that this new approach to Arabisation was applied. 
During the period 1969-1977, the Arabisation 
policy was influenced by A.Mehri who started a radical 
Arabisation of the educational system. In 1969 he presided 
over a National Commission for educational reforms, which 
included a sub-commission of Arabisation, to be implemented 
from 1974. When he was appointed General Secretary of the 
Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education in 1977 he set a 
plan for a total and complete Arabisation of primary and 
secondary education by 1982, in order to 'force' the 
Arabisation of higher education(120). His action was halted 
by his replacement and the appointment of M.Lacheraf, as the 
new Minister of Primary and Secondary Education. He 
expressed his determination to bring about a new reform by 
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reconsidering the process of the complete Arabisation 
undertaken previously. He started by dismissing Mehri's team 
and stopped the projects in process. 
With the third government, Lacheraf was replaced 
by M.G. Kharoubi at the head of the Ministry of Primary and 
Secondary Education. He favoured a return to the policy 
initiated by Mehri(121). This indicates the discordant 
approach to language policy and its fluctuations and 
influence according to the political tendency of the persons 
involved in decision-making. 
Therefore an increasing dissatisfaction with the 
Arabisation policy is felt (in Algeria) which stems 
essentially from the inconsistencies in implementation in 
the educational system. The educational system, as the major 
agent of social change, was meant to achieve the double 
objective of re-establishing national identity and promoting 
modernisation. This had led to a dual system of education, 
one Arabised in order to achieve the first objective, and 
the other using principally French for the second objective. 
The Arabisation policy so far has been implemented in the 
literary subjects and social sciences, whereas French has 
remained the predominant medium of instruction in the 
scientific subjects and branches(122). 
With the governmental emphasis on scientific and 
technical education on the one hand, and the job-market 
possibilities on the other hand, available mainly to French 
educated (or at least bilinguals), the scope and efficiency 
of the Arabisation policy seem rather limited. 
This, again, underlines the contradictions 
between the stated aims and actual practices. Furthermore, 
the efforts undertaken to achieve the other educational 
aims, namely the expansion of education to all children of 
school age, its 'Algerianisation', and principally the 
stress on scientific and technological knowledge, not only 
created important pressures in the educational system but 
are in themselves contradictory. since access to scientific 
and technological knowledge, for instance, is essentially 
imported from the West and necessitates the use of the 
French language. The democratisation of education with the 
objective to provide education to all children of school age 
was itself an ambitious programme considering the increasing 
demand. The population explosion in this country(123), has 
led to a rising pressure for schooling. 
In spite of remarkable results, universal 
education is not yet achieved. Inequality of access between 
urban and rural areas and between boys and girls is still 
strikingly high. The average rate of schooled children, in 
the primary cycle in the important urban areas, reached 
between 77Y. and 86% during the decade 1975-1985. In the 
rural areas the rate of schooled children is much lower and 
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so is the rate of schooled girls as compared to boys(124). 
The aim of general compulsry education is not yet achieved 
and disparities between the two sexes and urban and rural 
areas, in terms of educational provision, is still 
quantitatively and qualitatively very high. 
The demand for education and the attempt to take 
the maximum number of children into the schools made it 
difficult to achieve the other objectives especially the 
Algerianisation of the teaching staff and the Arabisation of 
the system as a whole. 
The Algerianisation of the teaching body in the 
primary cycle is achieved, but the number of qualified 
teachers, although steadily increasing, is still minimal 
especially in rural areas. Their level of education and 
training, the large number of children (40 to 50 per 
classroom) and the limited pedagogical means have not only 
resulted in an important drop in quality but has contributed 
largely to the rate of wastage(125). 
In secondary and higher education the 
Algerianisation of the teaching staff remained difficult to 
achieve. Until recently,there was an important proportion of 
foreign teachers, especially French teachers in this cycle. 
In 1976-1977 there were 3,035 foreign teachers out of a 
total of 15,744 in the first cycle of secondary education, 
450 of them were French. In the second cycle, general 
education, there were 2,918 out of 4,117 teachers, more than 
1,000 of them were French. In secondary technical education 
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out of a total of 653 teachers, 449 were foreigners, of whom 
200 teachers were French. In higher education there was a 
proportion of 60% to 70% of foreign teachers(126). 
In the Algerian context, where the impact of the 
French language was the strongest and where the means to 
achieve very ambitious educational objectives are limited, a 
radical approach to language was adopted. This 
radicalisation is reflected in the increasing and rapid 
process of the Arabisation of education. The Arabisation of 
the primary cycle of education is achieved as all subjects 
are taught in Arabic. French is taught as a subject from the 
fourth grade only. But in secondary education there were, 
until recently, two sectors, one completely Arabised with 
French as the first foreign language, and another called 
bilingual where both languages are used with the 
predominance of French in scientific subjects. In higher 
education most branches in the humanities and social 
sciences have been Arabised completely as is the case in the 
departments of law, literature, and sociology, or Arabised 
branches have been created alongside ones taught in French 
tas is the case in the departments of economics, psychology 
and educational science). The scientific and technical 
branches, and post-graduate studies and research are still 
using French almost exclusively(127). 
In the last decade (1980-1990), Arabisation has 
been totally achieved in the primary and secondary cycles. 
In higher education it is expanding to cover most 
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branches(128). But this rapid process of Arabisation has 
affected the quality of education, which has resulted in a 
cultural and educational 'vacuum'. The rising generation is 
not only undereducated, that is possessing minimal and 
superficial knowledge and skills, but does not master 
properly either Arabic or French(129). This generation, as 
the popular saying goes, are 'bilingual illiterates'. 
Furthermore, scientific and technical education 
is considered as one of the major foci of education, and as 
closely related to the supremacy of industrial development 
in the national planning. In this context scientific and 
technological studies are considered as the most important 
field throughout the educational system and are increasingly 
encouraged by the government. National grants for the 
students at the university are higher for those in science 
than those in the humanities or social sciences. 
Scholarships to study abroad are more easily obtained for 
scientific and technical studies. The job market is more 
accessible to those with a minimum scientific and technical 
education and training than to those with literary and arts 
degrees. Considering that scientific and technical education 
is, to a large part, provided in the French language, 
whereas the Arabic language is still reserved to the 
increasingly less prestigious humanities, the complete 
Arabisation of the educational system - which is the 
official intention - remains a major political issue in this 
country. 
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This situation has been reinforced by the existing 
general structure of the educational system, its 
administrative organisation and pedagogical norms, which are 
still largely based on the French model. The Ministries of 
Primary, Secondary and Higher education themselves and 
affiliated administrations operate mainly in French. 
The privileged position of the French language at 
all levels of political, economic and social activities has 
contributed to its prestige whereas the Arabic language had 
been relegated to a secondary position. In this context, the 
Arabisation policy is not only far from being fully 
achieved, in real terms, but the partial implementation has 
created serious problems with political, economic and social 
repercussions. 
Conclusion. 
In the three countries of the Maghreb, the social 
and educational contexts were directly affected by the 
contradictions resulting from the language policies 
adopted. The policy of Arabisation in the three 
nation-states was conceived within their process of 
decolonisation. It was and is the means by which national 
identity is to be re-established and colonial influence is 
to be eradicated. 
However the commitment of these countries' leaders 
to modernisation, imported from the West in its form and 
content, has not only increased their economic dependence 
(on France particularly), but has reinforced the cultural 
impact of the West. This has increased the role and prestige 
of the French language to the detriment of the national 
languages. 
The claim for the Arabic language, as the official 
national language to restore national identity, has been 
constantly asserted by the political leadership in the three 
countries. However, in practice the French language remains 
an important feature of the Maghrebian societies, and is 
used as a tool of work, education and social interaction. 
French is identified with modernisation and progress whereas 
Arabic is given a secondary role and seems to fulfil 
nationalistic aims rather than practical objectives, 
becoming principally an ideological issue. 
In Morocco, Arabic is the official language but 
the use of French is justified on the grounds of the need 
for the modernisation which legitimates the continuity of 
the Monarchy. In Tunisia, Arabic is also the official 
language but the primacy of modernisation in nation building 
justifies the semi-official adoption of French-Arabic 
bilingualism. In Algeria there is a more radical emphasis on 
Arabic as the national language which is used as a major 
means of political legitimacy. However, in practice there is 
a de-facto situation of bilingualism. Consequently, in 
Algeria the emphasis is on a reduction of the use of French 
language. In the two other countries there seems to be a 
strengthening of the use of French language. 
The Arabic language in its present form is not 
accessible to the majority of the population where the 
mother tongue is either colloquial Arabic or Berber, 
especially in Morocco and Algeria. French is considered in 
the three countries as a more viable means of social and 
economic mobility and access to modernisation. Arabic, in 
the Maghrebian social context, is still identified with 
tradition, a notion reinforced by two major factors : 
- the classical linguistic characteristics of the language 
render it unable to compete with Western modern 
languages in terms of transmitting scientific and 
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technological knowledge. 
- the economic options related to industrialisation 
requiring an important transfer of technology and 
know-how led to stronger ties with the West and the 
increasing use of the French language. 
In Morocco and Tunisia there is a clear trend in 
favour of universalism, in the sense of remaining open to 
different civilisations especially the Western. However, in 
Morocco the important proportion of Berber speaking 
population has complicated the social setting for 
implementing Arabisation. In Algeria the reaction against 
French colonisation resulted in a more insulating policy 
with a stronger stress on Arabisation. However, the 
historical impact of the French language in addition to the 
existence of a relatively important Berber speaking 
population has, as in the case of Morocco, complicated the 
social and linguistic setting for the adopted language 
policy. 
The educational system is seen as one of the 
principal means to achieve the two major aims of national 
identity and modernisation. Education is the principal 
channel for the implementation of Arabisation and its 
expansion into the society. In terms of modernisation, the 
educational system is expected to provide the required 
qualified manpower and to raise the standard of living of 
the population. These double functions attributed to the 
educational systems have resulted in its being the field or 
convergence for the contradictions and fluctuations of the 
language policies. 
In Morocco, the Arabisation of the educational 
system has oscillated between radical and moderate policies, 
whereas in Tunisia these policies were characterized by a 
certain moderation with a prevailing bilingualism. In the 
case of Algeria, Arabisation was undertaken more radically 
and rapidly in spite of difficulties in the way of its 
implementation. 
The contradictions in the three countries, in 
terms of language policies, have adversely affected the 
social and educational contexts. The major contradiction 
underlying these policies is that between a strong 
emphasis, in the political rhetoric, on using Arabic 
language to offset the impact of the colonial heritage, and 
importing, without discrimination, the Western model of 
development. Furthermore, in the three countries of the 
Maghreb, since their access to independence, little 
provision has been made to make the Arabic language an 
instrumental tool in education, work, culture and 
development. 
Thus, there is a pressing need to reconsider 
approaches to the language question in the three countries, 
especially in Algeria, and to undertake language planning 
which notes both the specific characteristics of the 
societies and the desired type of modernisation and its 
requirements. 
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Chapter V 
General Conclusion: Proposed Alternative Approaches 
to Language Policies in the Maghreb 
The purpose of this chapter is threefold: to draw 
the main arguments of the thesis together; to reassess 
contemporary difficulties over language policies in the 
three countries of the Maghreb, in the process of their 
nation-building; and to propose in the light of the general 
argument of the thesis, alternative approaches to language 
in the Maghreb, with special reference to Algeria. 
The arguments of this chapter will evolve 
around the following main themes: 
- the importance of local socio-cultural values,in the 
process of modernisation; 
- the need for the societies of the Maghreb to undertake 
internal and external adaptations in their process of 
development; 
- the need for an efficient assessment of the existing 
complex linguistic situation in the three countries; 
- the need for language policies to be based on rational 
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rather than ideological factors, with an analysis of the 
possible consequences of proposed solutions. 
Thus the organisation of this chapter will be as follows: 
Section 1: An integrated Process of Modernisation. 
In this section an alternative approach to 
modernisation, emphasising the importance of the 
socio-cultural specific characteristics of each society, is 
underlined. In the Maghreb, an integrated development is 
necessary, which takes into account the appropriate 
adaptations required by both national identity and 
modernisation. 
Section 2: Contemporary language situation in the 
Maghreb. 
This section will deal with a reassessment 
of contemporary difficulties over the policies of language 
in relation to the three countries' process of development. 
These difficulties are currently accentuated by the rising 
social pressures for political participation and improved 
standards of living, which imply the creation of a 
democratic political systems and efficient economic models. 
Altered language planning may become necessary in this 
context. 
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Section 3: Language Planning. 
In this section three alternative approaches 
to language policy will be proposed. The first proposal is 
that of standardizing and developing the local languages 
(Colloquial Arabic and Berber), in relation to the argument 
emphasising the importance of the specific socio-cultural 
traits of the Maghrebian society. The second alternative 
consists in modernising and developing the Arabic language 
to make it more operational and competitive. The third 
alternative would be an organised and rationally planned 
Arabic-French bilingualism. This range of choice is 
assessed. 
Section I 
An Integrated Process of Modernisation 
Modernisation involves the interrelated and 
interactive processes of economic and social development. 
As argued earlier in the thesis the experiences of 
development in China and Japan have underlined the important 
role of socio-cultural factors in the process of 
modernisation.It was also argued that the specific 
characteristics of each nation must be taken into 
consideration in the modernisation process. Among these 
specific characteristics language and education issues are 
significant, and - before attention reverts to the Maghreb - 
it is worth reviewing the Chinese and Japanese experiences 
and policy efforts in these two areas. However, it is 
stressed that the main theme of this chapter remains the 
Maghreb. 
In China, the language issue has been 
characterized by two major problems which strongly 
influenced national policies in general and educational 
policies in particular. These two problems are related to 
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the diversity of spoken languages and the complexity of the 
writing system(1). This has affected national unity as well 
as educational development and has led to important reforms 
launched in the late 19th century, with the main objectives 
of establishing a national language accessible to and used 
by the majority of the Chinese population(2). In 1916 a 
National Language Committee was set up with the aim of 
developing a standard national language - Mandarin - for 
written communication and wide use in China(3). However, the 
complexity of the writing system with its very large number 
characters has always constituted a major obstacle to the 
learning of the Chinese language. There were about 50,000 
Chinese characters, and even though some of them are 
obsolete, at least 3,000 characters haw: to be learned for 
the minimum literacy in urban areas(4). In addition each 
character is composed of a number of strokes ranging from 
one to thirty six which can affect the clarity in writing 
and certainly constitutes a burden for the learner(5). 
Therefore, efforts at the simplification of the 
traditional Chinese writing has involved the reduction of 
the number of strokes used to write a particular character, 
and the reduction of the total number of characters by 
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weeding out those that are unusual, redundent, and those 
with complex alternate forms(6). In 1952, a new Research 
Committee for Reforming Chinese Written language was set up 
and its work has led to the identification (and 
simplification) of about 3,000 characters which are 
frequently used, and these are introduced in primary 
schools(7). 
Hence, China, given the complexity of the 
language, has had to struggle to achieve an agreed standard 
script and one official language, based on the Peking 
dialect, Mandarin. This dialect has been in a strong 
position since Pekin became the capital of China in the 
early fifteenth century and it has continued in use as the 
major common language under the Communist leadership(8). 
Language policies in China have therefore been 
geared towards the achievement of a common national 
language. Among these efforts were the simplification and 
improvement of the written system of Chinese language. But 
despite this, illiteracy rates have remained a problem 
within the education system. In 1949 the rate of illiteracy 
in China was about 45% of the total population(9). 
China's efforts in anti-illiteracy are 
clearly the greatest experiment in mass 
education in the history of the world. 
A nation of some 970 million in some 
odd years had become a nearly literate 
society. 
(10) 
Nevertheless, in spite of all these efforts, China is still 
far from being a universally literate society and about 25% 
of the total population is still illiterate(11). 
This particular difficulty however, should not 
be permitted to hide the proposition that education has been 
central in the Chinese Revolution. It was closely and 
explicitly related to the process of nation-building(12). 
Education was used as the major means of political 
socialization and in the spreading of the new ideology which 
underpinned the economic and socio-cultural transformations 
of the Chinese society. The Cultural Revolution in 
particular was aimed at instilling new norms, behaviours, 
and perceptions. In this context, education played the key 
role in achieving the major objective of the Cultural 
Revolution: to be both Red and Expert(13). 
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Education in revolutionary China was also 
closely linked to national economic development with the 
objective of developing China's human resource. This 
required important and even radical charges in the Chinese 
educational system to adapt it to national requirements. 
There have been at least four major educational 
reforms in China since 1949, combining political principles 
with institutional changes(14). The first reform (1950-1957) 
aimed at changing the inherited system of education and 
adapting it to the new socialist doctrine and aims. The 
second reform occured in 1958, with the restructuring of the 
schools and the introduction of the notion of "productive 
labour" into the curriculum in line with the economic policy 
known as 'the Great Leap Forward'. The third reform which 
occured with the Cultural Revolution during the decade 
1966-1976, during the decade 1966-1976, brought about 
further major and radical transformations in the Chinese 
educational system, the most important of which was the 
emphasis on relating theory to practice(16). The fourth 
reform is located from the post-Mao period, after 1976, and 
has been characterized by crucial changes in the objectives 
of the educational system. These reforms stress academic 
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achievements rather than ideological values> There has been 
a major move away from the approach to the theory and 
practice of education adopted during the Cultural 
Revolution(17). 
This new trend in the contemporary Chinese 
educational policies reflects the emphasis of the political 
leadership on scientific and technological knowledge 
stemming from the West. This was clearly spelled in the 
Chinese Five-Year-Plan (1981-1985) where the need to send 
scholars and students abroad is stressed(18). This specific 
policy is formulated within the renewed emphasis in today's 
China on development and modernisation, where a move from 
ideology to efficiency in education is noted(19). 
Therefore, the Chinese experience illuminates 
the major themes of the thesis namely the close relationship 
and interactions in the development process between thwe 
economic and the socio-cultural variables and the issue of 
language. The latter is raised principally for its relation 
to edducation and the development of literacy. The concept 
of a unifying language is often stressed in political 
rhetoric in China as was disscussed earlier; however, even 
during the crucial period of the Communist Revolution, it 
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was mainly communist ideology which was used as a unifying 
force rather than language. In this context, it must be 
noted that national unity in China is rooted in its 
tradition and civilization. But cultural identity was 
reinforced by the communist ideology and an hegemonic 
imposition of a common language: Mandarin. The resorbtion 
of the Tibet resistance, for example, reflects the strongly 
integrative policies of the Communist Chinese leadership. 
But this particular approach to development, as 
argued earlier, though useful an experience for late comers 
like the countries of the Maghreb, has not been successful 
in achieving modernisation. This is reflected in the level 
of development presently achieved by China which is not 
competitive with modern industrialized nations, and which 
continues to face severe social and economic problems. 
It is increasingly realised in China, as in many 
other parts of the Globe, that delinking with the West is 
neither posssible nor desirable. It is commonly realised 
today that national development cannot be exclusively 
self-reliant. The world today is increasingly characterised 
by interdependence among nations. However this view of 
internationalisation and universalisation of development 
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does not imply, as most theories of development suggested, 
total Westernisation. It implies flexibility and 
possibilities to make internal and external adaptations as 
previously argued in the thesis. In this context the 
experience of Japan is enlighteneing. 
Japan, as argued earlier in the thesis has 
achieved a remarkable level of development and modernisation 
because of its ability to use foreign thought and practices 
in dealing with its own specific problems while retaining 
strong cultural identity. In this process, the Japanese 
socio-cultural factors have contributed to the promotion of 
its modernisation. 
The Japanese, like the Chinese language is 
complex. But, unlike China, there is no major linguistic 
diversity in Japan. In this country a common language, 
Japanese, has constituted a major unifying force. 
The Japanese language writing system has three 
main types of writing characters: Kanji, Hiragana, and 
Katakana, Roman letters are also used but to a much lesser 
extend(20). The Kanji characters were ilaported from China 
and are ideograms developped from pictograms and signs(21). 
The three types of Japanese characters are designed to be 
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written in vertical lines, though they can also be writtewn 
horizontally. There are more 1945 characters for use in 
books and newspapers, but every Japanese needs to know 
considerably more characters to read even the newspapers and 
ordinary books(22). Thus the Japanese language is a mixture 
of the four types of characters mentioned above(23). 
However, the Japanese language has its own pecular sentence 
structure and writing system which distinguishes it from any 
other language. 
The importance of education and learning have 
always been a major characteristic of Japanese society. This 
contributed to the spread of literacy which achieved a high 
rate as early as 1870, and increased with the educational 
policies of the Meiji period(24). The development of the 
Japanese language as a unified and important element of 
Japanese national cultural identity has largely contributed 
to the development of its educational system and 
modernisation. This is because language was not an issue it 
did not consequently hamper the development of the 
ducational system. In this sense, education in Japan has 
promoted modernisation. 
To a higher degree than in China, education in 
Japan has been closely linked with such national 
development. In Japan , with its limited natural resources, 
the human factor constitutes the major resource. 
Furthermore, as argued earlier in the thesis, socio-cultural 
values are percieved in Japanese society as important in 
initiating, sustaining, and promoting economic 
development(25). The adaptation of the Western model of 
development to the specific characterisitics of the Japanese 
society has not engendered resistance to economic 
development. 
The process of development of the Japnese 
educational system has been characterized by three major 
phases. The first one can be traced as early as 1868 with 
the educational policy of the Meiji Emperor which 
emphasized, on the lines of the European models, the 
expansion of educational opportunity through compulsary 
education. The main objectives of this policy were to raise 
edducational standards with the acquisition of academic and 
technical knowledge, and to contribute to the consolidation 
of a modern state(26). Education was therefore geard towards 
the double objective of bringing about the necessary changes 
for modernisation while preserving Japanese cultural 
identity. 
The second phase was during the period American 
occupation in 1945, where important changes were introduced 
in the Japanese educational system. The most important of 
these changes were related to curriculum and the structure 
and administration of the system. Above all, the educational 
system was democratized and its national ideology was 
suppressed(27). 
The second phase of the reforms from 1952 to 1960 
was taken up by the Japanese. The major aims were to 
establish a democratic educational structures and achieve 
universal education. These reforms were spurred by: a) 
nationalistic reactions against American policy; b) 
adaptation of the adopted American model of education to the 
cultural and social conditions of the Japanese society; c) 
adaptation to the changing social, economic, and educational 
needs(28). 
Therefore, education in Japan has been perceived 
and used as a powerful means of development. Hence, 
educational policies were tightly linked to economic 
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policies as well as social policies. In this sense, the 
experience of Japan underlines a major theme of the thesis 
emphasizing the necessity for an integrated development to 
achieve modernisation. 
However, in the particular case of Japan cultural 
identity and national unity were reinforces by a common 
unifying language from the early stages of its development 
as a nation. 
These themes in the Chinese and Japanese 
experiences should now be kept in mind as the range of 
responses developed in the Maghreb are analysed. The 
responses in the Maghreb, while facing the same general 
problems - including the issue of a complex language 
situation - have been interestingly different, and certainly less 
successful than the responses of Japan. 
The emphasis on the economic aspect traced in this the 
in the Maghreb has led to an unbalanced and fragmented developmen 
made worse by the fact that economic potentialities are limited a 
the model of develpment is imported and only loosly related to lo 
specficities. 
Modernisation has remained a central theme in 
the process of nation-buiding. The Maghrebian nations have 
set modernisation as the main objective to be achieved, in 
order to catch up with the Western world. However, the three 
countries of the Maghreb, in their attempts to follow the 
Western path, have failed to fulfil this goal. These nations 
are still struggling for development in a world 
characterized by some leading industrilized nations and 
many dependent underdeveloped ones. This situation has led 
to an increasing disillusionment with the Western model of 
development, especially its economic determinism and 
emphasis on industrialisation(29). 
The Maghrebian nations have invested most of 
their resources to intiate and sustain economic growth 
through industrialisation. But, this process of 
industrialisation has generated social and economic problems 
which have hindered the development of these societies. The 
progress made in industrialisation has not generated (as was 
expected) the development of other sectors, namely 
agriculture; but it has resulted in an increasing dependence 
on Western nations in terms of technology and financial 
resources(30). Furthermore, this uneven development has 
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created important social problems such as unemployment, lack 
of social services (such as housing, health, education), and 
consequently social disparities have been reinforced. 
It is the argument here that the priority given to 
economic development, through industrialisation, based on 
imported technology and Know-How, has undervalued the role 
of people in the process of modernisation. People, in fact, 
constitute the basis of any development. The socio-cultural 
environment conditions the objectives of modernisation(31). 
Therefore, an approach based on an integrated model of 
development, where the nation's human and material resources 
are efficiently, rather than ideologically, invested in the 
different sectors, is necessary to achieve modernisation. 
Such an approach largely involves the mobilisation, 
participation, and expansion of people's capabilities(32). 
Industrialisation cannot succeed without appropriately 
trained people. Technological transfers and development 
icannot be achieved if no provision is made to expand the 
knowledge and abilities of the personnel involved. The 
development of people's capacities is, in turn, dependent on 
the social and cultural development of the country 
concerned. 
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The importance and centrality of the socio-cultural 
aspects in the process of development and modernisation has 
been underestimated in the theories of development(33). 
These aspects have been considered as secondary and 
subordinated to economic and material factors. In this 
sense, the social dimension has been reduced to a 
materialistic variable. Underdevelopment has been analysed 
in Western theories of development in relation to economic 
'backwardness'. Consequently, these theories have proposed 
the adoption of the Western model of development as the 
prototype, the universally valid, example of 
development(34). 
However, such an approach to development implies a 
process of 'deculturation' for the developing nations which 
have to internalise Western socio-cultural values as part of 
this model. The cultures and traditions of the developing 
nations are considered as obstacles to modernisation in 
these theories. Therefore these nations are expected to 
absorb Western cultural influence. This process started in 
fact with the spread of Western colonialism and its 
'civilizing mission', whereby the dominated societies 
gradually become lost of their collective memory, and their 
identity(35): 
... dispossessed of the knowledge of their 
own reality, 'uprooted' from within, 
members of the third world societies 
have all one desire: be identified with 
Westerners. The 'Fetish' instrument which 
expresses this desire is called economic 
development. 
(36) 
The socio-cultural and economic dependence on the 
West has been reinforced since the access to independence of 
the developing nations with their policies of development 
based on an imported model of development from the West. 
This situation has generated conflicts and contradictions, 
when these nations undertook to define and (re)establish 
their cultural identity and at the same time achieve 
modernisation. However, the Western world remains the 
leading example of successful practice and the major source 
of theoretical approaches to modernisation. The emerging 
nations cannot therefore modernise without referring to, and 
interacting with the West. 
The delinking approach proposed by Dependency 
theorists, in order to break with the situation of 
dependence, is difficult in an increasingly interrelated and 
interdependent world. The experience of Mao's China, in 
spite of important achievements in terms of economic 
infrastructure, has suggested that it is difficult to break 
up with the West if modernisation is to be achieved quickly. 
In this context, the recent political and economic changes 
in China are significant. 
The remarkable level of development and 
modernisation achieved by Japan also suggests some 
limitations in both linear-evolutionary and dependency 
theories of modernisation. Japan has developed in a short 
span of time contradicting the notion of 'stages' in 
theories of development. Furthermore, as the first non 
Western nation to achieve such a compet:tive degree of 
modernisation Japan undermines the contutmporary notion that 
a complete rejection of the Western model -a delinking 
policy- is the only way to achieve development in the Third 
World. 
It is suggested that Japanese success is not so 
much a result of the adoption of the Western model as it is 
of its adaptation. Japan has adapted to its specific 
political and socio-cultural setting what the West has to 
offer in terms of development(37). In so doing, Japan, has 
managed to reduce the disruptive effects of a foreign model 
and achieve an integrated modernisation. 
During its process of nation-building, Japan has 
not only accomodated the Western model to its specific 
context, but at the same time it underwent internal 
adaptations and transformations. Social organisation 
structures, and social norms, were used as means for 
national development. Consequently, Japan has achieved what 
countries like those of the Maghreb are striving for: to 
modernise while preserving national cultural identity. 
It is this aspect of the Japanese approach to 
development which should be noted by developing countries 
such as those of the Maghreb. The important aspect of this 
particular example of nation-building is that in Japan a 
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nationalist ideology has been an essential element in the 
modernisation of Japan, especially in the post Second World 
War period. But, the difference between Japanese twentieth 
century nationalism and the Maghrebian one is that the major 
ideology of Japanese contemporary nationalism is that of 
meritocracy and efficiency as motivating principles of 
popular action and participation. 
Popular participation has constituted the pillar of 
Japanese development. Japan - an agricultural society which 
lacked natural resources - has managed to transform itself 
quickly into a highly industrialised nation principally 
because of its people and its socio-cultral qualities. More 
than any other aspect of Japanese development, it is this 
aspect which is mostly relevent to the countries of the 
Maghreb: emphasis on the human and socio-cultural aspects as 
major resources for modernisation. 
However, this strong emphasis given to the 
socio-cultural development, in this thesis, neither means an 
overvaluation of the socio-cultural over the economic, nor 
an exclusive stress on national identity. Such an approach 
would imply a 'cultural determinism' as compared with the 
'economic determinism' proposed by some Western theories of 
development. 
The argument in this thesis is that national 
development ought to be based on a combination of the 
socio-cultural and the economic as major elements to achieve 
an overall modernisation. In this context, the experience of 
Japan - where modernisation has been neither exclusively 
economic nor overstressing cultural authenticity - is a 
tempting one for the developing nations of the Maghreb. 
However, it must be noted that when embarking on intensive 
industrialisation and economic development, following World 
War Two, Japan posssessed a long established cultural 
tradition and a unifying (and developed) language. Whereas 
the Maghreb, due to its long colonial experience and 
disruptive foreign influence, is today characterized by a 
complex socio-linguistic situation. This situation has been 
complicated by overideologised cultural and linguistic 
policies as well as by an imported, and non adapted, model 
of development. 
Section 2 
The contemporary language situation in the 
Maghreb 
More than a quarter of a century after their 
access to independence, the Maghrebian countries are still 
trying to clarify the language issue. The policy of 
Arabisation, adopted in these countries, was aimed at 
restoring national cultural identity. The implementation of 
the Arabisation policy concerned principally the educational 
system where the French language was gradually replaced by 
the Arabic language. However, the maintenance of the French 
language, as the more efficient and operational language and 
the existing local languages (Colloquial Arabic and Berber) 
have hampered this process of Arabisation. 
In Morocco, the primary and secondary cycles are 
completely Arabised while French is taught as the first 
foreign language. In higher education French has remained 
the major medium of instruction, especially in scientific 
and technological branches; while the humanities have been 
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Arabised. Access to higher education is therefore 
conditioned by knowledge of the French language(38). In 1989 
the first wave of completely Arabised students has entered 
higher education, and because of the predominence of French 
in this cycle the new students entering university will be 
required to undertake an intensive summer course of French 
language(39). 
In Tunisia, the Arabic and French languages have 
been simultaneously used as mediums of instruction in 
primary and secondary education. In higher education French 
remains the major language(40). The recent reforms of 
education launched in 1987, were aimed at improving the 
efficiency of the educational system. In terms of language 
policy, the Arabic language was to be reinforced during the 
first three years of schooling. At the same time the 
teaching of the French language has been increased, starting 
from the second year of primary education. The argument for 
this language policy is that the Arabic language will 
mainly strengthen, in the child, national sentiment and 
identification with the Arabo-Islamic values. The French 
language is justified on the grounds that it is the language 
of scientific and technical knowledge and the means of 
access to other civilizations(41). 
In Algeria, the Arabisation of the primary and 
secondary cycles is completed. French is only taught as the 
first foreign language. In higher education Arabisation has 
been completed in the humanities branches. In the scientific 
branches attempts are made, this year, to introduce the use 
of Arabic language as the medium of instruction(42). 
However the Arabisation policy as a whole, whether 
in secondary or higher education has been hampered by three 
major obstacles: the lack of qualified personnel; the 
scarcity of teaching material, especially in scientific 
subjects; and the continuing use of the French language as 
the major language of work and knowledge. 
At the present time, the educational system as a 
whole, in spite of its arabisation, is still producing 
bilinguals who have insufficient knowledge and mastery of 
both languages. The reasons are complex but include the 
failure of the educational system itself in its general form 
and content, and the fact that neither of the two languages 
is the mother tongue or the means of social interactions. It 
-371- 
is Colloquial Arabic and Berber which are the major means of 
expression in daily life. But French, because of its 
operational qualities and hence its social status, is often 
used in social interactions, especially in Algeria(43). 
It is the argument of this section that the major 
reason for this increasingly complex linguistic situation, 
particularly in Algeria, is the absence of stable and 
rational policies. A rational (as opposed to ideological) 
approach means, in general, a less politicized framing of 
national policies and especially language policies. More 
precisely, it implies that language, as an important tool of 
work and education, should be de-politicized and reformed in 
terms of its practical efficiency. A rational approach to 
language is also used to mean the use of, and reliance on, 
experts rather than politicians in language planning. 
It is therefore suggested that, because of this 
lack of a rational approach, the language policies in the 
three countries of the Maghreb have failed to attain the 
simultaneous objectives of reinforcing national cultural 
identity and modernisation. French language, as the 
operational language for development, is less and less well 
mastered by the rising generation. The same argument is 
valid for the Arabic language, the symbol and expression of 
the Arabic cultural identity. 
However, from the perspective of the Maghrebian 
political elite, these policies are considered successful, 
since the Arabic language has expanded throughout the 
educational system. Hence their present justification for 
the use of a second language of wider communication, namely 
French, in education and other activities because it no 
longer is a threat to national identity(44). This could be a 
prelude for a more democratic debate on the language 
question. 
The current changes in the political scene in the 
Maghreb, mainly in Tunisia and Algeria, may favour a more 
rational, that is de-policized, approach to the language 
issue. In Tunisia, there were changes after 1987 with the 
deposition of Bourguiba. The new president, Ben Ali, has 
undertaken a process of political, economic, and social 
reforms(45). However, the most important of these reforms is 
the recognition of the different political parties, with the 
exception of the religious party. 
It is suggested here that these changes constitute 
the premises of the establishment of a democratic system, 
which will bear on the different national policies. The 
approach to language is likely to be more rational, that is 
de-policized, and reformulated on pragmatic bases. In this 
case it will be more closely linked to development rather 
than on an over ideologized cultural identity. 
In Algeria, the social upheaval of October 1988 
has forced the political elite to reconsider the whole 
political system established since Independence. The 
president, Chadli Benjedid, was forced to undertake 
political, economic, and social reforms to respond to 
rising popular dissatisfaction and major problems at various 
levels of national life. Some of the major and pressing 
problems in the Algerian society are the lack of political 
participation, economic recession, and above all the 
specific problems of the young generation especially in 
relation to education, training and employment. 
The major changes, so far, have been the reform of 
the Constitution, with a more liberal political approach. 
This led to the official emergence of different political 
parties in the national Political scene. Hence, there seems 
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to be a move, here also, towards the adoption of a more 
democratic political organisation. This important change, 
from an authoritarian-monolitic regime to a more open 
political system is likely to affect overall national 
policies. Consequently, the approach to language, if a 
democratic system is really applied, will have to be based, 
as in Tunisa, more on rational than ideological formulas. 
In Morocco, there has been no spectacular change; 
especially in political terms. But it seems that the 
possibilities for social reforms are appearing(46). The 
unification of the five countries of North Africa (Morocco, 
Tunisia, Algeria, Lybia, and Mauritania) into what they call 
"L'Union du Maghreb Arabe",( U.M.A), is likely to promote 
changes in this country. These will result from the 
interrelationship and inter-influence, politically, 
economically, and culturally, of the countries involved. 
This new organisation of the Maghrebian countries 
was officially created in February 1989, with the main 
objectives of reinforcing political, economic, and cultural 
ties among the member countries. The U.M.A is based on a 
sense of common historical and social characteristics, and 
similar aspirations and aims(47). This organisation, if 
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sustained, will mean a unified strategy concerning mainly 
economic and cultural cooperation(48). Therefore, the 
language polices will have to be reconsidered in accordance 
with the global development of the member countries. This 
means, in practice, more adapted, useful, and flexible 
policies than exclusively national ones. However, Morocco, 
Tunisia, and especially Algeria are fac_ng two major and 
crucial problems in terms of language policy. 
The first is that the ad-hoc policy of 
Arabisation which has been implemented so far has affected a 
whole generation of school children. Therefore, if an 
efficient language policy, that is socially relevant and 
economically useful, is to be adopted, it will be necessary 
to make provisions for this generation ‘,hich has been 
affected by the previous radical language policies. This 
will mean the planning of intensified and adapted 
educational and linguistic programmes to facilitate their 
integration into the new socio-cultural framework. 
The second is that the failure of the political, 
economic, and social policies, as reflected in the whole 
reconsideration of the monolitic political system, the 
economic crisis, and social unrest, have favoured the 
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emergence of religious fundamentalist movements. The two 
immediate effects of this rising movement, in the Algerian 
context, are opposition to the policy of modernisation, and 
the claim for a religious Islamic state. Consequently, if 
this movement, now a recognised political party in Algeria, 
manages access to power, a more radical approach to 
Arabisation will be stressed. 
This new situation of the Mghrebian societies, in 
general and Algeria in particular, calls for more clarity 
and rationality, as opposed to ideology, in the options of 
the political leadership regarding the choice of the desired 
future image of the society and the type of model of 
development to be used for its achievement. In this sense, a 
choice is to be made regarding the selection of the most 
relevant social and cultural features which embody national 
cultural identity and at the same time promote national 
development. 
Once this choice is clarified, the problems and 
contradictions, as reflected in language policies will be 
overcome. This means that it should be made clear, at the 
political level, which aspects of the national culture are 
most appropriate in the process of development. It means 
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that the internal and external adaptations to be undertaken 
are clearly formulated in the overall national policies. In 
this context, the language issue, free from ideology, will 
no longer constitute a central theme of controversy. The 
dilemma between two different sources of references (the 
Arabo-Islamic and the Western) will be resolved by these 
adaptations and pragmatically conceived polices. 
Therefore, if the political approach to national 
policies is altered and reformed in terms of practical 
efficiency rather than ideology, it wild then be necessary 
to assess the alternatives and possibilities, in terms of 
language options. The Maghrebian countries and specifically 
Algeria, will have to look for adequate solutions to the 
ambiguous linguistic situation. There is a pressing need to 
reconsider the approach to language policies, adopted so 
far, and initiate a rigorous language p:.anning. 
Section 3 
Language Planning: Alternative language Policies 
It is the purpose of this section to investigate 
the possible alternative solutions to the present language 
policies in the Maghreb in general and Algeria in 
particular. 
The general argument for the alternative 
approaches to language, in this section, is that if a more 
democratically based type of political system is to emerge, 
then a more pragmatic approach to national planning in 
general and to language planning in particular will be 
necessary. There will be a need to move away from the 
predominence of ideology to pragmatism. This will involve, 
in terms of language planning, the direct contribution of 
experts in the field of language and related issues (eg. 
education, economy, and sociology). These experts will have 
firstly to assess the linguistic situation of the country 
and determine the range of choices offered to them. Secondly 
they will have to make proposals for language planning; they 
can have insights from the of available literature on 
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language planning as well as from practical experiences of 
other countries which had previously faced similar 
linguistic problems. However these theoretical approaches 
and practical experiences should be, as argued throught the 
thesis, carefully analysed and adapted to local 
circumstances and needs. Thirdly, it is a crucial part of 
language planning to measure and foresee the constraints and 
consequences of each alternative and inform public opinion 
to ensure adhesion and support. 
Language planning in this context implies an 
organised investigation of adequate solutions to language 
problems(49). However, the complex political and social 
meanings and roles of language for political legitimacy and 
cultural identity, as a symbol and means at the same time, 
in addition to its role as an instrument for communication, 
complicate the process of language planning. 
Hence the different approaches to language 
planning whether in theoretical or practical terms. For the 
purpose of this research three major approaches to language 
planning have been identified. These involve: 
- The selection of a national language (Code Selection); 
- The Standardisation of a language (Elaboration and 
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and Codification); 
- Development and modernisation of the national 
language(50). 
These aproaches have been selected in relation to 
the existing social and cultural reality of Algeria where 
three possible language policies can be proposed. The three 
alternative policies are part of the code selection, that is 
the choice of a national language or languages constitutes 
the first step in future language policies, if they are to 
be undertaken. In this context the standardisation of the 
local languages could be selected as a language policy as a 
response to the noted importance of socio-cultural 
characteristics of Algeria and mainly tc the social pressure 
for more attention, in national plannincj, to these 
languages. 
A- The Standardisation of the Spoken Varieties. 
The spoken varieties, Colloquial Arabic and 
Berber, are major features of the Algerian social context, 
and are considered by many as the real expression of the 
national cultural identity(51). As an integral part of the 
national cultural and linguistic repertoire, it is therefore 
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important to take them into consideration when approaching 
language planning in this country. It is necessary to 
analyse, at least on a theoretical basis, the possibility of 
planning of these languages. The emphasis on the 
standardisation of the spoken varieties is justified by 
three major arguments: the first is that there is a social 
pressure, especially from the Berbers, for an official 
recognition of these languages; the second is that these are 
important features of the national cultural identity and 
therefore require attention from the political as well as 
the intellectual elite; the third is that these vernaculars 
are the mother tongues of the Algerian population and 
consequently have an important effect on education) 
achievement: 
There is evidence that learning the art 
of reading in an alphabetized version of 
the home vernacular is the quickest way 
to literacy, since the child can associate 
known sounds and known words and phrases 
with recongnizable letter sequences 
(52) 
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Although Colloquial Arabic, in general terms, is a 
derivative of Classical Arabic the gap between Colloquial 
Arabic and Classical Arabic is very important, especially in 
the case of Algeria. So the child is confronted with a 
nearly new medium when starting school. In addition, Berber 
is the mother tongue of an important proportion of the 
population who, given the national policies, are 
increasingly claiming the use of their language in 
education. However, Colloquial Arabic and Berber are 
undeveloped and are classified as dialects(53), hence the 
need to investigate the possibilities, and effects of their 
standardization as an aspect of language planning. 
The standardization of a 'dialect' into a 
standard language involves a planned process, a direct and 
deliberate intervention into a medium of expression which 
has not a literary written form, as is the case of the 
Colloquial Arabic and Berber(54). It also involves a process 
of development of the language in order to adapt it to the 
requirements of the present time. Language planning is 
therefore necessary to bring a 'dialect' up to the status of 
language. Consequently, the study of the Colloquial Arabic 
and Berber, their characteristics, their homogeneity and 
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diversity, need to be investigated as an initial step in 
this planning. This involves theoretical as well as 
practical approaches, especially now that theoretical 
advances in sociolinguistics can help a systematic study of 
such problems. Because of the growing interest in dialects 
and their importance in national cultures, an increasing 
number of linguists, sociologists, educationalists, and 
principally sociolinguists, have proposed useful theories, 
analyses and methods of language planning, including dialect 
standardization(55). 
In the case of Algeria the standardization of both 
Colloquial Arabic and Berber would be based on the general 
principles and processes proposed by language specialists. 
The general model involves the following main processes in 
language standardization: 
- Norm selection, 
- Codefication, 
- Development or elaboration, 
- Implementation(56) 
Norm selection refers to the choice to be made 
regarding: the variety (or varieties) to be standardized; 
the specific purposes to be achieved; and the functions to 
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be allocated to the chosen variety. 	 the case of the 
Maghreb, this language is the spoken form of Arabic, which 
is characterized by both a certain homogeneity, common 
features and intelligibility, as well as regional 
differences. A second problem is the Berber language which 
differs morphologically and syntaxically from Arabic. 
In Algeria, therefore, the promotion of a 
'standard' variety, in each language, which can be grasped 
by the majority of the population will condition the success 
of this policy. If this can be achieved than the second step 
will be its codification. 
"Codification" refers to the development of the 
linguistic structure of the selected variety including 
phonology, grammar, and lexicon. The production of 
dictionaries, literary texts and orthography are basic to 
the codification process. A crucial aspect of this process 
is "graphisation", that is the development of a writing 
system. 
The development of most languages depends on the 
development of its writing system as an essential means for 
its diffusion, preservation, and growth. It is also thanks 
to the existence of writing systems for languages that 
literacy, education and knowledge have been achieved 
throughout the world(57). 
Graphisation, in the case of the spoken varieties 
of Algeria, would require the establishrent of norms of 
pronounciation, grammar, vocabulary, and orthography. These 
would be different for either Colloquial Arabic or Bereber. 
Graphisation involves mainly the choice of a specific 
writing system, including the fundamental choice between 
syllabary and alphabetic systems. 
This will present a delicate issue in the case of 
Algeria as a choice needs to be made between the Arabic 
script, the Roman script, or the invent!.on of a new script. 
However, the Arabic script could easily be used for the 
Colloquial Arabic while the existing Berber script 
'Tifinagh' could be used for Berber. 
"Modernisation" (development, elaboration) of 
language refers to the expansion and enrichement of a 
language so that it will be able to "cover topics and appear 
in a range of forms of discourse for which it was not 
previously used"(58). The development of a language, or its 
elaboration, constitutes the major stage following the 
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structural change or establishment of the spoken varieties 
in a standard language. This process is related more to the 
functional aspect of the language within the society, that 
is the role and status of the language, rather than its 
structural aspect, eg. its grammar. Elaboration of language 
involves the expansion of its functions from a tool of 
interaction among individuals (as is the case of the two 
spoken varieties) to an appropriate vehicle for modern 
thought and practice. This involves the expansion of the 
lexicon, for each variety, by the introduction of new words, 
concepts, and expressions. In turn, this requires the 
production of glossaries, dictionaries, and new technical 
terms and expressions(59). 
The process of implementation of such a language 
policy requires the contribution of the government and 
affiliated agencies. It will also require the contribution 
of linguists as well as sociolinguists, sociologists, 
educationalists, economists, and political scientists. In 
short it will require the coordinated attention of 
multidisciplinary authorities. This is because of the 
importance and centrality of language in overall national 
activities. 
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The success, or failure, of a language policy is 
tested at the level of its implementation. As indicated 
earlier, the assessment of the different choices in language 
planning are an important intial step. However an assessment 
of the positive and negative effects and the constraints 
(political, economic, social and cultural) is equally 
important before the final adoption, or rejection, of a 
particular policy is made. 
It is the argument here that a policy of 
standardizing the two spoken varieties in Algeria namely 
Colloquial Arabic and Berber will have the following set of 
positive effects: 
- the standardization of a comprehensive (standard) and 
generally accepted form of speech will stabilize and 
preserve the common means of expression of the Algerian 
population and their cultural identity. 
- this policy will abolish the diaglossic situation, in the 
case of Colloquial Arabic, which constitutes an important 
obstacle in national communication and education. It will 
reduce and eventually eliminate the present social 
disparities generated by Classical Arabic and French. 
- the development of these mother tongues (Colloquial Arabic 
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and Berber) will facilitate the child's socialisation in 
classroom activities and improve his educational 
achievement. 
- As the real means of expression of the Algerian 
society, and therefore the true vehicles of national 
cultural identity, these two languages will be more 
politically and socially legitimated. 
However, this particular policy will generate 
important problems and constraints which must be noted: 
- the first constraint is that the stanOardisation of both 
Colloquial Arabic and Berber will takc time and money, 
which a developing country like Algeria cannot afford at 
the present time. 
- during the process of standardising these two vernaculars, 
there will be a need to maintain the use of a modern 
language, eg. French. This will not improve the already 
complex linguistic situation in Algerian society. 
- Once standardised, these spoken languages will be enclosed 
in specific and established grammatical and lexical rules 
to which the spoken form does not presently comply. Thus, 
in their new form (standardised and developed) these 
languages will lack the natural and spontaneous 
-389- 
characteristics of the spoken form. 
- the eventual option for either or both vernaculars as the 
official national language(s) will generate important 
political and social problems. It will be difficult to 
achieve a general consensus regarding the variety to be 
standardized. This will lead to further division among the 
population. 
Thus, the standardization of the spoken 
vernaculars as a solution to the present language-related 
problems, in the Maghrebian context in general and the 
Algerian in particular, will be problem-generating. 
However, as the major languages of the majority 
of the population and the means of cultural expression and 
preservation, Colloquial Arabic and Berber, constitute, in 
the Algerian context, important elements of the national 
cultural identity. These vernaculars, in fact, have 
transmitted, for generations, national traditions, values, 
and feelings of Algerian society in ways in which the two 
other languages (classical Arabic and French) are not able 
to do. This is because, in their present form are 
ill-adapted to the socio-cultural context of Algeria. 
Consequently, Colloquial Arabic and Berber should be 
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accounted for in any language planning. the language 
policies adopted so far have failed to provide structures 
for the preservation or consolidation of these languages. In 
fact, the strong emphasis on the classical form of Arabic as 
the only national language was aimed at the eventual 
eradication of Colloquial Arabic, perceived as a 'corrupt' 
form of the Classical language, and Berber, perceived as a 
threat to national unity. In the Algerian context, mainly 
because of the restrictive type of political system, any 
claim for these vernaculars was 'taboo', and considered as 
anti-nationalist. There is today a pressing need to assess, 
to attempt to standardize, and to develop these mediums 
which constitute essential elements of the Algerian 
personality and cultural identity. This might be achieved in 
the long run, but presently, it is necessary to look for 
other alternative solutions to the language problems in the 
Maghreb in general and Algeria in particular. 
In this context, and because of the radical option 
for Arabic adopted in Algeria particularly, the second 
alternative in terms of language planning, would be the 
modernisation of the Arabic language. This solution could be 
considered as an intermediate solution between the 
Classical and Colloquial Arabic, between the oral and 
written forms of the Arabic language. 
B- The Modernisation of the Arabic Language. 
The purpose of the modernisation of the Arabic 
language is firstly to create a variety of the Arabic 
language which responds to the needs of national unity and 
cultural identity. A modernised form of the Arabic language 
would constitute a link between the spoken form, the major 
expression of the national cultural heritage, and the 
Classical form, the language of the Islamic religion, 
tradition and knowlege. Secondly, once modernised and 
adapted to the present needs, this new form of the Arabic 
language could replace the foreign languages, as a viable 
and competitive instrument for scientific and technological 
interactions. Thirdly, a modernised form of the Arabic 
language, bridging the gap between the spoken and written 
varieties, would eliminate the diaglossia characterizing 
this language. 
The major argument for this solution is that 
the Arabic language, in its present condition does not 
respond to the specific cultural and linguistic 
characteristics of Algerian society, nor is it adapted to 
contemporary scientific and technological thought and 
practice. 
Hence, in relation to the general argument of the 
thesis stressing the necessity of internal (as well as 
external) adaptations, and in order to fulfill the major 
national objectives of cultural identity and 
nation-building, the Arabic language needs to be modernised. 
The modernisation of the Arabic language will 
involve both its general structure ,'corpus', as well as its 
role in society ,'status', planning'(60). Corpus planning 
involves the changes and innovations in the form and content 
of the language. Status planning involves the expansion of 
its functions in the society and its place in relation to 
other languages. The modernisation of the corpus of the 
Arabic, that is its morphology, will aim principally at 
equipping the presently rigid form of the language with more 
flexibility in word-formation and sentence building. This 
will facilitate intervention in the language, that is 
bringing into the Arabic language innovation, translation, 
and invention. In other words, a more flexible morphology of 
the language would make it easier to adapt to modern thought 
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and increase its modern vocabulary. This will affect the 
status planning of the language. The fusion of the spoken 
varieties with the Classical language, through word 
borrowing and structure adaptation, along with the 
simplification of the Classical form, will produce a 
'standard' language more easily accessil.le to the 
population. The status of the language bill improve as its 
role in the society and its functions in the educational and 
economic contexts become palpable. It is, however, the 
corpus planning which is the most difficult in the overall 
development of the language. 
The corpus planning of the Arabic language will 
concentrate on the modernisation and adaptation of the 
structure of the language, especially its writing system and 
grammar which constitute the principal difficulties in its 
learning and diffusion(61). Arabic writing is commonly known 
to be difficult. It has two major areas of difficulty: the 
first one is the plurality of letter variations (intitial, 
medial, and terminal), for example the letter 't' will vary 
in its written form depending on whether it comes at the 
beginning, middle, or end of a word. The second is the 
absence of vowel signs(62), the absence of vowel letters 
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which are the equivalent of 'a','o', 'e', 'i' etc. Children, 
or beginners, learn Arabic with stress marks over the 
letters (- , o _ ) which indicate the way in which the 
consonants are to be pronounced. These kinds of technical 
problems constitute a burden on the learner to understand 
and use the different letters and make correct spelling 
difficult. This difficulty in language acquisition, 
especially reading, is complicated by the absence of 
punctuation (apart from the fullstop). The other area of 
difficulty of the present writing system is printing, as a 
great deal of time, effort, and expenses are needed to use 
the vast number of variations for a printing system. 
There have been, in recent history, especially 
after the Second World War, proposals to improve the Arabic 
writing system. Two major approaches could be mentioned: one 
proposal favours the simplification of the Arabic writing 
system, mainly by reducing letter variation to a 
minimum(63). A modified and simplified Arabic writing system 
was advocated on the argument that although the changes 
would affect the tradition, they would facilitate reading, 
writing and printing; and consequently promote literacy in 
the Arab world. The other proposal favours a radical change 
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of the script and its replacement by the Roman Alphabet, as 
happened in Turkey in 1932(64). The position of Romanizing 
the Arabic script(65) was justified on the grounds that the 
Roman script was more widely used and more efficient. Its 
adoption would facilitate communication with most parts of 
the world. The major criticism directed against this 
proposal is that the Roman Alphabet lacYs symbols for some 
Arabic consonnants. This approach was a:.so rejected by the 
'Classicists' of the Arabic Academies who favour the 
preservation of the Arabic script. 
The other major difficulty in the modernisation 
of the structure of the Arabic language is its grammar. 
Arabic grammar is characterized by the complexity of its 
rules, exemplified mainly in the great number of 
'exceptions' resulting in a multiplicity of grammatical 
terminology(66). This creates important problems in 
education in the Arab world. The method of its teaching is 
maintained in archaic form as a means oi preserving the 
'purity' and 'richness' of the Arabic language. There have 
been, since the late Forties and early Fifties, various 
proposals to simplify, or reform, Arabic grammar as an 
essential basis for the modernisation of the language(67). 
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However, these proposals were also rejected by the 
traditionalists-classicists who control the academies. They 
argued that the present grammatical structure is an 
essential foundation of the Arabic language and the major 
asset for the preservation of its purity. This attitude has 
hampered any progress in language modernisation. 
The modification of the structure of the Arabic 
language, principally its script and grammar, will lead to 
the transformation of its content as it becomes more precise 
and flexible and more easily able to absorb modern 
terminology. The introduction of new terms, concepts, and 
ideas into the language is needed, because at the present 
time the 'poverty' of the Arabic language lies principally 
in its inability to produce adequate vocabulary for 
scientific and technological innovations. The Arabic 
language, once a language of science, has become today a 
mere borrower of foreign terminology, without any process of 
adaptation to the patterns of the language. This has led not 
only to the static, even impoverished, state of the Arabic 
language, but the 'invasion' by words and expressions which 
do not convey properly the knowledge to be transmitted. But 
this innovation, in terms of vocabulary, and language 
cultivation cannot be achieved if the structure of language 
itself is not modified. 
The status of the language in the society depends 
essentially on its expressive power, communicative strength, 
and functions in different socio-political and economic 
activities(68). Improvements in status will result firstly 
from the 'corpus' planning of the language with the 
transformation of its structure and content according to 
modern and scientific norms. Hence, becoming more 
operational, and more useful, it will become more viable and 
thus more acceptable. The simpler characteristics of a 
modernised form of the Arabic language, its adaptation to 
contemporary requirements, its use in education, work, and 
daily communications will have an effect on its status and 
expansion. Its diffusion in the society will depend on the 
means and ways used for its modernisation and 
implementation. 
The process of the modernisation of the Arabic 
language and its effective use at all levels of national 
activities will be determined by the efficiency of its 
development. This process of developing the language will 
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require the joint efforts of multidisciplinary specialists, 
especially linguists, sociolinguists, and educationalists. 
They with the politicians will make the fundamental 
decisions and devise the best ways of bringing about the 
changes and implementing them. 
As a national issue, with its political, economic, 
socio-cultural and educational implications, it is the 
responsibility of the state to organise and administer this 
policy. A National Commission of these experts could be set 
up to investigate and assess the possibilities and 
consequences of the policy. The role of the educationalists, 
for instance, would be to consider the ways in which it 
would be educationally efficient and how the educational 
system would contribute to its expansion. The 
educationalists will ensure that the appropriate educational 
facilities, human and material, are available. 
The modernisation of the Arabic language will, 
therefore, require a major effort but this is not an 
impossible task. Any language can be developed and 
modernised if its people are motivated to do so and if the 
social and economic contexts are also developed. It is 
necessary, and urgent, if this language is to be preserved, 
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to undertake the process of its modernisation and adaptation 
to the requirements of our times. This, in fact, could have 
been initiated, in the Maghrebian countries since their 
access to independence, as well as other Arab countries. 
But, in these different countries, ideology in general and 
its relation to the language issue in particular has shaped 
language planning. The language question has been used as a 
means of political or/and religious legitimacy rather than a 
subject of scientific inquiry. 
Thus, the modernisation of the Arabic language, 
as a pressing issue, will have the following major positive 
effects: 
- once modernised the Arabic language will help recover a 
much desired national cultural identity, based on the 
Arabo-Islamic heritage. 
- bridging the gap between the Classical and Spoken 
languages will strengthen national unity and identity and 
produce a richer culture through this symbiosis: 
Diaglossia itself can be a source 
of creativity within a given language 
once the two versions of the language 
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begin to be bridged. Then, and only 
then, would the language as a whole 
acquire different levels of meaning 
and a range of nuances not otherwise 
available in any one version. 
(69) 
- it will become a more efficient instrument in achieving 
national progress, and hence becomes more viable and 
competitive in relation to other languages. 
- it will have an important bearing on education as an 
efficient medium of instruction. The educational 
task will be facilitated as the teaching and learning 
processes will be carried out in a language easily 
grasped by all, as it will embody elements and expressions 
of the Spoken language. 
- once it is able to convey scientifc and technological 
knowledge, it will reduce dependence on the French 
language and the related problems of importing a foreign 
language. 
The modernisation of the Arabic language could be 
presented as the most viable solution to the language 
problem in Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian countries. 
-402- 
However, there are a number of constraints and 
obstacles to this which have hampered the process of 
modernisation of this language. The major obstacle is 
related to attitudes towards this language. The Arabic 
language, as the expression of Islam and its Holy book has 
given it a certain prestige and sanctity among the Arab and 
Muslim community. Hence it was maintained untouched as 
attempts to change it have been regarded as prejudicial to 
the purity of the language. This mythic view of the language 
on the one hand, and on the other hand the important role 
this language played as a language of civilization, culture, 
and science in the past are used as major arguments by the 
classicists for its maintenance in its traditional form. To 
modernise it, efficiently, implies, as suggested above, 
dramatic changes in the orthography, grammar, and 
vocabulary. This, according to the classicists will affect 
the purity of the language and the ultimately whole of 
Arabo-Islamic thought and civilization. 
It has been, in fact, the roe of the Arab 
Academies to undertake the process of moderinsing the Arabic 
language. But their number hides the diversity and lack of 
consensus about principles and means and ways of bringing 
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about this modernisation. There are at least four Academies: 
the Syrian, established in 1918-1919, the Egyptian in 1932, 
the Iraqi in 1947(70). The most recently established is the 
Algerian in 1986. These Academies each produce an official 
journal and other publications related to contemporary 
Arabic linguistic, cultural, and educational problems. Their 
work mostly stresses the 'glorious past' of the Arabic 
language and literature. The Academies leaders resist any 
influences from the Colloquials and loan words from 
abroad(71). The Egyptian Academy stands out as an exception. 
Real efforts have been made to modernise the Arabic language 
and adapt it to modern thought and practice(72). However, in 
general these attempts and others are strongly resisted by 
the classicists who control these Academies. 
There has been, since the Second World War, 
increasing pressure from the young generation of 
intellectuals either to standardize the Colloquials or 
bridge the gap between the two varieties. But this was 
constantly resisted. The Colloquials, in the different parts 
of the Arab world, are seen by these tradtionalist 
Academecians as corrupt, and corrupting, versions of 
Classical Arabic. The preference is for the expansion of the 
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Classical language through formal education. In this context 
the general aims of the Damas Academy, for instance, are 
significant: 
... To protect and preserw, the Arabic 
language against the dangers threatening 
it, particularly against the dialect 
phenomenon of which the immediate 
consequences are manifest in the violation 
of the integrity of the language and its 
foundations... 
(73) 
Thus, there has been a deliLerate policy of 
maintaining the Arabic language in its present undeveloped 
form, by 'specialists' and by politicians of the different 
Arab countries, including those of the Maghreb. The process 
of modernisation of the Arabic language would require a 
change of approach in political terms. It also requires the 
allocation of human and material resources. 
Consequently this solution, though attractive is 
costly in time and resources. Hence the need to look for 
another alternative solution to the language problem, in the 
Algerian context particularly. This alternative is that of 
an Arabic French bilingualism. 
C. Arabic-French Bilingualism. 
The purpose of this alternative approach to 
language planning is to propose an immediate solution, 
principally in education, in order to achieve the desired 
objectives of national identity and modernisation. As an 
immediate solution, bilingualism, in the Algerian context, 
will solve the language problems faced with the present 
language policy, especially in education. 
The main arguments are that there is, firstly, a 
de-facto situation of Arabic-French bilingualism in 
Algerian society at all levels of national activities. 
However, this bilingualism is endured rather than 
welcomed(74). Furthermore, because the policy is not 
officially stated, its implementation is disorganised and 
inefficiently planned. Secondly, the pressing need to hasten 
the process of modernisation and the increasing 
internationalisation of world relations, require the use of 
a language of wide communication such as French. Thirdly, 
the Arabic language, in its present condition, cannot fulfil 
the major aims given to it in the area of modern scientific 
and technological knowledge and activities. 
A planned and well organised bilingualism will 
involve, above all, a specification of the objectives to be 
achieved and the roles to be attributed to each language. 
This will facilitate the processes of its adoption by the 
society at large as well as by those concerned with its 
implementation. 
The role of the Arabic language will be to 
maintain and preserve the national cultural identity, 
largely drawn from the Arabo-Islamic tradition, and 
reinforce national unity. The role of the French language 
will be principally that of a means of access to modern 
scientific and technological knowledge. The Arabic language 
will facilitate and strengthen relations and interractions 
with the Arab and Islamic countries, while French will 
facilitate and strengthen relations and interractions with 
the rest of the world. Consequently, through these two 
languages, a broader international integration could be 
achieved. 
The institutionalisation of a functional 
bilingualism means the adoption of a clearly defined policy 
and its insertion into educational planning with 
legislative, economic, and educational provisions. The 
necessary means for the implementation and diffusion of this 
policy and its possible consequences for the social and 
educational sectors should be rigorously assessed. This 
language policy would necessarily involve an option for a 
specific form of bilingualism in terms of practical steps, 
especially at the level of implementation. It might be 
useful to look at policies of bilingualism, mainly bilingual 
education, in other contexts and draw relevant examples in 
the planning of a bilingual education and try to adapt it to 
the Algerian context. 
Studies of bilingualism, in countries such as the 
United States of America, Canada, the U.S.S.R, Belgium, 
Suitzerland and others, often concentrate on the analysis of 
the roles and relationships of the languages involved in 
education. The choice of the role attributed to each 
language bears on the type of bilingualism to be adopted 
particularly whether it is a 'transtion-oriented' or 
'maintenance oriented'(75). In the former the mother tongue 
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is used for a determined period in the educational system, 
along with the major language. The main objective of this 
type of bilingualism is to unable the child to adjust to the 
learning process through the use of the medium most familiar 
to him. In the United States, for instance, English is 
introduced gradually, but increasingly to become the major 
medium of instruction in the secondary cycle, while the 
mother tongue (Spanish, Portuguese, or Italian) is taught in 
the primary cycle of education. The ultimate aim of such a 
language policy is to move from a bilingual situation to a 
monolingual one on the basis of a unifying national language 
(English). Hence, as a set of practices, bilingualism in the 
United States is only transitional. 
In 'maintenance oriented' b!.lingualism there is 
a stable and balanced distribution of the two languages in 
the curriculum and throughout the three cycles of the 
educational system. This type of bilingualism aims at 
maintaining the two (or more) languages in the society 
concerned, that is opting for a bilingual (or multilingual) 
type of society as is the case in Canada, Belgium, 
Switzerland, the U.S.S.R and so on. 
In the specific case of Arabic-French 
bilingualism in Algeria, a combination of these two 
approaches can be applied. A transition-oriented 
bilingualism would involve the Arabic language, as the 
mother tongue, as the first and major medium of instruction 
in the first years of the primary cycle; the French language 
will be introduced in this cycle from the second or the 
third year. Both languages, Arabic and French, are given a 
balanced and even distribution from the secondary cycle 
principally. 
The purpose of such an approach is to achieve a 
relatively equal mastery of the basic skills of the two 
languages. In this context, teaching material, syllabuses, 
teaching methods, must be provided for in both languages. 
Translation would be here of crucial importance. In terms of 
time-tables, the "concurrent approach" used in some 
American bilingual programmes can be adopted(76). This means 
a 'balanced' time allocation in the use of the two languages 
should be applied for all subjects of the curriculum. 
Consequently, the profeciency of the pupil in the two 
languages will be more easily achieved as he is socialised 
into recognising, and separating, the grammatical structures 
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and language characteristics. This will enable him to avoid 
language interferences occuring in the case of second 
language learning with a limited time and subject 
allocation(77). The mastery of these linguistic skills will 
better prepare the pupil for higher education where the 
distribution of the two languages becomes functional: each 
will be used for specific subjects and specialisation. 
The major argument for this form of bilingualism 
consists in achieving a "balanced and coordinated" knowledge 
of both languages(78), that is a well organised and equal 
knowledge of the two languages. This will affect social 
attitudes towards the Arabic language as it becomes 
functionally equal to the French language at the national 
level. 
However, the achievement of this objective of a 
balanced competence in the two languages depends on the 
assumption that they have both reached a similar level of 
development. If this was the case, would make the need for 
bilingualism absolete because, if the Arabic language 
achieves a level of development similar to that of French, 
it will fulfill the functions requiring the use of French. 
The two languages will then become "functionally 
redundent"(79). Consequently the maintenance of an 
Arabic-French bilingualism will become unjustified. 
But, in the Algerian context, because of the equal 
emphasis on national identity and modernisation, both Arabic 
and French languages are needed at the present time. Hence 
the adoption bilingualism of would be useful as an immediate 
solution, at least for a transitory period, until the Arabic 
language is modernised and adapted to the requirement of 
modern times. 
Bilingualism has become a major concern in most 
parts of the world; but it has remained a complex and 
controversial issue. As an increasingly worldwide 
phenomenon, bilingualism has been a privileged theme of 
research, especially since World War Two, yielding an 
impressive array of literature(80). 
Early studies on bilingualism, before the 1940s, 
were mostly undertaken by psychologists and 
educationalists(81). These studies concentrated on the 
psychological and intellectual development of the individual 
and his adaptation to his social environment. It was 
asserted that psychological and educational problems were 
-413- 
noted in bilingual children(82). However, interest in 
bilingualism, especially in education, has risen since 1945 
as a consequence of the development of international 
relations and the expansion of communication means and 
networks(83). The emergence of some strong and widespread 
languages, mainly English, French, Russian, and Spanish, as 
languages of 'wider communication', has largely contributed 
to the expansion of bilingualism and fostered further 
intellectual interest in the subject. The establishment of 
new political entities, with heterogeneous cultural and 
linguistic populations, has also contributed to the 
development of this phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, an emphasis on the negative 
effects of bilingualism continued to predominate in the 
literature. Bilingualism was perceived as the cause of the 
low scores of intelligence tests produced by bilinguals as 
compared to their monolingual contreparts. Psychological 
disturbances and afflictions, such as mental alienation and 
even schizophrenia, are attributed to bilingualism. Haugen 
Einar introduced in 1962 a new 'ailment.' resulting from the 
individual's exposure to two, or more, languages, called 
"schizoglossia". It refers to: 
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... the conflict which arises within the 
individual speaker when he becomes 
uncertain as to what he ought to say and 
write because the linguistic item is 
presented to him in more than one way. 
(84) 
These 'disruptive' effects of bilingualism were 
reviewed by linguists who were concerned with the lingustic 
proficiency of the bilingual and the interference and 
confusion arising between the two languages used. The 
linguists claimed that the individual's language learning 
ability is divided between two languages and consequently 
his linguistic performance will be limited. The structures 
of the languages themselves are altered as components of one 
of the languages is often introduced in the other(85). 
Sociologists have underlined another aspect of the 
'negative' effects of bilingualism. It was seen as an 
obstacle to social integration, social equality, and 
national cultural development(86). These 'traditional' 
attitudes towards bilingualism and its drawbacks which still 
prevail in an important number of recent: researches, have 
largely influenced language and educaticn planners in their 
position to bilingualism. 
However, 1960s research, initiated mainly by 
Elizabeth Pearl and Lambert Wallace questioned the validity 
of these findings about the negative effects of 
bilingualism(87). Their main argument was that the earlier 
theories on bilingualism failed to take into account 
essential factors, such as the social crass background and 
educational opportunities of the bilinguals who were 
investigated. This new approach, based on the socio-cultural 
context of the groups investigated, achieved radically 
different results from the previous ones. It showed that the 
linguistic, intellectual, and educational performances of 
bilinguals was much higher than that of their monolingual 
peers(88). 
The work of Pearl and Lambert marked a new trend 
in the research about bilingualism and :.ts effects on the 
individual and the society. Most of the subsequent studies, 
characterized by a plurisciplinary approach and based on 
contextual variables, produced findings favouring 
bilingualism. The results showed that bilingual children 
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gained high scores on measures of cognitive flexibility 
'diversified structure of intelligence', creativity, and 
mental development(89). The stress of these studies 
continued to be the socio-cultural context in analysing the 
effects of bilingualism(90). These new approaches, 
emphasizing the advantages of bilingualism, may justify its 
adoption. 
In the case of the Maghreb in general and Algeria 
in particular, and in addition to the advocated general 
advantages of bilingualism, Arabic-French bilingualism is 
justified in this thesis by the following major arguments: 
- the strategic geographic position of the country as 
a link between the Arab and Western worlds. 
- the historical impact of the French language, along 
with the Arabic, has meant that they have become integral 
parts of the socio-cultural and linguistic characteristics 
of the society. 
- the process of nation-building and development, based 
essentially on Western thought and practice, requires 
the use of the French language, whereas the Arabic 
language is the expression and symbol of the 
Arabo-Islamic national cultural identity. 
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- the linguistic and cultural contacts of the two 
languages will constitute a source of a cultural 
enrichment and progress for the society. 
- in the process of modernisation, the use of the two 
languages will part of the necessary internal and 
external adaptations. 
However, there are some important constraints and 
obstacles to be considered when planning this policy of 
Arabic-French bilingualism in Algeria. 
The major obstacle is political, since the 
language issue has been raised in political terms. The 
adoption of Arabic as the official national language has 
been used as a means for political-power legitimacy and a 
reaction against the former colonial power. Hence there will 
be a need for other means of political legitimacy (such as a 
more democratic system and efficient policies); and a new 
approach to the French language, which will have to be 
viewed as an asset rather than an instrument of foreign 
domination. 
The second obstacle is economic. The maintenance 
of two languages will necessitate important investments, 
especially in education. This will increase the financial 
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pressures on this developing nation. Financial provision 
could be obtained from the joint contribution of the state 
and private capital. 
The third obstacle is socio-cultural. The French 
language is not, first of all, the mother tongue of any 
social group in this country. Consequently,it more difficult 
to legitimate, compared with Canada or E,elgium, for example, 
where each of the two languages is the rother tongue of a 
proportion of the population. 
Modernisation, and access to the 
international community are perhaps the main possible 
sources of legitimation 
The option for bilingualism as an immediate 
solution for the language question in Algeria is not an end 
in itself but a transitional solution tcwards a new 
linguistic situation, until Arabic is modernised and 
developed. Arabic-French bilingualism appears to be the most 
practical answer to the current language issue, while the 
Arabic language is developed and modernised and the local 
dialects are promoted. Then the Arabic language, as an 
operational language, will be used as the unifying national 
language. The Colloquials will also be able to find a place 
in the society which uses French language as the main second 
language for international integration. 
However, excessive optimism should not be attached 
to these proposed solutions. It has finally to be stressed 
that a very great deal depends on political developments. At 
the time of writing, with the success of traditionalists in 
the Algerian local elections, the complex interrelationship 
between politics, economics, culture, schooling and language 
policy is likely to continue to change, in scale, and at 
multiple levels(91). The future of the language issue in the 
Maghreb is not simplistically predictable. 
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